Notes On Greek of Romans I.

B. W. Newton

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

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Notes, expository of the Greek of the first chapter of the Romans with remarks on the force of certain

NOTES

EXPOSITORY OF THE GREEK OF THE

First Chapter of the Romans.

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NOTES

EXPOSITORY OF THE GREEK

OF THE

First Chapter of the Romans;

WITH

REMARKS ON THE FORCE OF CERTAIN SYNONYMS, ETC.

BY

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LONDON:

HOULSTON AND STONEMAN,

65, PATERNOSTER ROW.

1856.

2665
.N49
1856

HUNT AND ELLIOTT, PRINTERS, TITCHBORNE STREET,
EDGWARE ROAD.

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE following notes were written, with the intention of appending them to some observations I have lately published, on the First and Second Chapters of the Romans.[1] Finding however that the remarks on certain Greek words, &c., were enlarged to an extent that seemed unsuited to a work designed for general circulation, I determined to print in the pamphlet referred to, such only of the notes as appeared adapted to the general reader, and to publish enlarged notes subsequently, in a separate form. This I have now done.

Although in what I have said respecting the force of certain prepositions, synonyms, &c., I have sought to avoid advancing anything except

[1] *See advertisement at close.*

what appears capable of being easily sustained, yet I wish my remarks on such subjects to be regarded as *suggestive* merely. I am well aware that there is abundant room for elucidation and enlargement; and shall be thankful for any hints that may be supplied by any who are interested in these subjects—that is to say, from any who really desire the βεβαιωσις of the Gospel of the GRACE of God.

The Scripture, it must be remembered, distinctly asserts its own VERBAL INSPIRATION. The Apostle Paul expressly says that he wrote in "words taught of the Holy Ghost—ΛΟΓΟΙΣ ΔΙΔΑΚΤΟΙΣ ΠΝΕΥΜΑΤΟΣ ΑΓΙΟΥ." And the words, "Wherefore as the Holy Ghost saith," (Heb. iii 7,) and, "Whereof the Holy Ghost also is a witness to us," (Heb. x. 15,) are immediately followed by citations from the Psalms and from Jeremiah. What then can be more important than precision in the interpretation of the words of Scripture? Accuracy is valuable always; but in the interpretation of

Scripture, it is a duty. It is the more important now, when the temper of the day, disliking the restriction of definite truth, is disposed not to repress, but to encourage, the many attempts made to introduce laxity and uncertainty into the exposition of the Word of God.

70, *Finchley New Road, London.*
May 20th, 1856.

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CORRIGENDA.

It is especially requested that the errata *marked with an asterisk* in the subjoined list should be noted; since the error in these cases affects the sense. The lines are counted from the top of the page.

Page 21, line last in note; for αμαρτιας, read ἁμαρτιας.

*Page 23, line 25; for *distinguishing*, read *contrasting*.

Page 24 (note); for *alind*, read *aliud*

*Page 34, line 4; for καταρτισμος, read καταρτισις.

Page 37, line 27; for *apease*, read *appease*.

Page 40, line 22; for εαυτου, read ἑαυτου.

Page 40, line 23; for αμαρτιων, read ἁμαρτιων.

Page 89, lines 7 and 8; for καιρω, read καιρῳ; and for εως, read ἑως.

Page 90, line 5; for *foretel* read *foretell*.

*Page 92, line 13; for *that* read *than*.

Notes Critical and Expository

ON THE FIRST CHAPTER OF THE EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS.

Verse 1.

Paul, a servant of Jesus Christ, called to be an Apostle, separated unto the Gospel of God.

A Servant.] Literally, *a bond-servant* or *slave*—δουλος. The thought of purchase is, I suppose, intended; as well as that of eternal possession by Him who has bought His believing people by His own blood. To be the property of an earthly master may be one of the greatest of curses; but to be the purchased inalienable possession of God and of Christ, and to have the sure title of serving them for ever, is everlasting blessing. When God is brought into the relationship, a word, for the most part, terrible on earth, is changed into a name of joy and honour. Thus it is applied even to the saints in glory, for when the Heavenly City is described in the Revelation, it is said, "The Throne of God and of the Lamb shall be in it, and His servants (δουλοι) shall serve Him." (Rev. xxii. 3.)

Among the ordinances of Israel, we find permission granted to the servant, to make himself, if he so pleased, a bond-servant for ever. "If the servant shall plainly say, I love my master, my wife and my children; I will not go out free: then, his master shall bring him unto the judges . . . . . and he shall serve him for ever." (Exodus xxi. 5.)

The Apostle sometimes terms himself δουλος; sometimes ὑπηρετης; sometimes διακονος.

The first, δουλος, from δεω, *to bind*, is used when the Apostle wishes to speak of himself as not being his own, but as being the property of Him whom he served. "Ye are not your own, ye are bought with a price." He who owns himself to be a δουλος, does thereby recognise the corresponding relation of Δεσποτης.

The second, ὑπηρετης (from ὑπο and ερεσσω, to row or serve at the oar in subjection to another) is an official word, applied to the official attendants of kings or judges. It implies *a subordinate official*, and in the New Testament is continually used in this sense. Thus, Matt. v., "Lest the judge deliver thee to the officer"—τῳ ὑπηρετῃ. And in John xviii. 18, we read, not only of the servants (οἱ δουλοι) but of *the apparitors* or *officers* (οἱ ὑπηρεται) of the High Priest. It was one of the "servants" whose ear Jesus healed; but he by whom he was smitten was one of the "officers." (See John xviii. 22.) When the Apostle wished to direct the mind of the Corinthians to the fact of his being officially commissioned by One, to whom, and to whom alone, in virtue of such commission, he was subject and responsible, he uses the word ὑπηρετης. "Let a man so account of us ὡς

ὑπηρετας Χριστου." As the ὑπηρετης of Christ, he was appointed to *serve* them, but not to be under their control. Christ was his master, not they.

The third, διακονος, is used when attention is directed towards the servant as actively engaged in the duties of his ministration, especially when the subject of ministration or the persons ministered to are made prominent. Thus St. Paul was a δουλος of God, who having received a commission from and under Christ (ὑπηρετης Χριστου) was openly and actively engaged in service as διακονος καινης διαθηκης. (See 2 Cor. iii. 6.) In the use of these and such like synonymes, we must not expect to find antagonistic contrast or opposition. They are merely used to place the same person or thing in various *aspects*. The same may be said of types and parables in which the same subject is variously pourtrayed and illustrated, according as it may be intended to give to this or that aspect peculiar prominence.[1]

Θεραπων is a word which is also rendered "servant" in our version, occurring however only once. It is a word of more honourable signification than δουλος, and is never used by the Apostle of himself. In ordinary Greek, especially in that of the earlier ages, it denoted one who was the companion, rather than the servant, of the monarch or chief whom he served. Thus Patroclus

[1] The etymology which some have given of διακονος, viz. δια, *through*, and κονις, *dust*, is fanciful, and is refuted by the quantity of the word, the *a* in διᾱκονος being long. Its derivation is probably from an obsolete verb διακω or διηκω, *to run, hasten;* whence also διωκω. (See *Scott* and *Liddell*, *Buttman's Lexill.*, and *Trench's Synonymes.)*

is called the θεραπων of Achilles; and charioteers and armour-bearers (both honourable offices) were called the θεραποντες of those whom they accompanied. Kings also were called θεραποντες of Jupiter; warriors θεραποντες of Mars; and poets of the Muses. The thought intended to be conveyed by these expressions, is, not that Jupiter and Mars had kings and warriors as servants under them employed in ministration to others; but rather that Jupiter and Mars had kings and warriors attached to them as persons to whom those deities were indebted for the gifts, service, and worship which they were supposed to receive at their hands. Such was the degrading thought which the Gentiles connected with the worship of their deities; and to this the Apostle distinctly refers in his address to the Athenians—"God who made the world and all things that are therein, He being Lord of Heaven and of earth, dwelleth not in temples made with hands; neither is ministered to (θεραπευεται) by the hands of men, as though He needed any thing, seeing that He himself is the giver to all of life, and breath, and all things." It is probably in order to avoid the thought which the Greeks connected with θεραπων, that we never find the expression θεραπων Θεου used by the inspired writers, though it occurs frequently in the Septuagint.

The only place in which it is used in the New Testament is Heb. iii. 5—where it is said that "Moses was faithful in all his house as a servant or minister." (θεραπων) Here however the θεραπεια of Moses is regarded as used by God towards others over whom Moses was appointed; but God is not spoken of as the subject of it. The word indicates a kindly and pro-

tecting care or service, such as is required by weakness and need, but is not capable of being directed toward God; because, as the Apostle says, "he needeth nothing." It is the part of God, in His goodness, to extend through His servants such kindly care towards His creatures, and they (His servants) derive their name of θεραποντες, partly from the fact of their being made the channels through which such kindly care is communicated, and partly because they are regarded as attending on Him from whom it flows—attending on Him in the same honourable sense in which a minister of state waits on his sovereign to receive his instructions, and sedulously to carry them into effect. He who failed in such sedulousness and attention would prove himself unworthy of the name of θεραπων. Moses, therefore, being first a δουλος (see Rev. xv. 3.); and a ὑπηρετης, as officially employed under God; and a διακονος, as actually engaged in the ministration of the first Testament, was also a θεραπων, one appointed as a confidential servant or minister, to attend to and watch over the house over which God set him; and he proved himself worthy of the name, for he was "faithful."

Οικετης is another word translated "servant." It properly means a household servant or domestic, one who dwells under the same roof as his master. "No servant (οικετης) can serve two masters"—full force being given to the statement by the thought of two masters claiming authority in the same house, and claiming to be served by the same domestic. Again, "who art thou that judgest another man's servant"—οικετην, *i.e.*, the member of another's family into which thou canst have no title to intrude. The only other

passages in which this word occurs are, Acts x. 7—"He called two of his household servants;" and 1 Peter ii. 18—"Servants (domestics) be subject to your masters." A δουλος might or might not be οικετης. A ὑπηρετης was too official to be called an οικετης — a θεραπων too honourable.

A called Apostle.] κλητος Ἀποστολος, *i.e.*, an Apostle duly called and installed into his office by God, as opposed to one *self-constituted.* An Apostle by Divine vocation. (For further remarks on the word κλητος see note on verse 7.)

I need scarcely say that "Apostle" is here used in its full official sense, as in Luke vi. 13, where it is said, that the Lord selected twelve out of His disciples, "whom also He named Apostles." See also 2 Cor. xii. 12, where St. Paul speaks of his having "the signs of an Apostle." There were *twelve* Apostles whose labours were peculiarly directed towards the circumcision, (Matthias having been elected into the place of Judas), and *two* Apostles whose labours were directed towards the Gentiles, viz., Paul and Barnabas.

The Apostles were enabled to perform especial miracles in attestation of their mission as Apostles, and could speak and write to the churches with the authority of God; but with them Divine legislation ceased. Few things can be of greater moment than to remember that, in their peculiar office, the Apostles had *no successors.* Since they were removed, there have been none who have had authority either to write Scripture, or to sanction as Scripture that which others may have written, as when St. Paul quoted as Scripture the Gospel of Luke.

See 1 Tim. v. 18, "*For the Scripture saith* . . . . The labourer is worthy of his hire"—words quoted from Luke x. 7.[1]

Sometimes the word "Apostle" is used in its ordinary non-official sense, meaning simply a person sent by another on some special mission. It is twice used

[1] Strenuous efforts are now being made, especially by writers of the "Broad Church" party, to lower the authority of the Apostles.

It has been argued—"The early Church was not perfect; witness the condition of those at Corinth and in Galatia. The Apostles were a part of the Church. How then can we esteem them perfect?"—an unworthy and sophistical argument; for although the Apostles were, in one sense, a part of the Church, yet *officially* they were distinct from the rest of the Church which they were empowered to teach and to govern with the infallible authority of God—their claim to do this being sustained by miracles.

Again, it has been said, the Apostles in their private walk could err. No doubt they could: but their *private* walk is not their *official* one; Peter erred at Antioch, but he did not pretend to be commanded by the Lord to do what he did. How carefully the Apostles drew a line of distinction between things that they said authoritatively, and things that they said *not* authoritatively, may be seen 1 Cor. vii. 12: where certain verses are expressly marked by the Apostle as not having the same authority as the rest of the Epistle. But of all besides these verses, the Apostle says, "If any man think himself to be a Prophet or spiritual, let him acknowledge that the things that I write unto you are the commandments of the Lord." St. Peter expressly calls the Epistles of Paul "Scripture"; and of all "Scripture" it is said that "IT CANNOT BE BROKEN." By God enabling the Apostles to work miracles in attestation of the truth of what they *authoritatively* said, it was proved; for God could not attest a lie.

thus in the New Testament, viz., in 2 Cor. viii. 23, and in Phil. ii. 25.

Αγγελος, *a messenger*, is not a word of the same dignity as αποστολος, inasmuch as it is continually employed to indicate one who announces tidings merely, or bears a message as a herald might do; whereas αποστολος would be used only of a person who is sent as a legate or ambassador, instructed as to the mind and intentions of the person who has sent him, and being in a certain sense his representative. The word Αποστολος is once applied to the Lord Jesus, as commissioned of God (see Heb. iii. 1—such commission being referred to by the Lord Jesus, when He said, "As thou hast *sent* (απεστειλας) me into the world, even so have I sent them into the world."

Every αποστολος is an αγγελος; but every αγγελος is not an αποστολος. John the Baptist is termed an αγγελος (see Luke vii. 27); but never an αποστολος. That was too high an *official* description for one who was indeed the honoured precursor, but not the preacher of "the great salvation," "which at the first BEGAN to be spoken by the Lord and was confirmed unto us by them that heard Him." *Dispensationally and ministerially*, John was not "in the kingdom of Heaven." Therefore it is said, "the least in the kingdom of Heaven is greater than he." He was however in the kingdom of Heaven *in its eternal sense*, (see Matt. viii. 11) though not in it as an economy here. As a minister he stood between Moses and the dispensation of grace introduced by the Lord.

Separated.] Αφωρισμενος from αφοριζω, *to limit off by*

a line or boundary—hence, *to separate*. Separation was a familiar thought to every Jew. Israel was as a whole a separated people; and within Israel itself there were many lesser circles of separation. Thus the Levites were separated; the Nazarite was separated; and afterward (though not by the commandment of God) the Pharisee was separated—the name Pharisee being derived from פרש, which means, *to separate*. Thoughts which were of hallowed meaning among the Jews were purposely embodied by the Apostles in their expressions, and used in fresh applications. St. Paul had not ceased to value true separation, because he had renounced the separation of the mere ritual Jew. He was still a "separated one"—separated, and that by God himself unto His gospel.

The separation here spoken of attached equally to all the other Apostles. Indeed, in a general sense, it attaches to every Evangelist ordained of God. It must not therefore be confused with another more peculiar separation, which is spoken of in the Acts, as attaching to the Apostles Paul and Barnabas, from the moment when, at Antioch, they were specially detached from all fixed local connexion with any particular Church or Churches, and were sent out to spread the Gospel in the wide Gentile world. That such is the meaning of separate as used in Acts xiii. 2, is shewn by the passage itself; for after commandment had been given by the Holy Ghost to separate Paul and Barnabas, that commandment was fulfilled by those to whom it was addressed, by their sending those two Apostles away. "As they ministered unto the Lord and fasted, the Holy Ghost said, Separate me then (*αφορισατε δη μοι*)

Barnabas and Saul for the work whereunto I have called them. And when they had fasted and prayed, and laid their hands on them, THEY SENT THEM AWAY" (απελυσαν). Their special separation, therefore, consisted in being thus "*sent away.*" In this sense James, who presided over the Church in Jerusalem and remained located in Jerusalem, was not separated.

It should be observed, that the insertion of the word "then" or therefore (δη) in the passage before us, "Separate me *then*," shews the subject of their previous supplication to have been concerning the promulgation of the Gospel, in remembrance probably of that commandment—"Pray ye therefore the Lord of the harvest, that he would send forth labourers into his harvest." It is as if God had said, I have heard your supplication, "Separate me *then*," &c. Our translation omits this word altogether. Δη is frequently used as a particle "marking sequence, without distinct reference to time, though arising from it—'*then*,' ει χρη μαθειν σε, παντα δη φωνειν χρεων: and so in summing up numbers γιγνονται δη οὑτοι χιλιοι—these *then* make up a thousand—hence to resume what has gone before, like Latin *igitur*." (See *Scott* and *Liddell.*) Διελθωμεν δη ἑως Βηθανιας. (Luke ii. 15.) "Let us go then to Bethany."

Gospel of God.] This expression should be noted. The Apostles continually speak of the Gospel, as the "Gospel *of God;*" for it was God who sent His only begotten Son—it was God who gave that Son unto death—it is God who is now engaged in the ministry of reconciliation, preaching peace through Jesus Christ. Thus

God *testifying of Jesus*, becomes the ultimate object of saving faith. Accordingly, St. Peter, speaking of believers, says, "who through Him (Jesus) do believe in God, that raised Him up from the dead, and gave Him glory; that your faith and hope might be in God." Sometimes the gospel has been preached in a way that hides this manifestation of the love of God, and represents Him as if hard to be appeased and with difficulty prevailed on, through Christ's intercession, to shew mercy. Such a mode of preaching the gospel entirely nullifies the expression, "Gospel of God," as well as every other passage that speaks of God as having Himself provided the reconciliation. It is most true, indeed, that His justice demanded expiation. The maintenance of the holiness of the Divine government required atonement, and *that by vicarious death*, but God's own love provided that atonement, thus fulfilling that early expression of Abraham's confidence, "My son, God will provide Himself a lamb for a burnt-offering." Hence that covenant name "Jehovah Jireh"—*the Lord will provide.*

Verse 2.

Which He afore promised by His Prophets in the Holy Scriptures, &c.

Which He afore promised.] These words sufficiently refute a dangerous doctrine which has been lately pro-

mulgated by some, who have taught that the Gospel *as preached by St. Paul* was something so peculiar and so new, that it was not and could not have been the subject of any definite statement, or promise, in the Old Testament.

Can there be a clearer intimation of forgiveness of all believers through the vicarious sufferings of a substitute than that contained in the 53rd chapter of Isaiah? "He was wounded for our transgressions, and bruised for our iniquities, and by His stripes we are healed." Is not the union of believers with their risen Lord distinctly taught in the 26th chapter of the same Prophet, where the saints who have died in Israel are spoken of as His "dead body," *i.e.*, His mystical body, and as such it is said "they shall arise"? "Thy dead men shall live—my dead body shall they arise. Awake and sing, ye that dwell in dust: for thy dew is as the dew of herbs, and the earth shall cast out the dead." Are we not also continually accustomed to appeal to those well-known words, "The Lord our righteousness," (Jer. xxiii. 6.) as teaching us that Christ is the righteousness of all them that believe? Are not these the very same truths that St. Paul was commissioned to unfold?

It is true indeed that for the Gospel and its resulting blessings to be prophetically announced, is a very different thing from its being so ministered as to be explained and applied. The Gospel was prophetically announced by Isaiah; but Isaiah was not sent, as the Apostles were, to preach it. In this he differed from Philip, who was sent to preach it; but Philip preached it, be it remembered, from Isaiah's predictions—"beginning at the same Scripture, he preached unto him

(the Eunuch) Jesus." (Acts viii.) The Gospel, although stated in the Prophets, was necessarily "kept silent" (to use the expression of St. Paul) until the Law had run its course—for how could grace be preached under a dispensation of Law? But as soon as the time came for the full ministration of grace to begin, then it was "kept in silence" no longer, but was "manifested," and by means of the prophetic Scriptures "made known." Read the words of St. Paul himself, in the last chapter of this Epistle—"Now to Him that is able to stablish you according to my Gospel, and the preaching of Jesus Christ, according to the revelation of the mystery kept silent (σεσιγημενου) since the world began, but now made manifest, and by means of the prophetic Scriptures . . . . . made known, &c. (δια τε Γραφων Προφητικων γνωρισθεντος) How could that be made known by means of the prophetic Scriptures, which was not in them? Or how, if the truths respecting Christ were not announced in the Old Testament, could the Apostle Peter have said that the Prophets prophesied of the grace now brought unto us? οἱ περι της εις ὑμας χαριτος προφητευσαντες. Or, how could the Apostle Paul have said that the Gospel which he preached was "borne witness to by the Law and the Prophets?" (Rom. iii. 21.)

Some have asked whether the expression "my Gospel," used by St. Paul, does not imply that he had a peculiar gospel different from that of the other Apostles; but it might as well be asked whether the words "my God," used in the 8th verse, do not imply a peculiarity of relationship to God, different from that of other believers.

That which had *most* the character of a new revelation

in St. Paul's ministry, was his being commissioned to declare that believing Gentiles were to be admitted into full fellowship of heavenly blessing with Israel: but even this was not peculiar to the ministration of St. Paul, for he expressly mentions the other Apostles as sharing it with him. When speaking of the dispensation of the grace of God which had been given him towards the Gentiles, he adds, "which in other ages was not made known unto the sons of men, as it is now revealed unto His holy Apostles and Prophets by the Spirit, that the Gentiles should be fellow-heirs," &c.

It must be remembered too, that even though the Law and the Prophets testified to the Gospel of the grace of God as something *future*, and although the servants of God after Sinai were dispensationally placed under the Law, and therefore the *ostensible* dealings of God with them in the earth were, according to Law, and not according to grace, yet that still, all who were "of faith" were, as to all their heavenly and everlasting blessings, not under law, but under that covenant of grace which God made with Abraham four hundred years *before* the Law, and which therefore could not be disannulled by the Law. Thus Moses, being, as regarded his earthly relation to Israel, under Law, was judged according to its strictness, and was not allowed to enter the promised Land. If his heavenly inheritance had been held on the same tenure he would have lost that also. But it was not. As to that, he was under the covenant of *grace*, and therefore on the Mount of Transfiguration we find him standing by the side of the Lord, his Redeemer, bright in the excellency of the like glory.

We now are so accustomed to think of the Gentiles

as "fellow-heirs" with Israel, that we marvel that any doubt should have been raised on such a question. But we must remember that although in all blessings that are *spiritual, heavenly,* and *everlasting,* there ever has been, and ever will be, strict fellowship between believing Gentiles and believing Jews, yet that in the national order to be established in the millennium, marked precedence will be granted to Israel. "To thee shall it come, even the FIRST DOMINION; the kingdom shall come to the daughter of Jerusalem." (Micah iv. 8.) The supremacy thus to be granted during the millennium to Israel in Jerusalem, is so abundantly dwelt on in the Prophets, and is a subject made so very prominent, that it is not to be wondered at, that those who believed from among the circumcision should raise questions as to the Gentiles ever being received into any thing but a *secondary* place.

Verse 3.

Concerning His Son, who became of the seed of David according to the flesh.

Concerning His Son, who became, &c.] There are three senses in which Christ is called in Scripture the Son of God; first, in respect of His Divine and eternal Sonship, as the only begotten of the Father before all worlds. This, His eternal Sonship, is plainly taught in such texts as these: Micah v. 2—"whose goings forth

have been from of old, from everlasting": and Heb. vii. 3, where the fact of Melchisedek having no recorded genealogy in Genesis, is referred to as constituting him *typically* (not actually) an eternal person, and therefore used to foreshadow the Eternal Son. "Without father, without mother, ungenealogised (αγενεαλογητος), having neither beginning of days, nor end of life; but made like unto the Son of God," &c.—that is, made typically like to the Son in respect to His having, in Genesis, no record of beginning, nor any record of end. In Col. i. 15 also, we find the Son spoken of as πρωτοτοκος πασης κτισεως—"born before all creation."[1] The eternal sonship of the Son, like the self-existence of God, is a truth to be believed on the testimony of God, not a truth to be reasoned on. With respect to the Son it is emphatically said, "No one knoweth the Son but the Father." If we seek by the powers of our own finite understandings to grasp mysteries which God has not explained, we shall soon find ourselves lost in a labyrinth of unhallowed speculation. Arianism, the heresy against which the Nicene Creed was written, affords an awful example of this. The Nicene Creed truly says, speaking of the Son, "Light of Light, very God of very God, begotten not made, being of one substance with the Father." (ὁμουσιος) This we receive, not because our understandings grasp it, but because it is WRITTEN. We wait to understand it, in the ages to come.

[1] Not "the first-born of every creature," for that might imply that the Eternal One was a creature. Compare οτι πρωτος μου ην —"for he was before me." (John i. 15.)

Secondly, the name Son of God is applied to Christ as born in the world. Thus, the angel said to Mary His Mother, "That holy thing that shall be born of thee, shall be called the Son of God."

Thirdly, the same name is used of Him as raised from the dead, in reference to which it is said to Him, "Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee"—words quoted by St. Paul, and applied to the resurrection of the Lord. (See Acts xiii. 33.) Hence also He is called both in the Epistle to the Colossians and in the Revelation, "the first-born from the dead."

Now inasmuch as "the Gospel of God concerning His Son," is not confined merely to the birth, death, and resurrection of the Lord Jesus, but also includes testimony to the dignity of that Eternal Person who became man, I should regard the words "concerning His Son," as especially intended to direct our minds to the Son, in His eternal Sonship before He became flesh; the more so, because the next clause speaks of His having become flesh.

I say, "*become*," because the strict meaning of γιγνεσθαι is "to become," and not "to be made." In John i. 14, "The Word became flesh" (σαρξ εγενετο) is a far better rendering than "The Word was made flesh," and there should be the same alteration here—"concerning His Son *who became* of the seed of David according to the flesh," &c. Such a translation accords with the statement of His pre-existence previously made in both passages, and marks His assumption of humanity as voluntary. Γιγνομαι properly indicates the occurrence of new circumstances that existed not previously, as in the case where that which had no previous exis-

tence begins to exist; or, when that which has existed previously, enters on some new condition of being. In cases in which the new condition of being, spoken of, has been reached *by creation*, the general meaning may be sufficiently given by rendering γιγνομαι, "*to be made*"; although even then the words "*came into being*" or some such expression would more accurately represent the meaning—the object of γιγνομαι being to direct the mind, not to the means or process by which the state spoken of is reached, whether by creation, or by birth, or in any other way; but to the fact of the attainment of existence in the state spoken of. Every one would feel the impropriety of rendering Genesis i. 3. as given in LXX., by "Let there be light, and light was made," although it is quite true that light was made; but the mind is not directed in the last clause to the mode in which light was formed, but to the fact of light suddenly coming into existence out of a state of non-existence. Alteration of condition or transition from one condition to another is implied in γιγνομαι. There may be cases in which it is impossible to preserve the specific meaning of words in a translation, and then we must be content to adopt some general expression; but we should always avoid giving a generic meaning where the specific can, not only be used, but where it is more appropriate. Almost in every instance, the difference between ειναι, *to be*; ὑπαρχειν, *to subsist or to have a known and developed existence*; γιγνεσθαι, *to become—hence, to come into existence; to come to pass*; κτιζεσθαι, *to be created, and* ποιεισθαι, *to be made*, can be preserved.

Of these words, those which most nearly resemble

each other in meaning are εἶναι and ὑπάρχειν. The former is used when the attention is directed either to abstract independent existence, or, to the fact of existence rather than to the circumstances connected with that existence. The latter (ὑπάρχω) is used when not the existence merely, but the *subsistence, i.e.*, the circumstances under which the existence is held, is made the subject of regard. Thus, when it is said, "Before Abraham was I AM"; or "The Son ὁ ὢν (the Being One) in the bosom of the Father," the chief thought is abstract essential existence; and accordingly εἰμι is used. But when it is said, "who being (ὑπάρχων— subsisting) in the form of God, thought it not robbery," &c., the attention is especially directed to the circumstances connected with the existence spoken of, and that in contrast with other circumstances about to be entered into. Again when the circumstances are manifest, palpable, or recognised by the persons addressed, ὑπάρχω is used. Thus St. Paul, addressing St. Peter, says, Εἰ σὺ Ἰουδαῖος ὑπάρχων. The fact of Peter's being a Jew was patent to all who were being spoken of. It was a known and undisputed fact. But when the fact of St. Paul's condition was doubted, he says, "Men and brethren, I am (εἰμι) a Pharisee." (Acts xxiii. 6.) "I am (εἰμι) a man which am a Jew." (Acts xxi. 39.) As a general rule it may be said, that when instruction is given respecting any thing that is new, or disputed, or respecting which the persons addressed are supposed to be ignorant, εἰμι is used; but when the reverse is the case, ὑπάρχω is employed. In almost every case in which ὑπάρχω is used in the New Testament, the

words "avowedly," or "confessedly," or "plainly," or "palpably," might be added as explanatory.

[See also the use of ὑπαρχω in such passages as the following: ὑπαρχουσα ουσια: τουτων δ' ὑπαρχοντων—*His positis et constitutis*: πολλα κοινα πολλοις ὑπαρχει των ζωων, such "common properties" being not only existent, but having a displayed and recognised existence.]

According to the flesh.] These words are contrasted with those which follow, viz., "*according to the Spirit.*"

The contrast between these two expressions should be carefully noted. The first refers to that physically weak and lowly, though sinless condition of humanity, which once pertained to the Lord Jesus here (for "in all things He was made like to His brethren," sin excepted): the second refers to that glorified condition of humanity which He now has in resurrection—a condition which is no longer according to the flesh, but according to the Spirit; even His body being spiritual, and strength and glory being as essentially connected with His humanity in its present condition above, as weakness and humiliation were connected with its former condition here.[1] Thus we find in 2 Cor. xiii. 4, "For

[1] "The Son of God, the second person in the Trinity, being very and eternal God, of one substance, and equal with the Father, did, when the fulness of time was come, take upon Him man's nature, *with all the essential properties and common infirmities thereof*, yet without sin, &c."—*Confession of Church of Scotland, chapter* viii.

See also the following extract from Bishop Pearson on the Creed—Art. iv. "The Son of God took upon Him, the nature of man

though He was crucified through weakness, yet He liveth by the power of God" *και γαρ ει εσταυρωθη εξ ασθενειας αλλα ζη εκ δυναμεως Θεου.* See also 2 Cor. v., where we are told that though we once knew Christ "after or according to (*κατα*) the flesh, yet now henceforth know we Him (so) no more,"—that we know Him henceforth only in resurrection as the risen Head of the new creation of God, where every thing is altogether spiritual or "according to the Spirit," and not "according to the flesh."

Nevertheless, although now no longer "known after the flesh" the results of His having been in the flesh remain. Not only were His meritorious obedience and sufferings accomplished in the flesh, but through Mary, He became the lineal heir of the blessings to Abraham and to David (for to Abraham and to his SEED were the promises made—Gal. iii. 16.) in virtue of which

of which the body is a part; so we acknowledge that He took a true and real body . . . . . This body of Christ really and truly human, was also frail and mortal, as being accompanied with all those natural properties which necessarily flow from the condition of a frail and mortal body: and though now the same body, exalted above the highest Heavens, by virtue of its glorification, be put beyond all possibility of passion; yet in the time of His humiliation, it was clothed with no such glorious perfection, but as it was subject unto, so it felt weariness, hunger, and thirst. Nor was it only liable to those internal weaknesses and natural infirmities but to all outward injuries and violent impressions."

The condition of "glorification" here spoken of is *κατα πνευμα*; during His "humiliation" He was known *κατα σαρκα*—*εν ὁμοιωματι σαρκος ἁμαρτιας*.

heirship, He will, by and by, assume manifestly the Headship of Israel, and over all nations. This gives great *future*, as well as, past importance to the title, "Son of David." Nevertheless, when manifested in His millennial glory, He will never be known "according to the flesh" again—that is, He will never again have that *condition* of humanity which He once had, in the days of His humiliation. His earthly titles, even when He will manifestly exercise the offices which those titles indicate, will never again bring Him into a condition "according to the flesh." They are titles into which He brings the excellency of His own fulness, and raises them with Himself into His own sphere of heavenly and Divine glory. Heaven will be ever His home, though He will reign over the earth and over all things.

Verse 4.

Του ὁρισθεντος, *Son of God, in power, according to the Spirit of holiness by resurrection, &c.*

Του ὁρισθεντος.] "Declared," which is the word adopted in our version, is a very inadequate rendering of ὁρισθεις. Ὁριζω in its primitive sense, means "to mark out by a boundary line or limit," answering to the Hebrew גבל, "to bound." See Josh. xiii. 27—ὁ ιορδανης ὁριει, *(Sept.)*, and Josh. xv. 2—και τα ὁρια αυτων, ἡ θαλασσα ἡ μεγαλη ὁριει *(Sept.)* This is manifestly the sense intended in the passage before us.

That condition of resurrection life and glory which now surrounds the Lord Jesus, as by a circle, not only marks Him as being the Son of God, but marks Him as being this, by a palpable line of demarcation, distinguishing Him from every thing that is "according to the flesh."

The being thus visibly brought by resurrection into a distinct sphere of spiritual existence in power (εν δυναμει Rom. i.) and in glory (εν δοξῃ 1 Tim. iii. 16) in heavenly places, did not *make* the Lord Jesus Son of God, for He was so already; nor did it for the first time *declare* Him to be so; for His words, His character, and His miracles, had continually *declared* Him to be this before His resurrection; and He was not unfrequently so owned. (See Matt. xiv. 33.) The renderings, therefore, that have been commonly given, viz., δειχθεντος, *shown;* αποφανθεντος, *declared;* κριθεντος, *adjudged;* ὁμολογηθεντος, *acknowledged,* are all objectionable; not only because they do not represent the strict meaning of ὁριζω, but also because all these words are applicable to the Lord Jesus, whilst yet "known after the flesh." He was again and again demonstrated to be the Son of God before His resurrection, and therefore such demonstration could not be said to be derived *from* His resurrection (εξ αναστασεως), especially in a passage which is professedly distinguishing what He now is, in resurrection, with that which He was during the season of His humiliation here. Indeed it is allowed that no satisfactory example can be adduced of ὁριζω used in any of these meanings. "*Defined*" or "*determined*" would not be objectionable translations if they could be used in their etymological sense, to indicate the being marked out as by a boundary, but these words are not

contrasting

used except in their secondary meaning. In Latin "*intra terminos suos constitutus,*" and "terminis suis distinctus," have been proposed as phrases correctly conveying the force of the expression.[1] We want a word suitable to express the thought of being marked by a defining and distinguishing limit.

Ὁριζω should of course never be confounded with προοριζω, as has been done by the Vulgate translation of this passage—"*prædestinatus.*" In every other place in which ὁριζω occurs in the New Testament it refers to *moral* limitation, not to any limitation marked physically, and, therefore, may fitly be rendered "determine." The difference between αφοριζω and ὁριζω is, that the first directs the mind, primarily, to the separation effected by the limit spoken of; the second, to the limit as giving effect to the separation, and to the "distinctio" or "definitio" thence resulting.

In power.] Εν δυναμει, in a state or condition of power; εν answering to the use of the Hebrew ב. "Ac-

[1] See *Le Clerc* and *Wessel*, quoted by *Wolf*, in his "Curæ Philologicæ." Of these two renderings, the last is to be preferred, viz., *terminis suis distinctus.* Perhaps "terminis suis distinctus et definitus" would most correctly give the full force of the word. "Quando igitur filius Davidis ita intra terminos suos constituitur, eoque a communi omnium creaturarum sorte separatus est, ut natura quoque divina ejus dilucide cognoscatur, ut idem sit filius Dei, non εν λογῳ non υἱος λεγομενος sed εν δυναμει, cum potentia (he might have added κατα πνευμα) quid aliud hoc est, quam logica et distincta illius definitio, apodictica demonstratio et declaratio?"—*See Wolf in loco.*

cording to the Spirit" is, as I have said, an expression contrasted with "according to the flesh"—these two expressions indicating severally two different conditions of being. The words "in power" are connected with the words "according to the Spirit"—**power** being as necessary a characteristic of a condition "according to the Spirit" in resurrection, as **weakness** is characteristic of a condition here "according to the flesh." Compare 2 Cor. xiii. 4, already quoted.

It should be observed that the words "according to the Spirit" refer to that form and condition of being into which resurrection brings; and not to the agency of the Spirit as bringing into that condition. If that had been intended, the words would have been not *κατα πνευμα*, but *δια του πνευματος*.

Some have thought that the words "Spirit of Holiness" (which, as to form of expression, is a Hebraism, just as we say in English a "man of integrity" or "of uprightness" which is stronger and more emphatic than saying "an upright man")—some have regarded these words as a mere synonyme for "The Holy Spirit:" but there is doubtless a difference. If the Spirit had been referred to in respect of any peculiar function or office that He *distinctively* exercises as the Third Person in the Godhead, the words used would, no doubt, have been, "The Holy Spirit;" but inasmuch as the passage is intended to direct our minds to a mode or condition of existence which attaches to the Spirit, not distinctively, but which He has in common with the other Persons in the Godhead, the distinctive appellation, viz., *το Αγιον πνευμα* is not used, but a wider term. Angels are spirits (*πνευματα* Heb. i.), but they would not be

described as having a condition of being κατα πνευμα ἁγιωσυνης. Such a condition of existence pertains to the Divine Persons of the Godhead only, and Christ has now entered into the manifested glory of that condition. Christ, when seen by John in the Revelation—"His countenance as the sun shining in his strength, and His voice as the sound of many waters," was not really more holy than when John leaned on His breast at the last supper; but His holiness was *displayed* in very different circumstances—circumstances that harmonized with its own essential excellency. He was no longer seen, εν ὁμοιωματι σαρκος ἁμαρτιας—"in the likeness of sinful flesh"; but in unearthly glory—the glory which He had with the Father from everlasting.

[There are three words ἁγιοτης, ἁγιωσυνη, ἁγιασμος, frequently translated by the same word, *holiness*, in our version. A difference might, I think, always be preserved, and they be respectively rendered, *sanctity*, *holiness*, and *sanctification*.

Ἁγιοτης, *sanctity*, is used only once, viz., in Heb. xii. —"that we might be made partakers of His sanctity." It directs our minds, not so much to development, as to the intrinsic sanctity which is essential to the Holy One, and which would exist as the necessary characteristic of the Three Persons in the Godhead, even if no creatures had been made to whom that sanctity could be developed.

Ἁγιωσυνη, *holiness*, is especially used in connexion with *developed* or *manifested* holiness of condition or character. Thus ἁγιωσυνη is used in connexion with the developed character of the saints in 2 Cor. vii. 1,

"perfecting holiness in the fear of God;" and in 1 Thess. iii. 13, "blameless in holiness."

The third of these words ἁγιασμος may be translated *sanctification* in the sense of a holy condition reached; as when we say, that God has granted to believers *sanctification* in Christ. "Hallowment," if there were such a word, would most nearly express the meaning. In the New Testament, ἁγιασμος is never applied either to God or to Christ, but only to those who are brought, or to be brought, into a condition of sanctification. Thus, it is applied to the sanctification granted to the Church in Christ its Head; and also to the sanctification which attaches to believers in virtue of the indwelling presence of the Holy Ghost, whereby their bodies are made Temples of God; and thirdly, to that *practical* condition of sanctification which results not merely from the fact of the Holy Ghost dwelling in believers, but from His leadings being obeyed.

Thus, they who have sanctification (ἁγιασμος) in Christ risen (see 1 Cor. i. 30), and who have also sanctification (ἁγιασμος) in virtue of the indwelling and abiding presence of the Holy Ghost (see 1 Peter i. 2), and who are exhorted to perfect holiness (ἁγιωσυνη) in the fear of God, (see 2 Cor. vii. 1) do, by thus developing holiness, (ἁγιωσυνη) attain a practical sanctification (ἁγιασμος) here, (see Romans vi. 19) and will by and by, in resurrection, be made fully partakers of the sanctity (ἁγιοτης) of Him, who has called them into His own kingdom and glory.

The general and well-known rule respecting verbals derived from the perfect passive is this:

Those derived from the first person singular, denote

the thing made or effected by the action which the active verb expresses, as ποιημα, *a thing made;* πραγμα, *a thing done;* κλασμα, *a thing broken.*

Those from the second person signify **the act of making or effecting**, as ποιησις, πραξις, φυλαξις, *the act of guarding.*

Those from the third person signify **the agent**, as ποιητης, πρακτηρ, φυλακτηρ.

Those ending in—μος, *derived from transitive verbs* may, as a *general* rule, be said to indicate the condition reached as the result of the agency expressed by the verb. Thus ἁγιασμος is a condition of sanctification produced by a sanctifier: βασανισμος a condition of torment produced by a tormentor: καθαρισμος (Heb. מהרה) a condition of purification produced by a purifier: ἱλασμος, a condition of appeasement produced by an appeaser: ῥαντισμος, a condition of being sprinkled produced by a sprinkler. Similarly απαρτισις (that form of the verbal which expresses agency) produces απαρτισμον: καταρτισις, καταρτισμον: διωξις, διωγμον: κατακλυσις, κατακλυσμον, a condition of being inundated—a flood.

It must be remembered, however, that although it is always well to bear in mind general rules, no rules of etymology or derivation are other than *general,* admitting various exceptions caused by metonymy, usage, &c. The chief thoughts connected with every perfected action are, the doer, the act of doing, the thing done, and the effect produced upon the subject of the action, if such there be. Thus, the διωξις of the διωκτης produces διωγμα, *a pursuit* or *persecution* (sometimes meaning a specific persecution, sometimes persecution in the

abstract), and also produces διωγμος, *a condition of being pursued or persecuted.* The difference between διωξις, διωγμα, and διωγμος may be illustrated thus. A tyrant such as Nero, or blood-thirsty persecutors, like some of the Romanists, may be said to love διωξις (the act of persecuting) for its own sake. Others who might shrink from being personally engaged in διωξις, may yet approve διωγμα in the abstract: but when St. Paul says that he rejoiced in διωγμος, he means, not that he rejoiced either in διωξις or διωγμα, but in those persecutions of which he himself was the subject for Christ's sake—ευδοκω εν ασθενειαις, εν ὑβρεσιν, εν αναγκαις, εν διωγμοις, εν στενοχωριαις, ὑπερ Χριστου. (2 Cor. xii. 10.) "Persecution," used in this sense, is no real variation from the normal meaning of διωγμος, viz., *a persecuted condition.* In English (and it must be acknowledged as a defect) we are accustomed to translate all these words διωξις, διωγμα, and διωγμος by the same word "*persecution.*"[1]

I have observed above that we need forms of expression to denote the **doer**, the **act** of doing, the **thing** done, and the **condition** into which the subject of the action is thereby brought. It may be added, that we

[1] Stephens, in his Thesaurus, as also Scott and Liddell, give as *one* of the meanings of διωγμα "*that which is pursued or chased,* as in Old English the deer was called the "the chase." Hederic, however, after mentioning this meaning, well observes: "Nescio an sit locus primæ explicationi (viz., *id quod persequimur*). Exemplum quod affert Stephanus ex Xenoph. potest optime reddi *persecutio.* Sic se habet — πολλαι δε τα διωγματα αφεισαι επανερχονται δια το μισοθηρον; multæ (*i.e.*, canes) ferarum odio, persecutione omissâ, recurrunt."

likewise need words to express notions more abstract than those just referred to. Abstract qualities, for example, as well as the habit from which any particular action flows, and the effect produced by an action when such effect is considered abstractedly, *should* have (though, for the most part, the poverty of language forbids its being so) appropriated forms of expression. Thus ἁρπαγη, in its relation to ἁρπαξις, ἁρπαγμα, &c.: δικαιοσυνη, in its relation to δικαιωσις, δικαιωμα, &c.: απατη, in its relation to απατημα and απατησις, are all abstract or generic notions. Thus too σωφροσυνη is more abstract than σωφρονισμος; just as "contentment," as the name of a virtue, is more abstract than "contentedness" the name of a state. Language may be regarded as most perfect, when able to supply a sufficient variety of words to express suitably these different notions, and when the *usus loquendi* is so regulated as to be rigid in confining words to their proper meanings. But what language can pretend even to an approach to perfectness as respects these two things? Greek, with all its luxuriance, has not supplied itself with a sufficient number of distinct expressions to denote the several notions referred to; and the anomalies in the use of the words it possesses are so many, as to preclude the possibility of establishing any thing like unvarying rules. The precise meaning of words is therefore, for the most part, to be fixed by the context. Scripture which is, with few exceptions, content to adopt the words already in use among men, without seeking to form a new language for itself, is peculiarly careful to give precision and definiteness to its expressions by means of the context.

How very far our own language is from possessing a sufficient variety of words to denote distinctions of the most ordinary occurrence, may be seen by referring to a dictionary such as Johnson's. A passing observation of Dr. Johnson, respecting verbals in *ing*, may suffice for an example. Speaking of words omitted in his dictionary, Dr. Johnson observes: "The verbal nouns in *ing*, such as the *keeping* of the *castle*, the *leading* of the *army* are always neglected, or placed only to illustrate the sense of the verb, except when they signify things as well as actions and have therefore a plural number, as *dwelling*, *living;* or have an absolute and abstract signification as *colouring*, *painting*, *learning*." Thus the one word *painting* may be used to denote either the art of painting, or an act of painting, or the thing painted.

It would be well if we could establish as a fixed rule that the termination *ment*, when found in nouns derived from transitive verbs, signified a state or condition reached: but although the instances of its being thus used are so numerous as perhaps to justify our regarding it as a general rule (*e.g.* abandonment, abasement, abashment, abridgment, affrightment, &c., &c.) yet there are also various exceptions, arising chiefly from the want of words to express either the abstract quality, or, else, the act whilst in progress. If *ing* could be appropriated to the last; *ment* to the condition; and *ness* to the abstract quality, as when we say, "the *abominableness* or *hatefulness* or *odiousness* of such principles," we we might hope for greater regularity; but we find it far otherwise. However difficult precision of thought may be, precision in the use of words seems more

difficult of attainment still. Practically, as I have already observed, precision is made to depend on the context defining the exact meaning of the words.

If, in cases where a normal meaning for any word or form of word could be established, Lexicographers were careful to give such meaning as the normal one, and were to note other uses of the word as deviations, their works would be more correct and more useful. No one for example, after reading such a sentence as the following, εστω δη πραυνσις καταστασις και ηρεμησις οργης (Arist. Rhetor. ii. 3, 10) can doubt the active force of verbals of this derivation. Nor does the use in an active sense of some verbals in—μος, derived from the first person (such as επηρεασμος, εμποδισμος, &c.) take from verbals of the second person their normal right of expressing agency; nor is that right invalidated by instances in which verbals from the second person are themselves used to express completed acts, such as κτισις, δικαιωσις, αποκρισις, κρισις, &c. In such cases, we must not too hastily conclude that all traces of the normal sense are lost. An act complete and perfected, may, nevertheless, be spoken of with reference to the person from whom the act proceeds, rather than in respect of those who are the subjects of it. Thus if I speak of "*the resurrection*" simply, my mind is directed chiefly to the persons who are raised, but if I were to use another expression, viz., "*the raising up at the last day*," I should still speak of a completed act, but with more especial reference to Him from whom the act proceeded. Accordingly, αναστασις is the verbal adopted in the Greek; and it may be seen in the use of εγειρω and εγειρομαι throughout

1 Cor. xv., how much the thought of *the Divine agency* in raising the dead is preserved—a thought not sufficiently guarded by our translators in their rendering of those words. Δικαιωσις also, is a word which directs our minds to the agency of Him from whom justification proceeds; δικαιωμα to justification as resting on the justified, though both refer to completed acts. Thus too κρισις directs the mind to the judgment proceeding from the judge; κριμα to the judgment as resting upon the condemned.

Not unfrequently the verbal in μος is employed, in cases where we might have expected to find the verbal from the first person, denoting the completed action, or else the verbal from the second person. But if we examine the instances, we shall often find that the thought is not limited to the mere act performed, nor to the doer; but that it is extended so as to include the thought of the subject affected by the action. Thus, when it is said, that the Pharisees loved ασπασμους in the market-places, it is not meant that they loved the act of saluting merely, or the salutation regarded simply by itself, but that they loved ασπασμους in respect of their being themselves the subjects thereof. Ασπασμος is a word that involves the thoughts of a saluter, a salutation, and also of persons reached by and placed under such salutation. The same may be said of εμπαιγμος; whilst it involves the thoughts of a mocker and of mocking, it points also to the condition in which such mocking involves the sufferer. Καταρτισις, as used in 2 Cor. xiii. 9, directs the mind to the agency employed, especially by the Apostle himself, to bring the Corinthians into that completed condition which

would be expressed by καταρτισμος. In Eph. iv. we find καταρτισμος used to denote the condition into which those are brought, on whom such agency as is expressed by καταρτισμος has taken effect.

In the majority of cases in which the verbal in —μος is found in the New Testament, the notion of a **state or condition reached** is clearly discernible. If we were at liberty to use, more freely than we can, our English termination *ment*, we should be able to give the force of the verbal in μος better. Thus a hallowing produces *hallowment* (ἁγιασμον): an appeasing produces *appeasement* (ἱλασμον): a sprinkling produces *sprinklement* (ῥαντισμον) if we had such a word: a cleansing produces καθαρισμον—Heb. טהרה *(cleansement)*: a finishing produces a *finishment*. See Luke xiv. 28—"whether he have sufficient to finish it"—τα προς απαρτισμον. Since, however, the *usus loquendi* forbids us to employ such words as *finishment*, &c., we are often obliged to submit to the ambiguity of employing the same word to denote an action in progress, an action regarded abstractedly, a state regarded abstractedly, and an action regarded in its results.

The normal meaning of state or condition reached or produced, can, without much difficulty, be traced in the following instances:—ἁγιασμος, as used in Rom. vi. 19: απαρτισμος, Luke xiv. 28: βασανισμος, Rev. xviii. 10: βαπτισμος, Heb. vi. 2: διαμερισμος, Luke xii. 51: διωγμος, 2 Cor. xii. 10: εμπαιγμος, Heb. xi. 36: επισιτισμος, Luke ix. 12: ἱλασμος, 1 John iv. 10: κατακλυσμος, Matt. xxiv. 38: καταρτισμος, Eph. iv. 12:[1]

[1] If the force of the prepositions in this passage be observed.

μακαρισμος, Rom. iv. 6; μιασμος, 2 Peter ii. 10: πειρασμος, Matt. vi. 13: πορισμος, (a condition of being supplied) 1 Tim. vi. 6: ῥαντισμος, 1 Peter i. 2: στηριγμος, 2 Peter iii. 17, and many others.

In most of these instances, the thought of a **condition reached** as the result of certain agencies brought to bear upon a subject is obvious; nor are there any in which the deflexions introduced by usage are not easily accounted for. Take επισιτισμος for an example. When we speak of an army or of a multitude finding επισιτια, we mean simply that they find victuals—which victuals *may* perhaps be very scanty and insufficient as a supply: but when we speak of their finding επισιτισμον it would mean that they were placed in a condition of supply—an adequately provided condition. See *Xenoph. Hellen.*—εγενετο αὑτη ἡ στρατεια ὡσπερ επισιτισμος τῃ Πελοποννησῳ, "fuit illa expeditio pro *commeatus copiâ* Peloponnesiacis." We can easily understand therefore how, whilst the proper meaning of επισιτια is *victuals;* of επισιτισις, *a supplying of victuals;* and of επισιτισμος, *a condition of supply,* the latter word, by an easy deflexion, comes to be used for the supply itself—*commeatus copia.* The same remarks will apply to ἱματια, *garments,* as compared with ἱματισμος,

the meaning of καταρτισμος is more apparent. "He gave some apostles . . . . . some pastors and teachers with reference to (προς) the καταρτισμος of the saints unto (εις) the work of ministration, unto (εις) the edifying, &c. Now before God calls His saints to any employment of their energies, he provides that they should be brought into a state of *completed fitness* for such employment, and this condition of fitness is implied by καταρτισμος.

raiment or apparel. The strict meaning of the latter word would be a condition of being apparelled, but, by an easy change, it is used to signify, not garments simply, but raiment or apparel, *i.e.*, clothing *regarded in its totality*, and hence the chief or distinguishing garment in any one's apparel—that which is κατ' εξοχην our apparel. Hence we read that they divided the Lord's garments, (ἱματια) but on His ἱματισμος they cast lots.

Again, an army might find επισιτια or ἱματια and yet that which they found might not be available for themselves; but to find επισιτισμον or ἱματισμον would imply that they found what was available for and *used by* themselves. We say αγοραζειν βρωματα; Matt. xiv. 15: but ευρειν επισιτισμον; (Luke ix. 12.)

Thus too, in that most important and most blessed word ἱλασμος, from ἱλασκομαι, *to placate or appease.* Ἱλασμος is strictly the result of the ἱλασις of an ἱλαστηρ; and means *placamentum—a condition of being appeased—appeasement.* Thus in 2 Mac. iii. 35: ποιουμενου δε του αρχιερεως τον ἱλασμον—faciente autem summo sacerdote placamentum. In LXX. we find, του κριου του ἱλασμου—the appeasement ram, or victim, so called because it effected appeasement. Thus 1 John iv. 10, "He sent His Son as an appeasement-offering (ἱλασμον) for our sins." It is important to observe how clearly the thought of an **end effectually reached** is maintained in these verbals. They indicate not a condition in process of being attained, but a condition attained or produced.

As a rendering of ἱλασκομαι, "*appease*" is to be preferred to "propitiate." The latter word is frequently so used as to direct the mind, not so much to the

appeasement of *wrath*, as to the attraction of the *favour* of the person propitiated. It was in this sense that the Pagans addressed their deities with the words, "*Fave-propitius esto.*" Now although it is true that, in the Divine arrangements, favour and lovingkindness is a necessary result of wrath having been appeased, yet the primary and proper thought conveyed by ἱλασκομαι is *the appeasing of wrath*, and not the conciliation of favour. "Εξιλασασθαι το ΜΗΝΙΜΑ της Θεου" are words which sufficiently indicate the strict meaning of ἱλασκομαι. See *Stephens' Thesaur.*—who, after quoting a passage in which ἱλαος occurs, observes, that αγριος θυμος and ἱλαος θυμος are the opposed expressions, and also, νηλης and ἱλαος.

In LXX., ἱλασκομαι answers to the Hebrew כפר. The force of these words in their relation to wrath may be seen from the following passage in Numbers xvi. 44—"And the Lord spake unto Moses, saying, Get you up from among the congregation, that I may consume them in a moment. And they fell upon their faces. And Moses said, Take a censer, and put fire thereon from off the altar, and put on incense, and go quickly unto the congregation, and כפר עליהם—εξιλασαι περι αυτων (LXX.), *i.e.*, appease for them, for there is wrath gone out from the Lord; the plague is begun." See also Gen. xxxii. 20, where Jacob, dreading the wrath of Esau, said, "I will apease him" (אכפרה—εξιλασομαι, LXX.) "with the present." And Proverbs xvi. 14—"The wrath of a king, is as messengers of death, but a wise man will *pacify* it"—εξιλασεται αυτον. Hence in Numbers, του κριου του ἱλασμου—"the appeasement ram."

The deflexions of meaning in the verbal in μος, which have been mentioned above, tend to confirm rather than to invalidate the general rule. There are others, however, which present an appearance of somewhat greater irregularity. It is scarcely worth while, perhaps, to mention such instances as φραγμος, which instead of meaning (as according to analogy it should) "a condition of being hedged," means "*the hedge itself*"; or such an instance as θερισμος, which, instead of meaning "a condition of being reaped" is used for "harvest-time," or "harvest itself." These are mere examples of ordinary metonymy. We find a more important instance of deflexion in some uses of διωγμος, which, *sometimes*, instead of being used in the passive sense of a persecution endured, is employed in the active sense of a pursuit carried out by a pursuer. (See *Xenoph. Cyrop.* i. 4, 21.) Whether, however, it is necessary to give it an active sense in the New Testament might be questioned; and I should not mention it here, if it did not illustrate a similar variation in another more important word—important, I mean, as regards its use in the Scripture, viz., ἁρπαγμος, as used Phil. ii. 6. According to analogy, ἁρπακτηρ would mean "*a robber*:" ἁρπαξις, the act of robbing [which use of ἁρπαξις may be traced in the compounds, ἁρπαξιβιος, "*one who lives by rapine*," and ἁρπαξανδρος, "*snatching away men*." As contrasted with ἁρπαγη, ἁρπαξις would point to a specific action coming under ἁρπαγη, *rapine*, as the genus] ἁρπαγμα "*the thing stolen*," or else, "*the act of robbery completed*:" ἁρπαγμος, "*a condition of being robbed*." That such cannot be the meaning of ἁρπαγμος in Philippians (and it is no where else found in the

New Testament nor in LXX) is very obvious. It must be regarded therefore, as a deflexion similar to that of δωγμος; and be interpreted as having an active meaning—viz., "a condition of robbery." "Who being in the form of God deemed the being equal with God no condition of robbery;" in other words, deemed it His own rightful condition, which is the sense given in our version. They who wish to render ἁρπαγμον "a prey," or "a trophy," must show an instance of its being used in such a sense. They have also to say why ἁρπαγμα, a word continually used in LXX, in the sense of "prey," is not used here, if "prey" be meant. Schleusner refers, carelessly, to certain passages from the LXX, as if ἁρπαγμος occurred in them; whereas ἁρπαγμα is the word used. See Ps. lxii. 11, and Is. lxi. 8; Ez. xxii. 25; and Malachi i. 13,—all which Schleusner cites wrongly.[1] Schleusner also speaks of verbals in μος signifying "*fere* actionem non rem et statum:" which is just the very thing that verbals in μος in the New Testament do not "*fere*" signify. We do not say, that because δεδεγμαι, ειργασμαι, πεποιημαι, and πεφευγμαι vary from the general rule respecting passives, and bear an active sense, that, therefore, all perfect passives are so used. When we find Bishop Hall speaking of men being drawn "to an unnatural abandoning of life," and Burke saying, "an universal abandonment of all other posts will succeed," we say that the first of these words, (viz., "aban-

[1] Trommius gives no instance of ἁρπαγμος as occurring in LXX. The only classical occurrence of ἁρπαγμος, is, I believe, one from Plutarch, cited by Wetstein—τον εκ Κρητης καλουμενον ἁρπαγμον.

doning") directs our minds to an act in process of being performed; the second (abandonment) to a state resulting from an action completed—the second being a word of more pregnant meaning than the other: and although it may be true that the general sense would be the same, if "abandoning" were substituted for "abandonment," yet we do not on that account say, that there is no difference in the words, or that "abandonment" has an active meaning. In the passage quoted, it is rightly defined by Dr. Johnson to mean, "a state of being abandoned." We do not say that "enlistment" is, in itself, an active word, because, in certain combinations with other words, it may be made to partake of the active meaning expressed by them; as when we speak of "enlistment-money" being the moving cause of enlistment. We are not to make the anomalies of language the foundation of our general rules, but rather to see whether the general rule is not virtually acknowledged in the anomaly. In neither of the following passages does καθαρισμος mean a purifying act in process of accomplishment, but the result of a purifying act accomplished—δι ἑαυτου καθαρισμον ποιησαμενος των ἁμαρτιων, Heb. i. 3.[1]—ληθην λαβων του καθαρισμου των παλαι αυτου ἁμαρτιων. 2 Pet. i. 9. When "days of purification" are said to be accomplished, the

[1] Observe the dishonest Romanist perversion of this passage—"carying al things by the vvord of his povver, *making purgation of sins*, sitteth," &c. (Rheimish version of 1582)—thus perpetuated in the Dublin edition of the same version, in 1820, "upholding all things by the word of his power, making purgation of sins, sitteth," &c.

idea conveyed by the respective words in English, in Greek, and in Hebrew, is that of purification attained.]

By resurrection of the dead.] The connexion between ὁρισθεις and εξ αναστασεως should be carefully noted. The preposition εκ answering to the prefix מ in Hebrew, signifies properly the source or origin from which the thing spoken of is derived. Thus in the case before us the demarcation of the Lord Jesus as the Son of God in power, is derived *from* or springs *out of* resurrection. As respects the words αναστασις-νεκρων they may be regarded as a kind of compound word united by a hyphen—the latter word being adjectival and determining what kind of αναστασις is meant; for αναστασις and ανιστημι are not restricted in Greek to the meaning of revival from a state of death, but are sometimes used in the general sense of "raising up." See Luke ii. 34: "set for the fall and rising again (αναστασιν) of many in Israel." See also Acts iii. 26.

Verses 5 and 6.

Through whom we have received grace and apostleship, for the obedience of faith, among all the Gentiles, on behalf of His name, amongst whom are ye also, called of Jesus Christ.

For the obedience of faith.] That is, for the obedience which faith renders. The words are εις ὑπακοην

πιστεως. Some have proposed to translate these words, "obedience to THE faith;" but in that case the article would have been inserted before πιστις, as in Acts vi. 7, "And a great company of the priests were obedient to the faith"—ὑπηκουον τῃ πιστει.

St. Paul had received "*grace and apostleship*," not that he might bring to the obedience which ritualism or legalism render, but to that obedience which faith renders. His adversaries charged his doctrine with a tendency to licentiousness; and, therefore, it is one chief object of this epistle to dwell on the *results* of faith, and to shew, that although faith only justifies in virtue of the obedience of Another, yet that it leads to obedience. Obedience which faith renders is, therefore, a thought in harmony with the tone of the epistle throughout.

The Apostle says, that he had received "*grace*" to bring others unto the obedience of faith, and "*apostleship*" to bring others unto the obedience of faith. There is a similar use of "*grace*" in Eph. iii. 8. "To me, who am less than the least of all saints, *is this grace given*, that I should preach among the Gentiles the unsearchable riches of Christ." But St. Paul had not only received the grace of ordinary evangelic ministration (that had been received by every Evangelist)—he had also received the grace of apostolic ministration, and that not among the Jews only, but also among all the Gentiles, to bring not to the obedience which ritualism pretended to render, but to the obedience of faith.

The ellipsis in the passage may be supplied thus, χαριν και αποστολην [ὡστε αγαγειν] εις την ὑπακοην πιστεως. This commission to bring unto the obedience of faith was intended to be carried out "amongst all the

Gentiles." Observe he does not say that he was commissioned to bring all the Gentiles to the obedience of faith; he merely speaks of the whole Gentile world as the sphere in which his ministry was to be exercised —as to the number actually to be brought, that depended entirely on God. Compare Coloss. i. 23, where the whole creation is spoken of as the sphere in which the Gospel has been preached—του κηρυχθεντος εν πασῃ τῃ κτισει τῃ ὑπο τον ουρανον, "which has been preached in all the creation which is under Heaven," *not* "to every creature that is under Heaven," as our version reads.

The proper meaning of εις is *unto*, and answers the question, to what end? "All the Gentiles" is a far better translation than "all nations" here, and in every passage where a contrast is intended between "Gentile" and "Jew."

On behalf of His name—ὑπερ του ονοματος αυτου. The original meaning of ὑπερ, the preposition here used, is *over* or *above;* whence the Latin *super*.

The following illustration will show how easily the derived meanings of ὑπερ in cases where it governs a genitive, are traceable to this original. If we imagine a bird hovering *over* her young, and seeking to shelter them under the covert of her wings; and if we further suppose that a blow thus averted from them, fell destructively on herself, we can easily conceive how naturally the thought of action or suffering *on behalf of*, or *for the sake of*, or *on account of*, would become connected with *over:* and further, if her death *over* them were the means of rescuing them from destruction, we

can easily see how the thought of her dying *over* them would be merged in the more important thought of her dying *instead of* them. There is no more familiar notion than that of a shield; and a shield always suggests the thought of being *over* that which it protects, and of receiving the blow *instead of*, or *on account of*, or *on behalf of* that which it defends. Accordingly, ὑπερ in the New Testament is commonly used in one or other of these secondary meanings,—the context, in each case, sufficiently determining which is to be preferred. Of these meanings, the most important is that *instead of;* for ὑπερ when so used in reference to the sacrificial relation of Christ to His people, involves the full notion of deliverance by substitution. A bird might die *over* its offspring, and yet those offspring perish—a friend might fall in shielding another and yet that other be himself destroyed; but this could never happen where such death on behalf of another took place under a law which had stipulated (and had power to carry out the stipulation) that he, on behalf of whom another paid the penalty of death, should be legally regarded as if he himself had died, and so become free from all penalty.

Accordingly, we find the following most important statement in the Epistle to the Corinthians. The Apostle in speaking of the relation of Christ's death to believers, says, "If one person died ὑπερ all *(i.e.* all believers) then the whole died—ει εἱς ὑπερ παντων απεθανεν αρα οἱ παντες απεθανον. This is established as a universal principle of the Divine government. This text declares that when one person has died ὑπερ a certain company, the order of the Divine government

is to consider such company as having judicially died. No one therefore can question that ὑπερ in this passage is equivalent to "instead of."

Nor is this substitutional sense of ὑπερ confined to the Holy Scripture. The following are some out of many instances of its employment in this meaning by human writers. Thus Plato, ἑαυτον ανερωταν ὑπερ του χρησμου—*instead of the oracle:* and Eurip. Alc., μη θνησχ' ὑπερ τουδ' ανδρος—*instead of me.* See also Demosth.—ερωτησον αυτους· μαλλον δ' εγω τουθ' ὑπερ σου ποιησω—*I will do it in thy stead.* See Eurip. Alc. throughout.

Wherever therefore reference is made to an action or prayer or enquiry that is *in favour of* the person or object spoken of, there ὑπερ would be used; and that in strict conformity with the thought of "*over,*" as indicating a relation of kindly interest or protection. It has been said by many, that ὑπερ is used sometimes in the sense of περι, *concerning;* but this, as regards its use in the Divine writings is to be questioned. It is true indeed, that there are passages in which the general sense may be sufficiently given by rendering ὑπερ *concerning;* nor is it difficult to connect this meaning with its primitive sense of *over,* for a person who is making anxious enquiries or anxious supplication *concerning* another may well be represented as standing *over* him. But although *concerning* (which is the translation of περι) may give the general meaning of ὑπερ, in many passages, it does not hence follow that ὑπερ, when thus used, is a mere synonyme of περι. In the first place, the object of περι is to direct the mind to the *scope* of the observation or enquiry made. It answers the question, "what does your observation

include?" Whereas ὑπερ, introduces no question concerning scope; but supposing that to be determined, speaks of a relation between two objects, for the most part an agent and a subject. The consequence is, that the use of ὑπερ is much more restricted than that of περι; and in the Scriptures, may be said, I believe, to be confined to instances in which the relation spoken of is one of favour, not of disapproval or anger: whereas περι, in conformity with its meaning, may be used indifferently in either case. Thus our Lord, in speaking condemnatorily of the world, does *not* say, "I testify ὑπερ αυτου that its works are evil; but I testify περι αυτου that its works are evil." But when St. Paul says —"if any do enquire concerning Titus," the context manifestly shows that the enquiry is supposed to be that of friends, whose enquiries would be on behalf of Titus, and not against him. The passage which might seem chiefly at variance with this supposition is in the ninth chapter of the Romans—"Isaiah also crieth *concerning* Israel;" but if this chapter be examined carefully, it will I think, confirm the opinion I have advanced. The verse quoted by St. Paul is taken from that part of the tenth chapter of Isaiah which speaks of mercy returning to Israel, and therefore the use of ὑπερ in this passage is equivalent to saying, Isaiah even when prophesying, not against, but in favour of Israel, does nevertheless declare that only a remnant shall be saved. St. Paul in this place is quoting a series of passages which speak of God's returning favour to Israel.

The favourite word of our translators in rendering ὑπερ is "*for*." In many cases, no doubt, "for" sufficiently gives the general meaning; but when we

remember not only the exceeding ambiguity of "*for*" in English, but also that it is used in our version as the translation of twelve or thirteen different Greek prepositions, it is obvious that we should do well to avoid its use, whenever a word of more determined meaning can be employed.

It is worthy of remark, that whilst, in Greek, the word that signifies substitution is ὑπερ, *over*, the Hebrew word that represents the same thought is תחת, *under* —in the first case the sense being derived from the position of one interposed for protection *over* another; whereas in the latter case, the thought is deduced from one, who advances into the place vacated by another and so succeeds to and stands *under* his responsibilities, whether for good or for evil. The use of תחת in its primitive sense of *under* may be seen in Gen. vii. 19,—"*under* the whole heaven:" or Ex. xxxii. 19,—"*beneath* the Mount." Its use as "*instead of*" may be seen in Gen. xxii. 13,—"a burnt-offering *instead of* his son;" and again 2 Sam. xix. 13,—"*in the room of* Joab;" and Lev. xiv. 42,—" they shall take other stones, and put them *in the place of* those stones."

It is not uncommon for the idioms of different languages thus to vary. For example, in English, we speak of persons having lived, or of such and such things having happened, *under* Augustus Cæsar; whereas in Greek they speak of such and such things having happened "upon" (επι) Augustus Cæsar—the thought in the one case being the shelter of a sovereign's protection, in the other, that of leaning on him as a pillar or support.

Προ is not unfrequently used in the sense of substi-

tution. (See Eurip. Alc. 642-9, and 690.) The deduction of the meaning "*instead of*" from that of "*over*" in the case of ὑπερ, may be illustrated by this use of προ, whose primary meaning is that of a preposition of place, "*in front of.*" A deadly blow aimed at one, falls on him who places himself *in front of* the person aimed at, and so he receives it, *in his stead.*

Another preposition to which the meaning of "*substitution*" frequently attaches is αντι. Its original meaning is *over-against,* as traced in the adversatives αντα, αντην, αντιος, αντικρυ, αντιπεραν. Αντικρυ Χιου —*over against, Chios.* Αντιπεραν της Γαλιλαιας *over against Galilee.* One of the first thoughts which the sad experiences of human life caused to be connected with αντι, was hostile opposition, for foe was soon seen to stand *over against* foe. Another thought early connected with "over against" was exchange in the way of payment, as when one thing was set over against another with which it was to be exchanged, or when one thing was weighed in one scale against another thing in another scale. Hence the thought of substitution and compensation, for that which is accepted in lieu of that which is taken is of course substituted for it and is compensatory for its loss. Again, seeing that things that stand *over against* each other do, not unfrequently, correspond with each other, as one side of a valley or bank of a river with the opposite side or bank, or one side of a room with the opposite side; "correspondency" is a thought also connected with αντι —as in that blessed verse, "Out of His fulness have all we received and grace corresponding to grace," *i.e.,* corresponding to the grace in Him. Hence opposition

or else, substitution and compensation, or else, correspondency are the principal derived meanings of *αντι* In the sense of compensation or substitution, it is used in the following well known passages in the New Testament: "Even as the Son of man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister and to give His life a ransom instead of many"—*λυτρον αντι πολλων*. (Matt. xx. 28; and Mark x. 45.) "An eye *instead of* (*αντι*) an eye, and a tooth *instead of* (*αντι*) a tooth." (Matt. v. 38.) "Will he *instead of* (*αντι*) a fish give him a serpent?" (Luke xi. 11.) In ordinary Greek, I scarcely need say, it is continually used in this sense, as, *αντι ημερας νυξ εγενετο. (Herod.* vii. 37.) *Αντι του μαχεσθαι πειθεσθαι εθελει. (Xenoph. Cyr.* iii. 1, 18.) *Δουλοι ζωμεν αντ' ελευθερων. (Quidam apud Athenæum.)* *Τρεις ενος αντι πεφασθαι*—Three to be slain for one. (*Il. N.* 447.)

[There has been much difference of opinion as to whether *αντι*, in *Αντιχριστος*, means "*instead of*" or "*in opposition to*"—whether it is to be classed with such words as *αντιβασιλευς*, *viceroy; ανθυπατος*, *proconsul; αντιδειπνος*, *one who is the substitute and representative of an absent guest:* or whether with such words as *ανταγωνιστης*, *an antagonist; αντιβατης*, *an opponent; αντιδικος*, *an opponent in a suit; αντιθετος* and *αντικειμενος*, *opposed; αντινομια*, *opposition to law*, &c., &c. There can, I think, be no doubt that it belongs to the latter of these two classes.

"Instead of," let it be remembered, involves a very different thought when applied to a vicegerent and when applied to an avowed supplanter. Absalom sought to be *instead of* David, not as the vicegerent of David

but as his supplanter. Is it then in the sense of supplanting or of vicegerency that αντι is used in αντι-βασιλευς, ανθυπατος and the like? Evidently in the sense of vicegerency. But Antichrist will not profess to be the vicegerent or representative of Christ. On the contrary he is emphatically pronounced to be, one who opposeth and exalteth himself *above* and *against* all that is called God or that is worshipped—ὁ αντικειμενος και ὑπεραιρομενος επι παντα λεγομενον Θεον η σεβασμα. How could he be the vicegerent of God, who thus "exalts himself above all that is called God"? He is Antichrist that *denieth* the Father and the Son." The very use of αντικειμενος might teach us the meaning of αντι in Αντιχριστος. The Antichrist, says Professor Trench, is in Theophylact's language, εναντιος τῳ Χριστῳ —"*Wider*christ," as the Germans have rightly rendered it; one who shall not pay so much homage to God's word as to assert its fulfilment in himself, for he shall deny that word altogether; hating even erroneous worship, because it is worship at all; hating much more the Church's worship in spirit and in truth; who, on the destruction of every religion, every acknowledgment that man is submitted to higher powers than his own, shall seek to establish his throne; and for God's great truth, "God is man" to substitute his own lie, "man is God" *(Trench's Synonymes*, p. 120.*)*

Verse 6.

Εν οἷς εστε και ὑμεις, κλητοι Ιησου Χριστου—*Among whom are ye also, called of Jesus Christ.*

Εν οἷς.] Εν is frequently used in the sense of "among." See Matt. ii. 6—"not the least *among* (εν) the princes of Judah." Luke ii. 44—"*among* (εν) their kinsfolk and acquaintance." See also John i. 14—"dwelt *amongst* (εν) us"; and Acts xiii. 26—whosoever *among* (εν) you." "Annotavit hic Chrysostomus, quod Paulus, Romanis, rerum Dominis, nihil eximium attribuerit, sed in Evangelii ratione, unam e numero, cæterarum gentium fecerit."—*Critici Sacri.*

Και ὑμεις.] The use of the emphatic και should be carefully marked throughout the New Testament. It always throws its emphasis *on the word that follows it.* This rule has not been remembered as it should have been by our translators. There is, perhaps, no word whose translation needs more to be amended in our version than that of the emphatic και.

Κλητοι Ιησου Χριστου.] Literally, "Jesus Christ's called ones." It is the genitive of possession as in the first verse, "the servant of Jesus Christ;" and in Rev. i., "The Revelation of Jesus Christ, which God gave unto Him," *i.e.*, "the Revelation possessed by Jesus Christ, having been given to Him by God.

Verse 7.

Πασι τοις ουσιν εν Ῥωμῃ αγαπητοις Θεου, κλητοις ἁγιοις.—*To all the beloved of God who are at Rome, called saints.*

To all, &c.] The words in our version might imply that all in Rome were addressed, and not the believers in Rome only. The translation should therefore be altered as above; or we might render thus—"to all in Rome who are beloved of God," &c.

Called saints.] That is, saints called into saintship by God—saints by Divine vocation; just as κλητος Αποστολος above, means an Apostle called into his office by God.

It should be observed that κλητος, a word frequently applied to believers (τοις πιστοις) is nowhere used of the mere reception of an invitation, though κεκλημενος sometimes is, as in Matthew xxii. 8, where κεκλημενοι is applied to those who had received invitation to the marriage-supper, but would not come when the time arrived for the invitation to be acted on. These κεκλημενοι, therefore, never became κλητοι—κλητοι being used of persons who had not only received the invitation, but had acted on it.

Whenever, however, the calling expressed by κλητος, or by κλησις, or by καλεω, is spoken of as the result of the predestinative purpose of God, or whenever it is connected (as in the verse before us) with such expressions as "beloved of God," these words express effectual

calling—a calling that can never be reversed. See Rom. viii. 28—"For we know that all things work together for good to them that love God; to them that are the called according to His purpose"—τοις κατα προθεσιν κλητοις ουσιν. See also Rom. viii. 30—"Moreover, whom He did predestinate, them He also called (εκαλεσε); and whom He called, them He also justified; and whom He justified, them He also glorified." See also the use of καλεω, in the same sense throughout Rom. ix., where it is expressly connected with the calling of God according to election. In St. Paul's Epistles the word κλητος is never used except in the sense of effectual calling.

But in our Lord's parable of the marriage-supper, we find κλητοι used of the professing Church, as being all not merely invited (κεκλημενοι), but brought into a certain privileged standing, in which standing, however, they will not all be finally confirmed. In that parable Israel are the κεκλημενοι. They had received invitation, but when the supper was ready refused to come. Others from among the Gentiles were then invited. They came, and so became not κεκλημενοι merely, but κλητοι, and thus the wedding was furnished with guests. But the calling thus received was not in every case confirmed. There was one who had not on a wedding-garment. In other words, he had his own ordinary apparel on, but not garments suited to that royal feast. He had not, by faith, put on Christ, so as to be robed in His righteousness. His "calling" was, therefore, not ratified—he was cast out; and then our Lord adds—πολλοι γαρ εισι κλητοι, ολιγοι δ' εκλεκτοι, "for many are called, but few chosen." How different the condition of the *pro-*

fessing Church from that of the Church glorified, where the κλητοι and εκλεκτοι are only known as one. "They that are with Him (*i.e.*, Christ when revealed as Lord of Lords, and King of Kings,) are called, and chosen, and faithful"—κλητοι και εκλεκτοι και πιστοι. (Rev. xvii.)

Neither the Apostle Paul, nor any of the Apostles, ever use words of doubt or uncertainty respecting Believers in the abstract, nor respecting individuals whom they had known and proved as believers.. Not a word of doubt is expressed concerning Timothy, or Titus, or Philemon, or Phœbe, or Clement, or any other individual known and recognised as a believer. Of all such it would be said, "whose names are in the Book of life." But in addressing *large gathered bodies*, among whom the Lord had said that tares as well as wheat should be found, and amongst whom there was to be a great falling away, they frequently used words of uncertainty as to *some* in those bodies. Thus in writing to the Colossians the Apostle says; "*If* ye continue in the faith grounded and settled, and be not moved away," &c., as implying that some might be merely nominal Christians and so be moved away. In the general Epistles, which were of course widest in their scope, and which were written with especial reference to the corruptions that were beginning to appear, such references to false profession are chiefly found. There, consequently, we find the strongest exhortations to prove, by obedience, the truthfulness of our profession. There too we find full and consolatory assurances, that however dark the hour, however slippery the path, "the called" are guided by a hand and protected by a power mightier than their own. The superscrip-

tion of the Epistle of Jude supplies a memorable example—"Jude, the servant of Jesus Christ, and brother of James, to the called who are sanctified in God the Father, and preserved in Jesus Christ." Τοις εν Θεῳ Πατρι ἡγιασμενοις[1] και Ιησου Χριστῳ τετηρημενοις κλητοις. "Vocatis qui in Deo patre sanctificati sunt, et in Jesus Christo custoditi" *(Calvin.)* "His qui in Deo patre dilectis et Ihesu Christo conservatis vocatis" *(Codex Amiatinus.)* See also, τους εν δυναμει Θεου φρουρουμενους, in 1 Pet. i. 5.

It is questionable whether the words "many be called, but few chosen," at the end of the parable respecting the labourers in the vineyard in Matt. xx., are genuine. It is obvious that the calling there spoken of is not to saintship merely, but to *service* in the Lord's vineyard. Nor was the validity of the claim on the part of the labourers questioned. It was recognised and the stipulated recompence was given. But then it is intimated, that among those who are owned as servants, some may be counted worthy of more especial praise and honour, and be selected from amongst their fellow servants for such praise. This would be the general sentiment of the passage, whether the concluding clause be or be not retained: for the words, "the first shall be last and the last first," are undoubtedly genuine, and they imply a selection to a certain precedence in honour.

It must not be supposed that the knowledge that there would be unsound profession in the Churches, caused the Apostles to be negligent in enforcing the necessary discipline. They did not indeed attempt to

[1] The genuine reading is, no doubt, ηγαπημενοις.

judge the secrets of the heart; they dealt only with that which was ostensible. If any were known to be habitually guilty of things such as those of which the Apostle says that "they that do such things shall not inherit the kingdom of God," (Gal. v. 21.) or if any like Hymenæus and Philetus, openly denied the faith, all such (unless they repented) were immediately put away from the communion of the Church. *Manifested*, not secret evil, is that which the Church is commanded to judge. Even the Lord Jesus Himself, although as the Searcher of hearts and knowing all things, He well knew what Judas was, yet refrained from acting on that knowledge, and continued to treat Judas just as He did the other disciples, till his iniquity was manifested by open act. If he had manifested himself as the Traitor before the Last Supper, he would not have been allowed to be present there.

That authoritative and final judgment, which the Lord alone can and will execute at His appearing, when He will extirpate "the Tares," not merely from the professing Church, but from the earth, the Corinthian saints did not exercise nor attempt to exercise, when, in obedience to the command of the Apostle, they "put away from themselves that wicked person."

Discipline is very different from that kind of judgment which roots the unbeliever out of the world.

Verse 8.

First, I thank my God through Jesus Christ, concerning all of you, that your faith is spoken of in the whole world.

Concerning all of you.] Περι not ὑπερ is the right reading of this passage.

The primitive meaning of περι is *about, around*, in a physical sense. The notion connected with its use, when followed by a genitive, is agency or influence extended from a certain centre, and enclosing within its scope the objects spoken of. Thus in the case before us, all the saints at Rome are mentioned as included within the scope of the Apostle's thanksgiving. The same thought is easily traceable in every case where it is used with the genitive in the New Testament. When followed by a genitive it is never used except in its secondary sense, and may, in every instance be rendered by *about* or *concerning*. It is especially employed when the attention is directed to *scope* or comprehensiveness; and in this again differs from ὑπερ which does not direct attention to scope.

This verse affords a standard whereby to measure the depth of the fall of Christianity. What was the Church which thus called forth the thanksgiving of the Apostle? Who were they whose faith was thus spoken of in the whole world? It was the Church *in* Rome—a body since transformed into another that has called itself, "The Church OF ROME," whose history has embodied the worst corruptions and the most abandoned

profligacy—who have warred unceasingly upon the doctrines of God, and have sought to banish the truths of this Epistle from the earth. It is wonderful how any can reflect upon this verse and not see in it the memorial of the fall of Gentile Christianity. Where, throughout the whole earth, has Christianity continued in the condition which this verse describes? Has it preserved its primitive condition in the East? Has it there continued in God's goodness? The East (*i.e.*, the Eastern or Greek branch of the Roman Empire) was the region where Apostolic Christianity gave its fullest and brightest testimony. But what followed? Corruptions too deep, too manifold to be described. The fell scourge of Mahomedanism was sent upon these corruptions; but there was no repentance: and now, Mahomedanism itself loses half its aspect of blackness when viewed by the side of the superstitions and abominations found in the so-called Christianity that lingers around it. And does Western Europe tell a different tale? What has the history of Romanism been in Italy—in Spain—in France? What the history of Protestantism in Germany, in Switzerland, and in England? Worldliness, Latitudinarianism, Socinianism, Infidelity, are no proofs that Gentile Christianity, even as seen among Protestants, has "continued in God's goodness." And how feeble, how divided, the condition of real Christianity in the midst of these hosts of the Enemy! How then can any who really know the Truth of God—who are able to distinguish between the Gospel and human civilization, pretend that they see in the signs of the times evidences of the progress of Truth? The Spirit of God has not in vain given us in this verse, the

record of what Roman Christianity *once* was, and expects us to learn and to apply the lesson.

In the whole world.] I have so rendered the words εν ὁλῳ τῳ κοσμῳ, because it is desirable to translate the prepositions according to their strict primitive meaning, whenever it can be done without violation of the English idiom. Nor is *throughout* (δια) identical in meaning with "*in*" (εν). If we speak of the diffusion of any thing (such, for example, as of a rumour or a proclamation) which diffusion may be transitory and followed by no abiding result, δια, "*throughout*" would most suitably express our meaning: but if we are speaking of something not *diffused* merely, but received; and so received, as to become established and brought into *fixed* operation, we should with more propriety use the word εν. See 2 Cor. iii. 2, where δια δοξης, is applied to the *transitory* glory connected with the First Testament, as contrasted with the *abiding* glory of the New, which is said to be εν δοξη—ει γαρ το καταργουμενον δια δοξης, πολλῳ μαλλον το μενον εν δοξῃ.

There are, in all languages, occasions in which the prepositions, in virtue of words with which they are combined, obtain an idiomatic sense in which it is needless to seek after the original meaning. Thus ομνυναι εν, in Greek: and שבע ב, in Hebrew; and "to swear by," in English; may be all regarded as idiomatic expressions. So also αγοραζειν εν (Rev. v. 9)—ηγορασας τῳ Θεῳ ἡμας εν τῳ αἱματι σου; an expression which answers to the Hebrew שבר ב. See Deut. ii. 6, "Ye shall buy meat of them for money (בכסף)." Compare in English, "to pay in," as in the sentence, "they must either pay

in money or *in goods;*" or the impassioned language of revenge, "they shall pay *in blood.*"

But in cases which are not strictly idiomatic, it is not unimportant to trace back the various uses of εν to its connexion with its primitive meaning of "*in.*" Thus "amongst," or "in the midst of," is a very frequent meaning, there being an obvious analogy between a position occupied *in* any thing, such for example as a city, a house, or a ship; and a position occupied in the midst of any thing, such, for example, as a surrounding multitude, or, metaphorically, circumstances that environ you. Several instances of εν in the sense of "*among*" are found in this chapter, as in verse 5—εν πασι τοις εθνεσιν, and in verse 12, εν ὑμιν, "*among* you"; and in verse 19, εν αυτοις, "*among* them." Compare Hebrew, "fairest *among* (ב) women." (*Cant.* v. 9.)

Another translation frequently given of this preposition is, "*with*" or "*by,*" signifying the instrumental cause. Thus, Luke xi. 20—"If I by the finger of God (εν δακτυλῳ Θεου) cast out devils," &c. The Hebrew ב is, as is well known, used continually in the same sense.[1]

For the most part, no better translation than "with" or "by" can be given to represent εν, when thus used; but as δια, with the genitive, is the preposition commonly employed to denote instrumentality, it becomes a question whether any distinction can be drawn between these two prepositions, δια and εν, when used to to signify the instrumental cause.

[1] Not unfrequently ב in Hebrew, and εν in Greek, are regarded as instances of what has been called "constructio prægnans"; and are rendered "in" and "by"—both meanings being included.

Of instrumental causes some are regarded as merely instrumental; and when we speak of them we direct attention to the mere fact of instrumentality, whilst other causes, though instrumental, are yet so identified, either actually or in our apprehension of them, with the primary agent, that the *vis efficax*, the motive energy of the action, is regarded as, in an especial manner, resident in them. I believe, therefore, that it may be safely said, that in the great majority of cases where εν is used in the New Testament to denote an instrumental cause, it indicates something more than mere instrumentality; and represents the instrument as so associated with the agent, or so embodying the active power of the energy in question, as to invest the instrument even when inanimate, with a kind of living energy, and not unfrequently to determine its moral character for good or for evil. Thus, when it was made a question by the Jews, where the efficacious power of our Lord's miracles resided—they asserting it to be in Beelzebub; He declaring it to be in God, the preposition used is not δια, but εν—"This fellow doth not cast out devils except εν τῳ Βεελζεβουλ—in association or union with Beelzebub." (Matt. xii. 24.) "If I, in association or union with Beelzebub (εν Βεελζ.), cast out devils, in association or union with whom (εν τινι) do your sons cast them out?" "If I, εν δακτυλῳ Θεου, cast out devils," &c.; Luke xi. 15—19, or as in Matt. xii. 28, "But if I, εν Πνευματι Θεου, "in association with the Spirit of God," &c. Throughout these passages, εν is used; but when mere instrumentality is spoken of, we find δια, as in Mark vi. 2—"such mighty works are wrought by (δια) His hands." Again in Mark xi. 28—εν ποιᾳ

ἐξουσίᾳ "in possession of what, or in connexion with what, kind of authority doest thou these things?"—is much stronger than if it had been said, "by means of (διὰ) what kind of authority." Indeed the words "in possession of" or "in connexion or association with" are too weak to convey the thought of inhabitation, which is conveyed by ἐν when thus used.

In such instances as ἐν ἑνὶ Πνεύματι ἡμεῖς πάντες εἰς ἓν σῶμα ἐβαπτίσθημεν—"ἐν one Spirit were we all baptized," &c.; the full exposition can only be given by ascribing to the word with which ἐν is connected the inherency of the efficacious power denoted by the verb that follows. Thus in the instance just cited, the Spirit is represented not merely as the instrument, but also as the seat, of that baptising efficacy which is referred to by the verb: and even if we find it difficult or impossible to supply a better word than "with" or "by" in a translation, yet in private reading or in exposition to others it is worth while to note every thing that tends to give greater fulness or vividness to the expressions of Scripture. When a sword is represented as having in itself the power by which it destroys, or when an individual is represented as so identified with the rod of chastisement with which he smites, that it becomes for the time the representative of his agency—the representative as it were of himself—there is evidently a force in the expression that would be inadequately conveyed by any word that, like διὰ, merely represents instrumental means. Compare the Hebrew, "I appeared to Abraham באל שדי *as* God Almighty" (Ex. vi. 3); and Ex. xxxii. 22, "thou knowest the people כי ברע הוא that they are identified with evil—they in

evil, and evil in them"; and εν ραϐδῳ ελθω προος ὑμας (1 Cor. iv. 21); and with αποκτενω εν θανατῳ. (Rev. ii. 23.) That the use of ב and εν in many instances may be regarded as idiomatic I do not deny; but not unfrequently their use gives a vividness, or force of expression which ought, as far as possible, to be preserved in translation. The use of εν, in the instrumental sense, is not confined to Hebraistic Greek; it is found, though not so frequently, in other writers: but the instances found with them may be frequently regarded as *merely* idiomatic. Thus we find in Xenophon εν τοξοις διαγωνιζεσθαι. Sometimes, however, we find the same vividness of expression in the use of εν, *e.g.*, οἱ σ'εν λιταις στειλαντες εξ οικων μολειν—"*with* prayers" would be but a weak rendering; for all the feelings of the senders are supposed to be thrown into their prayers —they became identified with their prayers—their prayers are, as it were, their messengers. So, τι δ' εν δολῳ δει μαλλον η πεισαντ' αγειν, supposes a far nearer identification of the agent with the guile that he intends to practise,[1] than would be conveyed by the words δια δολου. The comment made by Brunk on these two last passages is, "*abundat* præpositio εν," but it is evidently not a pleonasm.

[1] Compare in this chapter, verse 27, εξεκαυθησαν εν τη ορεξει αυτων; and verse 21, εματαιωθησαν εν τοις διαλογισμοις; and verse 18, των την αληθειαν εν αδικιᾳ κατεχοντων—who are holders of truth, in unrighteousness—*i.e.*, who being themselves in unrighteousness, do, as a consequence, hold all that they do hold, in unrighteousness. See following note on κατεχω. In verse 27, the persons spoken of are identified with their evil desires, just as in ברע, and εν δολῳ.

As a general rule it may be said that when εν in Greek or ב in Hebrew are used with **verbs of motion**, it is implied not only that the end is reached but remained at: that when it is used of **proximity to a place**, and translated "at" or "near," it implies that the person or thing spoken of, has, for the time being, some special connexion with the place in question; as, for example, when any particular spot is occupied so as to be appropriated or made exclusively our own. Thus the armies of Israel encamped by (ב) a fountain in Jezreel (1 Sam. xxix. 1): and the cherubim seen by Ezekiel at (ב) the river Chebar, (see Ez. x. 15) derive from that river a kind of denominative appellation throughout the vision. Lastly, when εν is used to denote the **instrumental** means, it is more forcible than δια, and implies some peculiarity of union or association with the persons or circumstances in question. Some thought therefore connected with the primitive meaning of εν may thus be traced under its various modifications.

There are some places in our version where it is important to alter the translation of εν. Thus Col. i. 23—του κηρυχθεντος εν πασῃ τῃ κτισει τῃ ὑπο τον ουρανον, is rendered "preached to every creature which is under heaven;" whereas it should be "preached in the whole creation that is under heaven"—the *sphere* of the preaching, not the *extent* to which it might actually have penetrated, being the point in question. At first, the sphere of the gospel was restricted; it was confined to Israel only (see Matt. x. 5); but now, says the Apostle, it has been preached not in Israel merely, but in the *whole* creation, according to the commandment in Mark xvi. 15. By the whole creation thus used, is

meant mankind at large, as contrasted with a limited portion of mankind, such as Israel. The force of οἱ πολλοι and παντας ανθρωπους in Rom. v. is similar.

In the whole world.] I have already observed, that the Scripture condescends to adopt forms of expression that are in ordinary use amongst men. Its object being to convey its thoughts simply and easily, it uses such forms of expression as are most widely recognised and most generally understood. When we speak of any thing as being no longer a secret, but "*known to every one;*" or when we say of an invention, that it is known "*throughout the whole world;*" no one misunderstands our meaning; no one even thinks of our speaking hyperbolically, because the expressions are conventional. Every one understands that our words are not intended to include every African tribe or Asiatic horde, but that we speak of the world of knowledge and civilization. The constantly occurring expressions so familiar to ourselves of "tout le monde"—"all the world"—"every body"—"be it known to all men," and the stately language of Imperial Rome when she spoke of holding "*orbis terrarum*"—πασα ἡ οικουμενη, as her possession, are expressions so universally recognised as having a conventional and restricted meaning, that no one dreams of the proper sobriety of language being violated by their use. The sneer, therefore, of Professor Jowett is utterly uncalled for when he observes, that "the Apostle employs language according to our sober colours of expression too strong for the occasion, as when he says that their faith is sounded abroad throughout the whole world, or when he calls God to witness of his desire to

come to them, though there was no reason to doubt this." The conventional use of language would justify the expression "*throughout* the whole world." However, the Apostle does not say "throughout." He says "in." The many Pagan and Jewish and Christian strangers, who, after visiting the great metropolis of the civilized world, would return and tell their countrymen that there were some, there, fervent in faith towards Jesus Christ, would necessarily cause it to be true that their faith should be spoken of *in* all that which was known as the world.

Secondly, it is not true that the Apostle calls God to witness his desire to come to them; he called God to witness "how without ceasing he made mention of them in his prayers."

The words of the Apostle are, "God is my witness, whom I serve in my spirit in the gospel of His Son, how unceasingly I made mention of you,"[2] *i.e.*, in my supplications before Him. There were no doubt many who loved the saints at Rome, and may have desired to see them. But to desire to see them, and "unceasingly to make mention of them" in supplication before God, are two very different things. It is respecting the constancy of his supplication that the Apostle makes so solemn an asseveration. But this Mr. Jowett forgets. In his haste to disparage the Apostle, he forgets what

[2] I do not object to Mr. Jowett's pointing the verse as he does, viz., ὡς ἀδιαλειπτως μνειαν ὑμων ποιουμαι, παντοτε επι των προσευχων μου δεομενος ει πως, &c. But surely no one would affirm, that "the mention" spoken of was other than mention in prayer.

the verse really states. How different the comment of Bengel: "Asseveratio pia, de re necessariâ, et hominibus, remotis præsertim et ignotis, occultâ."

Whom I serve with my spirit.] Literally, *in* my spirit —εν τῳ πνευματι μου. "Serve," λατρευω, is a word of Levitical or priestly meaning; a word, therefore, of dignity and honour which Israel could once appropriate to themselves; but which had now become, by the appointment of God, transferred to the Apostles and others, who, like himself, were servants of Jesus Christ. The Apostle was still carrying on the priestly service of the God of Israel—that service which Israel had lost. He was carrying it on, not outwardly merely, nor in the way of ceremonial ordinances, but in and with his spirit. His was the service of the inner man, not that of the lip or of the hand merely. Thus the true priestly service of God never ceases. It is independent of external circumstances, and can be carried on by the believer, even in the hour of death. He has ever a temple to which he has access; ever an altar; ever incense; ever a mercy-seat. The thought of unremitted priestly service is largely dwelt on in the Epistles.

Yet this inward service of his spirit was not unconnected with developed activity of thought and action, as all his labours and sufferings in the Gospel testified.

Verse 10.

Always in my prayers making request, if, by some means or other, I might now at last be prospered, by the will of God, to come unto you.

If by some means or other.] The strict meaning of πως is indefinite *mode;* of ποτε, indefinite time. Dr. Bloomfield rightly observes respecting ηδη, that when followed by a future, it denotes what is soon to take place, as in *Joseph. Antiq.* iii. 14. 1 — την μεν ηδη εχετε, την δε ηδη ληψεσθε. In connexion with ποτε, however, its meaning is somewhat modified; and I do not know that a better rendering than the usual one could be given — *tandem aliquando, now at last:* though we want perhaps more of the meaning of "soon," than is implied in the Latin words; and more of indefiniteness than is implied by "now at last." The sentiment, however, of the passage clearly is, earnestness of desire to go to Rome; a sense of continued uncertainty as to the time and mode; a sense that his desire had been long disappointed (see this forcibly stated in Rom. xv. 23), and the expression of a hope that this long period of disappointment was now at last drawing to a close. "Hæc adverbiorum et conjunctionum congeries, πως, ηδη, ποτε, mirum quoddam et impatiens exprimunt desiderium ac studium festinandi, quemadmodum admonent et Græcanica Scholia." — *Critici Sacri.*

"Illud ειπως (si quo modo) significat non certum fuisse Paulum, an quod precabatur assecuturus esset." — *Idem.*

The result showed what reason there was for the uncertainty expressed in these words. He did not go to them, either in the manner nor at the time he had hoped. For a long time, he did not go to them at all; and when he did go, it was in bonds.

Verses 11 and 12.

For I long to see you, that I might impart to you some spiritual gift, to the end that ye might be established—that is, that I might be comforted amongst you, together with you, through the mutual faith both of yourselves and me.

For I long, &c.] Although we could scarcely say (as some have said) that επι is not intensive in επιποθω, yet it is true that its chief use is to indicate the direction of the desire—"my earnest desire is toward seeing you." Compare Phil. ii. 26, επιποθων ην παντας ὑμας; and Romans xv. 23, επιποθιαν εχων του ελθειν. Επι is evidently intensive in επιγινωσκω.—See Matt. xi. 27: "ουδεις επιγινωσκει τον υἱον," &c., although the thought of the mind being intently fixed on the object contemplated, is also involved. See 1 Cor. xiv. 37—επιγινωσκετω ἁ γραφω. See also επιμενω.

That I might impart unto you some spiritual gift.] The Apostles, in virtue of their office and in attestation

to that office (for St. Paul speaks of having the signs of an Apostle) were able to impart miraculous gifts by the imposition of their hands. But we never read in the Scripture of such gifts being imparted by imposition of hands, except by Apostles or in connexion with Apostles.[1] Pretended ability to impart spiritual gifts

[1] The gift bestowed on Timothy is, in one place, said to be by (δια) the laying on of the Apostle's hands. See 2 Tim. i. 6—δια της επιθεσεως των χειρων μου. In another passage, viz., 1 Tim. iv. 14, we find it also said, that it was by prophecy (δια προφητειας)—Timothy being thus miraculously designated either by the Apostle himself, or some other endowed with the miraculous gift of "prophecy," as one who was to receive the gift to which St. Paul refers. Observe, it is not said δια, but μετα (in association with) the hands of the Presbytery. Δια is used of the hands of the Apostle alone.

Imposition of hands is spoken of in the New Testament in reference to two other objects besides that already mentioned. It was sometimes done with the view of commending to the Divine blessing those who were going forth on any special mission; as when "certain prophets and teachers" at Antioch laid their hands on Paul and Barnabas, who being *already* Apostles were neither ordained by nor received gifts from those, who, as to office, were their inferiors. Imposition of hands was also used by the Apostles and those who, like Timothy and Titus, were associated with them in their peculiar service (which was migratory and not local), for the purpose of appointing as Elders or Bishops (for they were the same office—see Acts xx., where they who in verse 17 are called πρεσβυτερους, are in verse 28 called επισκοπους) those who, by their service, had proved, that they had sufficient gift and qualification for the local oversight of the Churches over which they were respectively appointed.

by imposition of hands *now*, is one of the astounding delusions of Christendom. How needful to remember the words addressed to the Church at Ephesus — "Thou hast tried them which say they are Apostles, and are not, and hast found them liars."

Some think that the Apostle does not, in this verse, refer to any thing that he would impart to them by his miraculous power, but merely to the edification to be received from intercourse with him and from his ministry. But if the use of χαρισμα in the New Testament be observed, it will be found to denote something too high to be bestowed by any one excepting God or by those who, like the Apostles, avowedly acted in miraculous power received from Him. Χαρισμα is used seventeen times in the New Testament, but never of any thing except, either the gift of God's grace in Christ, as in Rom. vi. — "the gift of God is eternal life in Jesus Christ our Lord:" or, of the gifts of the Holy Ghost, as in 1 Cor. xii. — "there are diversities of gifts but the same Spirit:" or of some extraordinary or miraculous intervention of the Divine hand, such as that to which St. Paul ascribes his preservation from daily danger and death. It is a word, therefore, that would scarcely be employed of the edification or instruction or comfort that would result to the saints from the Apostle's ordinary ministry. Χαρις is *gratia*: χαρισμα, *gratiæ donum*.

The Apostle, in writing to Timothy, exhorts him to stir up the gift that was in him, through the laying on of his (the Apostle's) hands. The bestowment of such a gift, and the remembrance that it had been bestowed, must greatly have encouraged Timothy. The saints in

Rome, if any of them should have been privileged to receive any gift in the same manner from the Apostle, would equally have been encouraged. It would have tended to their establishment. The power to bestow such gifts was a seal to St. Paul's Apostleship; and the actual bestowment of them on any, through the Apostle, was a proof that God approved and sanctioned those on whom they were bestowed, and that he sanctioned the relation in which the Apostle, as His servant, stood towards them. This would have tended, εις το στηριχθηναι.

To the end that ye might be established.] Εις το στηριχθηναι ὑμας. Στηριζω, from ἱστημι, *to set*, means, properly, to set fast or fix as we would a foundation or pillar, or to fix firmly any thing set on such foundation or pillar. Thus λιθον κατα χθονος εστηριξε, he set the stone fast in the ground, *i.e.*, by digging down into the ground and so securing the stone from falling. Κιοσιν εστηρικται—firmly fixed on pillars. Hence any thing firmly fixed on the land would be regarded as εστηριγμενον as contrasted with any thing on the waters, which would be ουκ εστηριγμενον. Στηριζειν therefore would imply the adoption of such methods as would secure against the being shaken or thrown down; and when applied morally, means the application of such agency as secures against such influences as would produce relinquishment of an object proposed, or discouragement, vacillation, fainting, or overthrow.

The word most nearly synonymous with στηριζω in the New Testament is βεβαιοω, derived from βεβαα p. m. of βαινω, to go,—whence βεβαιος, one who

advances steadily in a given path,—hence one that is *stedfast*,—hence one that is *sure and trust-worthy*. The difference between στηριζω and βεβαιοω may be illustrated thus. If the mast of a vessel were well and firmly fixed we might pronounce it στηριχθεν; yet if the material of which it was made happened to be frail, we could not pronounce it βεβαιον, *sure and trust-worthy*. When young trees are newly planted, they are commonly supported by strong stakes, in order that they may not be so shaken by the wind as to be prevented from striking their roots. Trees so planted we pronounce εστηριγμενα, but not βεβαια, until they have struck their own roots and attained a vigor and stability of their own.

And although in the spiritual use of these words it may be true that all believers who can be pronounced εστηριγμενοι, in its most comprehensive sense, may also be regarded as βεβαιοι, yet it does not hence follow that the states are identical, or that the agency implied by βεβαιουν is precisely the same as that implied by στηριζειν. If an army were discouraged, or, if, not being discouraged, they were conflicting with difficulties which they found it hard to surmount, we might seek στηριζειν them; if, on the other hand, they were full of successful energy and we wished that such energy should be maintained, we should seek βεβαιουν. Sustainment against present or apprehended pressure; the supply of food to that which *needs* food (whence we read of στηριγμα του αρτου); the giving fixedness and stability against any tendency to faint, or to fall, or to give way, are the thoughts that predominate in στηριζειν. Hence when the Thessalonians needed to be cheered and

upheld against the sorrows that were pressing hardly upon them, this word is used. "We have sent Timothy our brother and minister of God and our fellow-labourer in the gospel of Christ, to strengthen you (*εις το στηριξαι ὑμας*) and to encourage you concerning your faith that no one might be cowed (made to cower) by these afflictions"—*τῳ μηδενα σαινεσθαι εν ταις θλιψεσι ταυταις.* (1 Thess. iii. 3.) In the following passage it is used of sustainment against "falling." "Ye then, beloved, seeing that ye know these things before, beware, that ye do not, being led away by the error of the licentious (*των αθεσμων*) fall from your own fixedness"—*εκπεσητε του ιδιου στηριγμου* (*στηριγμος*, a condition of fixedness). The Apostle then adds, "but grow in grace," &c., this would be the *βεβαιουσθαι.* See also Col. ii. 5. "For though I am absent in the flesh, yet am I with you in the spirit, joying and beholding your order, and the firmness of your faith in Christ"—*το στερεωμα της εις Χριστον πιστεως ὑμων.*[1] This verse shows that the Colossians were regarded by the Apostle as already *εστηριγμενοι.* The next verse refers to their future progress. "As ye have therefore received Christ Jesus the Lord, *so walk ye in Him,* rooted and built up in Him, and stablished (*βεβαιουμενοι*) in the faith, as ye have been taught, abounding therein with thanksgiving." Strength derived from the ministration of food, or of any external aid, is different from that which arises

[1] *Στερεοω,* is a word which may be regarded as having the same origin as *στηριζω,* viz., from ΣΤΑ and *ιστημι.* See *Scott* and *Liddell.* The French word *solidarité* gives perhaps the closest rendering of *στερεωμα.*

from the impartation of an abiding internal vigour. This latter kind of establishment is more peculiarly expressed by βεβαιουμενοι. The agency, therefore, that is expressed by βεβαιουν is higher and more comprehensive than that expressed by στηριζειν—including all the various agencies in earth and Heaven, whether internally or externally operating, which God has provided both to preserve His people, and also to establish them in such things as make inwardly and abidingly strong —"strong in the Lord and in the power of His might." The high and comprehensive character of the agency expressed by βεβαιουν, is the reason, probably, why that word is never applied by the Apostles to their own ministry (though στηριζειν and επιστηριζειν often are) but is referred exclusively to the agency of God. I do not mean that God never uses the ministry of His servants as a means in promoting the βεβαιωσις of His people. He does; but still He alone is spoken of as ὁ βεβαιων. See 2 Cor. i. 21, Ὁ δε βεβαιων ἡμας συν ὑμιν εις Χριστον και χρισας ἡμας, ΘΕΟΣ. See also 1 Cor. i. 8;[1] and compare the use of στηριζω in Rev. iii. 2., and Luke xxii. 32. There is a sense of authority, certainty, and perpetuity, connected with βεβαιω, that is not found in στηριζω.

It will be understood that I apply these observations only to instances in which στηριζω and βεβαιοω are

[1] In this passage, however, the force of βεβαιουν, in consequence of its connexion with ανεγκλητους seems limited to confirmation in such things as should preserve the Corinthians, "uncharged." See subsequent remarks on ανεγκλητος.

applied in a moral sense to *believers, as subjects of the agency of others.*[2]

The το στηριχθηναι ὑμας, and the συμπαρακληθηναι εν ὑμιν εμε, are here regarded as virtually identical. We can easily understand how a condition in which he, the Apostle, could stand in their midst and be comforted, together with them, by the display of their mutual faith, might well be regarded as identical with a condition of increased fixedness. That which promoted one of these conditions would necessarily conduce to the other.

[2] These words στηριζεσθαι and βεβαιουσθαι in the passive, are never applied to the Lord Jesus, nor are capable of being applied to Him as to us, seeing that He never knew, or could know, any form of moral weakness or infirmity of purpose. Στηριζω in the active is once applied to Him when He formed the fixed purpose of going to Jerusalem, and meeting all that there awaited Him—το προσωπον αυτου εστηριξε του πορευεσθαι εις Ἱερουσαλημ.—Compare Isaiah l. 7—εθηκα το προσωπον μου ως στερεαν πετραν, και εγνων οτι ου μη αισχυνθω. Such words belong to One who had in Himself the inherent power of forming and giving fixedness to His own resolves, against all circumstances however terrible. Ενισχυω in a physical sense is applied to Him, where it is said, "and there appeared an angel unto Him from Heaven, strengthening Him." (Luke xxii. 43.)

Verse 17.

For therein is the righteousness of God revealed, &c.

The right understanding of these words, "righteousness of God" is of no little moment in apprehending the "gospel of the grace of God." The awakening of Luther's mind to a right apprehension of the sense in which these words are used in this Epistle, was, instrumentally, the cause of the Reformation. He had supposed that they referred to righteousness as an attribute of God, and therefore he had regarded the Gospel as a system of modified Law, under which life was to be earned by faithfulness of obedience. But when he thought of these words as meaning, not righteousness as a Divine attribute, but the righteousness prepared in Christ wherewith God invests, and wherein He accepts, believers—a righteousness which is "unto and upon all them that believe," the light of grace broke in on Luther's soul and he understood the Gospel.

The verse we are considering concludes with a quotation from Habakkuk, viz., "The righteous from faith" (that is, he whose righteousness is derived from faith, not from works) "shall LIVE." Ὁ δε δικαιος εκ πιστεως, ΖΗΣΕΤΑΙ.

That in this passage from Habakkuk, the words, "εκ πιστεως" are to be united with ὁ δικαιος, not with ζησεται, is manifest, not only from the accentuation of the Hebrew (an evidence not to be despised), but also from the manner in which the Apostle Paul constantly connects either δικαιοσυνη, or its cognates, with εκ

πιστεως, whenever he is reasoning on justification. See for example the following passages:—

Δικαιωσει περιτομην εκ πιστεως,	Rom. iii. 30.
Δικαιωθεντες ουν εκ πιστεως,	Rom. v. 1.
Δικαιοσυνην δε την εκ πιστεως,	Rom. ix. 30.
Ἡ δε εκ πιστεως δικαιοσυνη,	Rom. x. 6.
Δικαιωθωμεν εκ πιστεως Χριστου,	Gal. ii. 16.
Οἱ εκ πιστεως ευλογουνται,	Gal. iii. 9.
Εκ πιστεως δικαιοι τα εθνη,	Gal. iii. 8.

It is obvious that to speak of any one as δικαιωθεις εκ πιστεως, or as having his δικαιοσυνην εκ πιστεως is the same thing as saying that he is δικαιος εκ πιστεως. Also in Gal. iii. 9, we find the following parallelism of expression:—

Οἱ εκ πιστεως, ΕΥΛΟΓΟΥΝΤΑΙ.
Οἱ δικαιοι εκ πιστεως, ΖΗΣΟΝΤΑΙ.

And when, in Gal. iii. 2, the Apostle again quotes the passage from Habakkuk, the opposed clauses in verses 11 and 12 are ὁ δικαιος εκ πιστεως and ὁ ποιησας αυτα (εργα νομου).

Ὁ δικαιος εκ πιστεως, ΖΗΣΕΤΑΙ.
Ὁ ποιησας αυτα ανθρωπος, ΖΗΣΕΤΑΙ.

Every passage, indeed, in which St. Paul thus connects δικαιος, or its cognates, with εκ πιστεως may be regarded as a virtual reference to the text in Habakkuk, and as authoritatively confirming the meaning which the Hebrew accentuation gives. Besides, it would be utterly impossible to connect αποκαλυπτεται with εκ πιστεως, for revelation could never be said to *spring*,

either instrumentally, or in any other way, from faith; and if the words εκ πιστεως cannot be connected with αποκαλυπτεται, the only other words with which they can be connected are δικαιοσυνη Θεου. Any one too who examines the context of the passage in Habakkuk will see, that "LIVE" is there used in the same sense as when it is said, "This do and thou shalt LIVE," *i. e.*, it is used as the opposed thought to "perish." See this use of "live" in Moses and the Prophets throughout. But they who adopt the other rendering—"the just shall live by faith," attach to the word "live" quite another thought; referring it to the continuous or practical life of faith—a subject foreign to this verse.

These words of Habakkuk then, ὁ δικαιος εκ πιστεως, being quoted by the Apostle as identical with his own statement in the previous part of this verse, *prove* that δικαιοσυνη Θεου in this verse is to be supplied before εκ πιστεως. The verse, therefore, with the ellipsis supplied would stand thus—δικαιοσυνη γαρ Θεου εν αυτῳ αποκαλυπτεται—δηλονοτι, δικαιοσυνη Θεου εκ πιστεως αποκαλυπτεται εις πιστιν, καθως γεγραπται, Ὁ ΔΕ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣ ΕΚ ΠΙΣΤΕΩΣ, ζησεται. For the righteousness of God is in it revealed, to wit, the righteousness of God which is from faith is revealed to faith, according as it is written, "He that is righteous from faith," (*i.e.*, he whose righteousness is derived from faith, not from works) "shall live." The words δικαιοσυνη Θεου are used in the same sense in the following well-known passages: — Νυνι δε χωρις νομου δικαιοσυνη Θεου πεφανερωται . . . . δικαιοσυνη δε Θεου δια πιστεως Ιησου Χριστου, εις παντας και επι παντας τους πιστευοντας. Rom. iii. 21. And Phil. iii. 9—και ευρεθω

εν αυτῳ (Χριστῳ) μη εχων εμην δικαιοσυνην την εκ νομου, αλλα την δια πιστεως Χριστου, την εκ Θεου δικαιοσυνην επι τῃ πιστει. These verses may guide us to the meaning of δικαιοσυνη Θεου εκ πιστεως, wherever used.

That righteousness as a personal attribute of God cannot be meant by the words δικαιοσυνη εκ πιστεως, is manifest, from the fact that the Divine righteousness is underived, essential, and everlasting. Besides which, righteousness as a Divine attribute was the distinctive subject of manifestation at Sinai, through the Law, and therefore could not be referred to in a verse which avowedly treats of that which distinctively marks the Gospel.

The justifying righteousness in which a believer is accepted may be well termed "the righteousness of God," for it is appointed by God; it is prepared by God in Christ; and it is put on us by God. It is, in every sense, His work and His gift. And seeing that it results instrumentally from faith, not from works, it is described as springing "out of" or "from" faith not from works. And if God is pleased to recognise judicially, a righteousness which springs not from works but from faith, it follows, that such righteousness when the mode of attaining it is spoken of, must be spoken of as an object revealed to faith, and not as any thing proposed to works for attainment. Hence this righteousness is said to be "of faith," (εκ πιστεως) and to be revealed "unto faith" (εις πιστιν.) A system of justifying by faith is necessarily one that is proposed to faith, just as a system of justifying by works, must be proposed to works. Faith has to do with that which is proposed to faith, just as works have to do with that which is proposed to works.

It must be remembered, however, that when we speak of righteousness springing from or being derived from faith, we speak of faith only *as an instrument;* and not as any thing that is in itself meritorious. If any one, standing on a rock, casts a rope to another who is struggling in the waters and saves him, there is a sense in which we may speak of the safety of that person as resulting from his having grasped the cord; but it is in a sense very different from that in which we ascribe it to the strength or kindness of him who threw it. Faith is only as the act of the hand that grasps the proffered aid. In the fourth chapter of this Epistle, the Apostle expressly *contrasts* faith with works of righteousness; and so far from regarding it as in itself righteousness, or as the meritorious root of righteousness, says, on the contrary, that it is imputed FOR righteousness. Faith has, in the arrangements of God's grace, an attributed value which intrinsically it has not; just as a note stamped by the authority of government obtains a conventional value which intrinsically it has not. "To him that worketh not, but believeth on Him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is counted FOR righteousness"—λογιζεται εις δικαιοσυνην.[1] [Compare the use of λογιζομαι εις, in Romans ii. 26—ουχι ἡ ακροβυστια αυτου εις περιτομην λογισθησεται.]

And as the connexion of the words, εκ πιστεως, with δικαιοσυνη Θεου, prove that the latter cannot be inter-

[1] Faith imputed *for* righteousness, and the imputed righteousness of Christ are two very distinct, though connected, branches of doctrine. The first is treated of in the fourth chapter, the latter in the fifth chapter of Romans.

Imputed and Imparted - either/or, both/and

preted to mean righteousness as a divine attribute; so the words εις πιστιν shew that δικαιοσυνη Θεου cannot refer (as some have said) to any righteousness supposed to be infused into or implanted in us; for nothing *in us* could be described as revealed *to* our faith; for faith has always to do with something external to ourselves —something that is presented to us as an *external* object by God. No interpretation, therefore, of the words δικαιοσυνη Θεου is admissible, except it will bear the test of the words εκ πιστεως, and also of αποκαλυπτεται εις πιστιν. There is no surer way of undermining the Gospel, than saying that δικαιοσυνη Θεου describes any thing implanted in us.

We must beware of being misled by the mere *sound* of words in the interpretation of Scripture. It is not the ear, but the understanding, that is to guide us in exposition. I say this, because many persist in quoting the words "from glory to glory," in 2 Cor. iii. 18, as if they were analogous to "from faith to faith": and seeing that the former words signify progress from one degree of glory to another, therefore it is supposed that a similar notion of progress from one degree of faith to another is involved in the latter expression. But surely the reference of all prepositions, such as "from" and "to," is to be determined by the words with which they are respectively connected. In 2 Cor. iii., both these prepositions are attached to the verb μεταμορφουμεθα; there consequently progress of moral transformation from one degree to another is denoted; but in the Romans one of these prepositions, viz., εκ, is attached to δικαιοσυνη Θεου, the other "εις," to αποκαλυπτεται. On the impossibility of connecting εκ with

αποκαλυπτεται, I have already remarked; for there is no sense in which faith could be made the source of revelation. The subject of the passage, therefore, is revelation, not progression.

If the grace extended to us in the Gospel had ended in forgiveness merely—if deliverance from the consequences of our guilt had been the only blessing given, we should not have found the expression δικαιοσυνη Θεου to indicate the result into which believers are brought through redemption. But the Gospel has not left us in a negative condition, such as would attach to *mere* forgiveness. The forgiveness which men exercise towards each other has continually this negative character, being *mere* forgiveness; but the forgiveness of the Gospel is always accompanied by a reception into a recognised standing of righteousness. He who is *forgiven through* Christ, is also *accepted in Christ*. The endowment that he receives in Christ is Righteousness —Life—Love—Glory. RIGHTEOUSNESS, for it is written, "He is the Lord our righteousness." "Christ is the end of the Law for righteousness to every one that believeth." "Who is made unto us wisdom from God, both righteousness and sanctification and redemption." LIFE, for it is written, "Your life is hid with Christ in God, when Christ who is our life shall appear, then shall ye also appear with Him in glory." LOVE, for "Thou hast loved them as thou hast loved me." GLORY, "The glory thou hast given me, I have given them." Such, by the appointment of God, are the *necessary concomitants of forgiveness as received by the Gospel.*

In human arrangements (by following too closely the analogy of which, many have been led into error)

pardon may be granted to a criminal, but it is never accompanied by the imputation of righteousness. Human law when it cannot *prove* guilty, acquits; and it sometimes pardons convicted criminals, but it never imputes righteousness. A pardoned criminal may remain an outcast from society to the end of his days. But it is otherwise in the arrangements of God. The *Law* of Sinai indeed knows no such thing as acquittal. He that offendeth in one point being guilty of all; and failure in perfectness of love being as much a breach of the commandment as the commission of palpable transgression; none can be acquitted—*all* stand condemned. But grace can save the condemned; and, through Christ, it does save all who believe. But its method of salvation bears strict relation to what Christ has been in His two great characters—the Sufferer and the Righteous One. On the Cross we do not merely see the bruised and stricken Substitute bearing the wrath due to His people—we see also the Righteous One, "obedient unto death, even the death of the Cross," finishing in the midst of death that well-pleasing obedience that He had ever manifested in life. These two aspects of the Cross cannot be separated. They are as inseparable as the suffering and the righteousness of the great Substitute. Accordingly if Scripture speaks of His "having been made a curse for us," it also speaks of His "having given Himself an offering and a sacrifice to God for a sweet-smelling savour." If it be said, "God hath made Him to be sin for us who knew no sin," it is added, "that we might be (not pardoned merely, but) made the righteousness of God in Him." If one part of the sin offering was "burnt

up" or utterly "consumed" as by the fierce fire of wrath in a place without the camp, the other part was burned on the altar for a sweet savour.[1] If the victim which the worshipper brought to the altar was stricken so as to receive the stroke of death in his stead, it was also burned for him on the altar for a sweet savour, and thus the value of that sweet savour was reckoned to him. Can there be a plainer type of imputation of righteousness? Christ did indeed bear the wrath due to the sins of His people, but He also presented for them His own righteousness unto God; and therefore, in the method of grace, pardon and the imputation of righteousness can never be dissociated. Hence when the Apostle quotes from the Psalms a verse that describes the blessedness of the *non*-imputation of sin, he quotes it as proving the imputation of righteousness. Why is this? Not because non-imputation of sin is the same thing as the imputation of righteousness—not because they are always and under all circumstances, concomitants; but because, *in the arrangements of God's grace in Christ*, they are always concomitants. As a consequence of that double aspect in the sacrifice of the Cross to which I have referred, every one to whom sin is *not* imputed, must also be one to whom righteousness *is* imputed. The blessedness, therefore, of a person forgiven through Christ, involves, as the Apostle says, the imputation of righteousness quite as much as the

[1] The "burning up or consuming," and "the burning on the altar for a sweet savour," are denoted by two different words in Scripture—the first by שרף; the second by קטר, from which last קטרה, *incense*, is derived.

divinity, seen in creation
deity " " Christ

non-imputation of sin. We need not wonder therefore that the Apostle should not only speak of the αφεσις αμαρτιων but of the δικαιοσυνη of them who, through faith, are brought into connexion with the work of Christ.

Who hold the truth in unrighteousness.] The truth here spoken of is defined in a succeeding verse to be "the eternal power and divinity (θειοτητα) of God," which was borne witness to by the works of creation around them. This truth their understandings had fully grasped. They had a firm hold on it (such is the meaning of κατεχω): but they acted against their convictions, and so proved their guilt.

The primitive meaning of κατεχω is "*to have a firm hold of*" (κατα being intensive) as when we hold fast a prisoner, a treasure, or any thing of which we have firm possession. Compare 1 Cor. vii. 30, "and they that buy as though they possessed not—ὡς μη κατεχοντες, *i.e.*, as if they had no firm hold on that which they had bought. In Matt. xxi. 38, it is rendered in our version "seized on," but would be more properly translated, "let us hold fast," or "retain possession of" his inheritance; for the inheritance having been let out to the wicked husbandmen was already in their keeping. The following examples show the force of κατεχω in the New Testament whenever it is applied morally to the holding of truth.

Luke viii. 15, "Having heard the word *keep it* or *hold it fast*" (κατεχουσι).

1 Cor. xv. 2, "If ye *keep in memory (hold fast,* κατεχετε) what I preached," &c.

1 Thess. v. 21, "*Hold fast* that which is good."
Heb. iii. 6. "If we *hold fast* the confidence."
Heb. iii. 14, "If we *hold* the beginning of our confidence."
Heb. x. 23, "Let us *hold fast* the profession," &c.

It is obvious that when we "hold fast" a prisoner we may be said "to detain or restrain" him. This which may be termed an accidental or contextual sense of κατεχω (for it depends upon the context) is the meaning which some attach to it in the passage before us. They think that it describes the Gentiles as restraining or imprisoning the light of truth which had reached them.

But is it not the great object of the whole passage to dwell on the *external* source (viz., the works of creation) from which the light of truth reached them, and to shew that the light thence emanating was so full and clear that their consciences, unless unnaturally darkened, could not but recognise it. Do not the words νοουμενα καθοραται, in the 20th verse, and γνοντες, in the 21st verse, express this, in the same way as κατεχοντες? And are we ever accustomed to speak of light, when derived from some external and continuing source, as being imprisoned, because we may refuse to use it, or turn away our eyes from it, or even wilfully destroy our powers of perception. We should not be said to restrain or imprison the light, unless we could reach the source from which it emanated. Men could not imprison the light which the works of creation gave to the eternal power and divinity of God. They could not prevent the heavens from declaring His glory, or the firmament from showing His handywork. These

were truths that they could not imprison, for they were beyond their reach. They received the knowledge of these truths—their consciences recognised them, and yet they themselves continued in unrighteousness. Is not this fitly expressed by saying that "they held truth in unrighteousness"?

The intensive force of κατα in composition is well known. An instance in 1 Cor. ix. 18, deserves to be noted, where καταχραομαι does not mean "*to abuse*" as it is wrongly rendered in our version, but "to use thoroughly or to the full." St. Paul would not have "abused" his authority (as our version seems to imply) if he had demanded support for himself and his fellow-labourers; but he chose rather "to make the Gospel without charge," so that he did not exert or use to the full (εις το μη καταχρησασθαι) his authority in the Gospel. A similar correction should be made in 1 Cor. vii. 31—"and they that use this world as not intently using it." We are here directed not merely, not "*to abuse*" the world, but we are told not to use it with any degree of earnestness at all.

In ordinary writers we find the same use of καταχραομαι—ου μονον εις πομα καταχρωνται τῳ οινῳ. See Ælian quoted by Schleusner who rightly observes that "*abuti*" is used in the same intensive force in Latin. Thus Cicero, "nos sagacitate canum ad utilitatem nostram abutimur." He who "uses up" a thing or uses it till he exhausts it may carry his use of it to excess. Hence we can easily see how καταχραομαι obtains in some connexions the sense of "*abuse.*" But it must be regarded as its secondary and derived meaning. In the New Testament it is never so used.

Nothing is more common than the intensive use of κατα. See for example, καθορατα in the next verse.

On κατεχω *as used in* 2 Thess. ii. 6.

In the New Testament κατεχω is not often used to signify the holding fast *in the way of restraint*. The most remarkable instance of its being so used is in 2 Thess. ii.—και ΝΥΝ το κατεχον οιδατε, εις το αποκαλυφθηναι αυτον εν τῳ ἑαυτου καιρῳ· το γαρ μυστηριον ηδη ενεργειται της ανομιας, μονον ὁ κατεχων αρτι, ἑως εκ μεσου γενηται, και ΤΟΤΕ αποκαλυφθησεται ὁ ανομος.

The first word to be noted in this sentence is NYN. Its position marks it as *emphatic*. It sets the *present* existence of a certain agency in contrast with the *future* cessation of such agency—that period of cessation being marked by the word TOTE, to which NYN is opposed.

If (as is unhappily done in our English version) we connect the word νυν with οιδατε, the meaning would be this—"*at present* ye know something that, by and by, ye will cease to know."[1] Present possession of

[1] If the passage be examined, it will be seen that the next clause in which, μονον ὁ κατεχων αρτι occurs, amplifies and is virtually expository of the first—these words being a restatement in a more precise form of the truth that there existeth at present an agency that restrains. I say more precise, because το κατεχον implies an *agency* of restraint only, whereas ὁ κατεχων implies the existence of a *personal agent* employed in restraining.

From the first clause, it might possibly be inferred that "the

knowledge would be contrasted with future cessation of knowledge. But this is evidently not the meaning. Indeed it would not have been true; for knowledge once possessed would have been retained. The object of the passage is not to foretel the extinction of their knowledge, but to contrast the present existence of a certain restraining agency with the future cessation of such agency: the right translation of the passage being this—And ye know that there doth at present exist that which restraineth"—*και νυν (ὑπαρχειν) το κατεχον οιδατε.*

foretell

The passage does not state that the Thessalonians knew *what it was* that restrained the working of the mystery of lawlessness. It merely states that they knew that there was a certain agency that did restrain.

Man of Sin" was then existing; for it might be said, "Is he not spoken of as being under the restraint of *το κατεχον*?" But the next clause shows that it is "the mystery of lawlessness" that is now working, and that *that* and not the *ὁ ανομος* is the present subject of restraint.

It should be observed also, that in the first clause, the object of the restraining agency is mentioned as being this, viz., that the *ὁ ανομος* might be revealed in his own appointed time, *and not before*—*εις το αποκαλυφθηναι αυτον εν τῳ ἑαυτου καιρῳ.* These words shew that as soon as that appointed time comes, the now present restraining agency is to cease. *Νυν*, therefore, is contrasted with the *future καιρος* of Antichrist's manifestation in the first clause, just as *αρτι, the representative of νυν in the next clause*, is contrasted with the future *τοτε.* When particles of time like *νυν* and *αρτι* are used emphatically, the context shews whether they contrast the present with *past* or with *future* time.

To know that a certain power is existent and operative, is a very different thing from being acquainted with the nature of such power. If the Thessalonians had been acquainted with the agency by which God has, for so many ages, restrained the development of the evil here referred to, they must have understood the secrets of the government of God. They must have comprehended the method of His control over evil and over good; over angels, and men, and devils; over nations, and over individuals; over the Church and over the world—for what agency has not been called into operation to effect the restraint here spoken of? But these secrets of the Divine government the Thessalonians knew not, and we know not. All that they knew, and we know, is, that there existed, as there still does exist, an agency, by which a check is kept upon the working of the mystery of lawlessness.

This chapter is not unfrequently read as if it treated only of the period of the manifestation of "the Lawless One." It does indeed speak of that period; but it also speaks of the working of certain principles which, ages before the manifestation of THE Apostasy and its Head, secretly leaven society and prepare the way. Men love and cherish principles of lawlessness (*ανομιας*) before those principles become headed up and embodied in "the Lawless One." Although "the Apostasy," that is to say, Antichristianism as a matured and developed system, and Antichrist as the Head of the Apostasy, will, at a moment appointed of God, be suddenly and concurrently manifested, yet antichristian principles precede, by centuries, both Antichristianism and Antichrist. The mere fact of living previously to

his manifestation frees not from the danger of connexion with his principles. Of his own days the Apostle said, "the mystery of lawlessness doth already work."

We should give to *ανομια* its simple meaning of "lawlessness" in this passage. No word can more suitably express the moral condition of those who say both of Jehovah and of Christ, "Let us break their bands asunder, and cast away their cords from us." "Our lips are our own; who is Lord over us?" To acknowledge that the laws of God are worthy of being observed and reverenced, and yet under the force of temptation to break them is rebellion and sin; but it is a less advanced[1] manifestation of sin that when the authority both of the Law and the Legislator is avowedly rejected and blasphemed. Such rejection is Lawlessness. It is true indeed that all sin has in it the principle of lawlessness, and therefore is virtually lawlessness. "Every one," says the Apostle John, "who is a doer of sin is also a doer of lawlessness: and sin is lawlessness."[2] The bud cannot be essentially

[1] The contrary to this is, however, part of the popular false theory of morals.

[2] *Πας ὁ ποιων την ἁμαρτιαν και την ανομιαν ποιει, και ἡ ἁμαρτια εστιν ἡ ανομια.* *Ανομια* should not have been translated (as it is in our version) as if it could be the same as *παραβασις του νομου*. It was the habit of the Jewish mind, not only to multiply distinctions unnecessarily, but also to make out of such distinctions essential differences. Some were disposed to extenuate some forms of sin by pleading that they were not lawlessness. The Apostle answers that all sin is virtual lawlessness. The bud and the fruit of a poisonous plant are not different as regards the presence of

different from the flower and the fruit. Yet because of such essential similarity we are not accustomed to pass over, unnoticed, distinctions that result from different degrees of development.

When the Apostle spoke of "the mystery of lawlessness already working," he evidently referred to the avowed infidelity that was beginning to abound. The two great religious systems of the day, Paganism and Judaism, had begun to produce their matured results upon the minds of those who had been subjected to their influence. Although the last of these systems was not like Paganism, a lie, (for in origin it was from God) yet, in the hands of men it had become a system of perverted and prostituted Truth. The word of God had been made of no effect by tradition; and many among the educated Jews were just as ready as Pilate, scoffingly to say, "What is Truth?" Sadduceanism was virtual Infidelity; and both among Pagans and among Jews, many a heart, unsatisfied by forms and wearied by priestcraft and priestly assumption, were seeking in the freedom of scepticism a new sphere for the indulgence of their unsanctified and world-loving hearts. Contempt of and insubjection to every thing "called God, or that is worshipped," had become widely prevalent eighteen hundred years ago; and nothing but the reason here given by the Apostle, that is, the presence of an almighty restraining power, could account for the manifestation of "lawlessness" in its full and final form having been so long delayed.

the same poisonous element in both; though as to the degree of concentration there may be difference.

It pleased God, in His long-suffering mercy, to appoint that before the restraint on the manifestation of "the mystery of lawlessness" should be removed, the world should first be visited by the testimony of the gospel of the GRACE of God. But as soon as the Apostles had died, Truth, as revealed through Christ, fell into the grasp of unregenerate men, and by them was soon perverted and prostituted to the service of the world. Corrupt Christianity, like Paganism and perverted Judaism, has also hardened the hearts of men into scepticism. The scornfulness of Pilate and the indifferentism of Gallio, find their parallel in the thoughts and ways of thousands of nominal Christians now. Truth and its bright lines of light, and all disposition even remotely to acknowledge their preciousness, are fast departing from before the minds of men; and so where Truth and the Spirit of Truth are not, there is no barrier, save that which God's long-suffering mercy maintains, against the power of Satan. At present God is still the ὁ κατεχων, and provides the το κατεχον. But when the period of long-suffering is past, and the restraint now kept upon evil withdrawn, and the ενεργεια πλανης, the energy that leadeth astray, is judicially sent upon a forsaken world, who then will stand? None but those whose loins are girt about with Truth.

It has been proposed, in rendering the next clause of this passage, to alter the punctuation and the translation thus—"For the mystery of lawlessness doth already work (only there is at present One that restraineth) [and will continue so to work] until it be developed out of the midst—το γαρ μυστηριον ηδη ενεργειται της ανομιας (μονον ὁ κατεχων αρτι) ἑως εκ μεσου γενηται.

In this case the words "mystery of lawlessness," becomes the nominative to γενηται, and not ὁ κατεχων.

In support of this rendering it may be urged, that although εκ μεσου when connected with words signifying abstraction or withdrawal (such for example, as αιρω, εξερχομαι, ἁρπαζω) does, *in virtue of those words*, gain the meaning of removal, yet that γιγνομαι, when used independently, imparts to εκ μεσου no thought of abstraction or withdrawal; and that consequently the simple rendering of εως εκ μεσου γενηται would be "*donec e medio fiat;*" or if applied to the manifestation of something that had been hidden, "*donec e medio appareat*" but that it could not rightly be rendered "*donec de medio tollatur.*" When we speak of the moon as emerging from the midst of clouds; or of a horn appearing out of the midst of the head of an animal; or of an individual emerging from the midst of a crowd that had environed and concealed him, there is no thought of abstraction but merely of emerging into distinctness of manifestation. Thus it is said of Phineas, εξανεστη εκ μεσου της συναγωγης, where there is no thought of *abstraction*, nor even of departure until it is said in the next verse where he went. So again, προφητην αναστησω αυτοις εκ μεσου[1] των αδελφων αυτων. (Deut. xviii. 18.) Also, εκαλεσε Κυριος τον Μωυσην εκ μεσου της νεφελης. (Ex. xxiv. 16.) Compare also, ανθ' ού ὁσον ὑψωσα σε απο μεσου του λαου. (1 Kings xiv. 7.) [εκ μεσου would have been a more suitable rendering of the Hebrew here. See following foot note.]

[1] Some copies of LXX read only εκ in this place.

It may be further urged that whereas the working of lawlessness is spoken of in the first part of the passage as a hidden thing (μυστηριον) proceeding in the midst of society *secretly*, we might expect that its *development* would also be spoken of, and that such development is taught by the words, εκ μεσου γιγνεσθαι. Moreover, that this rendering is consonant with the use of "γιγνομαι εκ" in other passages in the New Testament; as φωνη εγενετο εκ των ουρανων (Mark i. 11); εγενετο φωνη εκ της νεφελης (Mark ix. 7, and Luke ix. 35); εκ σου καρπος γενηται (Matt. xxi. 19); φωνην εξ ουρανου γενεσθαι (Luke iii. 22); γενομενον εκ γυναικος (Gal. iv. 4); εξ ὡν γινεται φθονος (1 Tim. vi. 4); μη εκ φαινομενων τα βλεπομενα γεγονεναι (Heb. xi. 3). In all these passages it is evident that the thought of "issuing or springing from" is that implied by γιγνεσθαι εκ. Απο is the preposition that is commonly used with γιγνομαι, when "*separation*" is intended.[1]

The chief argument against the rendering proposed, is founded on the use of εις μεσον, εν μεσῳ and εκ μεσου, especially in *classical* Greek. The first—εις μεσον is frequently used of any thing brought into the midst of men; so that, εις μεσον τιθεναι τι, *in medio aliquid ponere*, would be said of any thing which we set as a

[1] See the following remark of Stephens: Affertur autem γιγνομαι et cum επι e Dem.—γενεσθαι επι πραγμασι. Contrariam autem significationem habet cum præp. απο, ut, γενομενος απο πραξεων εκεινων, "cum in illis negotiis occupatus esse desiisset." *Plut. Them.* Item, ὁταν γενομενοι καθ' αὐτους απο της ακροασεως. At cum gen. pers. απο τινος γενομενος, Ab aliquo disjunctus." (*Stephens in voc.* γιγνομαι).

prize for public competition; and εις το μεσον φερειν would be "*to bring forward any thing in public*": and εις μεσον would be applied to any one who had gone into the arena of strife or competition. Εν μεσῳ not unfrequently signifies "interposition," or the being in a middle place, so as to stand obstructively in the way of any thing. Thus, Xenoph. Cyrop. v. ii. 26—τι δ' εφη, εν μεσῳ εστι του συμμιξαι; *what stands in the way of their uniting with us?* As the opposite to εν μεσῳ thus used, εκ μεσου, sometimes, *when connected with words signifying removal,* implies removal from such obstructive place. Scripture supplies several examples of this use of εκ μεσου, *e. g.*, Col. ii. 14: εξαλειψας το καθ' ἡμων χειρογραφον τοις δογμασιν, ὁ ην ὑπεναντιον ἡμιν, και αυτο ἡρκεν εκ του μεσου" &c. Two passages from Herodotus are also quoted as shewing a similar use of εκ μεσου, viz., Herod. iii. 83, and viii. 22.[1] But neither of these two passages are of any value in determining the *independent* force of εκ μεσου, because the words καθεζεσθαι and εζεσθε, as here used, necessarily give to εκ the meaning of "secession," quite as much as its connexion with αιρω in Col. ii. 14 gives to it there the meaning of *removal.*

The passage most relied on to shew that εκ μεσου has the independent force of removal or withdrawal, is from

[1] These passages are as follow:—ουτος μεν δη σφι ουκ ενηγωνιζετο, αλλ' εκ του μεσου κατηστο—said of Otanes, when he retired from competition with his fellow-nobles for the Persian crown. And, ὑμεις δε ετι και νυν εκ του μεσου ἡμιν εζεσθε—addressed by Themistocles to the Ionians when he wished to separate them from the Persian confederacy against Greece.

Æschin. Epist. The passage is as follows: τις γαρ ουκ οιδεν, ὁτι αποθανοντες οἱ ανθρωποι οὑτω και φευγοντες εκ της πατριδος, τοτε δη και μαλιστα, ὁποιοι τινες εγενοντο τους τροπους, διαδεικνυνται; και γαρ ἁ συνεκρυπτον αυτοι προτερον, εκ μεσου γενομενων αναφαινεται καθαρως. (*Æsch. Epist.* xii.) On this passage Stephens remarks as follows: Ego vero non dubitem hanc significationem του εκτος s. εξω dare præpositioni εκ in isto loquendi genere, Εκ μεσου γενομενος, apud Æschin. Epist. pro "e medio sublatus"; nam γενομενος verti non posset "sublatus," nisi respectu signif. illius quæ datur præpositioni εκ."

The remark Stephens here makes, viz., that γιγνομαι, taken by itself, cannot imply "secession" or "removal," is very obviously true. But a word that may, in its independent use, be of very wide and undetermined meaning, may, by means of its context, become closely defined and limited. And is it not so in this passage from Æschines? In the first part of the passage quoted, he speaks of those removed either by death or by banishment. To them the words, εκ μεσου γιγνομενων, avowedly refer, and therefore virtually mean, "when they have been *so* removed," *i.e.*, by death or by banishment (death, &c. supplying the thought of the removing agency)—"when by death or banishment they have been removed out of the midst." The first part of the sentence defines the second. Nor do I know any passage in which γιγνομαι, or τιθημι, or καθεζομαι, or εζομαι are used with εκ μεσου in the sense of "abstraction or separation from the midst," in which that meaning is not derived from the context. A word like εκποδων, which is always used in the unvarying sense

of removal out of the way, as opposed to εμποδων, needs not the help of its context: but no one pretends that εκ μεσου has any such unvarying meaning. In Deut. xxiii. 18, it is used of raising up out of the midst without any thought of removal: in 1 Cor. v. 13, being connected with εξαιρω, it is used of removal from the midst of an associated company: in Col. ii. 14, being connected with αιρω, it is used of removal from an obstructive position: in Luke ix. 35, of a voice issuing from the midst of a cloud, without any thought of removal; and to these may be added another meaning assigned to it by some, who speak of εκ μεσου as used, sometimes, in the sense of εν μεσῳ. Thus Hederic, "Εκ μεσου, in medio, quod omnibus propositum est—τοις τροποις ζητων πριασθαι το φιλοτιμον εκ μεσου, "blandis moribus quærens acquirere principatum quod in medio jacebat." *Eurip. Iph. in Aulid.* 324. [Hederic seems here to take εκ μεσου as if necessarily connected with το φιλοτιμον; but it may be connected with πριασθαι—to purchase or secure to himself, out of the midst, (where it was set for general competition) the leadership of the Greeks. Εκ is sometimes used adverbially, as εκ μερους, "*in the way of part.*" 1 Cor. xii. 27. There may be instances (though I am not aware of any) in which it is so used with μεσου, which would then mean "midways," and be equivalent to εν μεσῳ.] These various uses of εκ μεσου sufficiently shew how it must depend on the context for its specific definition.

Is there then any word or words denoting *removal* in the former part of the sentence to which γιγνομαι εκ in 2 Thess. ii. belongs, of which γιγνομαι εκ may be

considered the exponent, as in the passage just quoted from Æschines? If we suppose that ὁ κατεχων is the nominative of γενηται, we must supply the ellipsis and translate the passage thus: "for the mystery of lawlessness doth already work, only there is at present one who restraineth, and who will continue to restrain until" &c. There is in this clause no mention of "*removal*," but only of *cessation* of restraining agency. One who acts in the way of restraint may suspend his agency, or cause it to cease without being himself removed, or even withdrawing himself. There is, therefore, nothing in the clause that would authorize us, as in the passage from Æschines, to regard the words γιγνομαι εκ as expository of, or, connected with, previous words denoting removal. If there had been a distinct reference to any removing agency, we might then have said, "until he became, by such removal, set aside out of the midst." But there is no word in the former part of the sentence that denotes or necessarily implies *removal*.

Moreover, if "*removal*" had been the thought intended, why, *as in every other case in the New Testament where removal is meant*, is not αιρω, or εξαιρω, or some word distinctively implying removal used? Why do we not find the word ἑως εκ μεσου αρθῃ? Why should we find the words, γιγνομαι εκ, used in a different sense from that in which they are used in every other passage in the New Testament? Why should we find the words εκ μεσου used in a different sense from that which they ever bear, both in the New Testament and in the Septuagint, whenever they are used apart from words that signify removal? The same remark applies

to the Hebrew expressions מקרב and מתוך, of which εκ μεσου is the representative.

It may, perhaps, be said that the reason why a word signifying "removal" is not used, is, that the expression ὁ κατεχων refers to God, or else to some personal agent acting by His authority, and that a word like αιρω or εξαιρω as implying compulsory removal would be totally inapplicable to God, and not likely to be employed of an agent acting *in the manner supposed* for Him—that a word expressive of retirement or withdrawal is more suitable than one that would imply "taking away."

There is no doubt truth in this. It may be truly said that the words μονον ὁ κατεχων αρτι do necessarily imply the cessation at some future time of the agency of such restrainer; and that such cessation virtually involves the retirement or withdrawal of the restrainer *as such;* and that consequently the thought of "withdrawal or retirement" *might* be taken (on the same principle as in the passage from Æschines) and attached to γιγνομαι εκ as expository of these words. This, no doubt, is the meaning, if ὁ κατεχων is to be taken as the nominative of γενηται. But here it may again be asked, why should not εξερχομαι, or some such unambiguous word, signifying withdrawal or retirement, have been used, if such were the meaning; and why should the Hebraistic or Hellenist use of γιγνομαι εκ and of εκ μεσου, when used with words not distinctly signifying withdrawal, be departed from; and a very peculiar passage in classical Greek made our guide instead?

If we enclose μονον ὁ κατεχων αρτι in a parenthesis, and take το μυστηριον της ανομιας as the nominative

to γενηται, no ambiguity remains; and the use of γιγνομαι εκ in the New Testament is not departed from, nor the meaning which εκ μεσου bears in every passage where it occurs independently of words signifying removal or withdrawal. However, I have endeavoured to state both sides of the question impartially, and now leave it to the judgment of others. It is true, that when I last published some observations on this passage I was not prepared to admit that there could be two sides to the question: for I was not then acquainted with the passage to which I have referred in Æschines. I cannot, therefore, now say that the rendering which would explain the words as referring to withdrawal or retirement is altogether inadmissible. At the same time there are three rules which should be adhered to as rigorously as we can, in translation:—first, to give the most simple and direct rendering; secondly, to take the *fullest* scope of truth that the words simply rendered can comprise; thirdly, to consider how far any proposed translation is such as to commend itself by its harmonising with the general tenor of Scripture on the point in question. In the present case, that translation which leads our thoughts to the present secret working, and to the future manifestation of the mystery of lawlessness is that which appears to me most to conform itself to these rules. The rendering is more simple; there is no tautology—on the contrary, a fresh truth is revealed; and the truth so revealed is consistent with all other parts of Scripture that treat of the same subject.[1]

[1] The very fact that the words εκ μεσου γενηται, depend, if connected with ὁ κατεχων, on the preceding clause for their definition,

Verse 19.

Διοτι το γνωστον του Θεου φανερον εστιν εν αυτοις.

By "that which is known of God," I understand that knowledge *respecting the eternal power and divinity* (θειοτητα) *of God*, which is not only possessible, but is possessed, by all, who do not wilfully reject the testimony afforded by the works of creation around them.

It is not material whether we translate εν αυτοις "*in* them" or "*among* them." The latter translation seems best suited to the context, which speaks of a knowledge proceeding from an *external* source; and it permits of the verse being extended to those who close their eyes against the light and grope in voluntary or judicial blindness: for, φως φανερουμενον, is not necessarily light *received*. The life was manifested, (εφανερωθη) says the Apostle, speaking of Jesus: nevertheless, few received it—almost all closed their eyes against it.

renders them tautological. It is as if we said, "only there is at present one that restraineth, who will continue to restrain until he quit the place of restraining. All this last part is implied in the one word αρτι—*at present*. In the other case, we learn a fresh truth. We are taught that the mystery of lawlessness which was already working as a mystery, would continue so to work uninterruptedly, not until Antichrist should arise to perfect it, but until it should itself become developed, and THEN Antichrist appears. The clause in which εκ μεσου γενομενων occurs in Æschines, is not tautological; and in this respect there is a want of parallelism between it and 2 Thess. ii.

If, however, we adopt the translation "*in* them," and regard the verse as limited to those who actually receive the knowledge spoken of, there is, no doubt, a sense in which knowledge, so received, may be said to be *in* them who receive it; just as we may speak of light received by the eye from an external source being *in* the eye. Conscience may, by a figure of speech, be termed the eye of the soul; and when it has received any light that light may be said to be *in* it; but this does not make conscience or any thing else in man the originator of light, or invest it with power of maintaining light, much less does it imply the possession of ability to use rightly the light received. "Meliora probo, deteriora sequor," is the motto of fallen humanity.

The chief use of light to fallen man is to prove to himself, not merely the depth of his own darkness, but yet more, the alienation of his will from God. Man, naturally, has no other mind than the mind of the flesh—*φρονημα σαρκος*: and "the mind of the flesh is enmity against God; it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be." The great primary need of such a a being is not a teacher, to teach him of duty, but a saviour, *to save him effectually and fully by an agency independent of himself.* Pardon, righteousness, and life are the great needs of unregenerate man. By life, I mean, a capacity of living unto God according to the circumstances into which redemption brings. Angels would not be happy, unless they had powers of life suited to the sphere which they occupy in Heaven. Adam would not have been happy in Eden, unless he had had powers of life suited to his condition there. The redeemed would not be happy in Heaven, unless

they were placed in possession of a life suited to that sphere of holiness and of glory which they are to occupy there. Accordingly, Christ as having in Himself a *quickening* power of life, cannot (by the appointment of God) be looked at *believingly* by any, without those so looking being instantly quickened with new and heavenly life. This is the force of the Lord's own repeated statement in John vi., respecting himself as the living bread, (ὁ αρτος ὁ ζων) which He also describes as the bread that *giveth* life. (ὁ αρτος ὁ διδους ζωην.) The manna could sustain life, but it could not quicken—it could not *give* life; but Christ, "the bread from Heaven, the true bread," not only sustains life, after it is given, but *imparts* it—and that, not natural life, but new and heavenly life, suited to the new creation of God. LIFE, therefore, as well as pardon and righteousness are received through faith in Him. But they who are not of faith are not quickened. They have not life. Light shines in vain on them. Light, for a moment, whilst Paul reasoned, broke in upon the conscience of Felix, and he trembled: but moral death was in him. The light encountered impenetrable darkness and was quenched. No results of life followed.

The look of the soul towards an object external to itself, even Jesus as the sacrifice, is the means by which the soul becomes quickened with new and heavenly life. Hence, when Nicodemus said, "How can a man be born again?—the Lord Jesus answered by speaking of the brazen serpent, saying, that all who look in faith to Him crucified, as the dying Israelite looked at the brazen serpent, have "eternal life;" in other words, are regenerate. Accordingly, the object of preaching

is to direct the heart towards Jesus as the sacrifice. Thus, St. Paul says, "By (διὰ) the foolishness of preaching God saveth them that believe"; and St. Peter, "Having been born again (ἀναγεγεννημένοι) not of corruptible seed, but of incorruptible (observe the eternal continuance implied in these words) by means of (διὰ) the word of the living God, &c. . . . . *and this is the word which by the gospel is preached unto you.*" Thus the word of the gospel is that which the Holy Spirit uses as the instrument for directing the souls of men to the Cross of Christ, and thereby quickening them. The instrumental means for bringing into connexion with the fountain of life is not a ritual ordinance, ministered by the hands of successionally appointed men, or by any other hands, it is the word of the gospel preached[1] by the lips of men whom God has prepared, by Himself instructing them in His gospel. If a ritual ordinance had been the appointed means of quickening souls, St. Paul never could have said, "Christ sent me not to baptize, but to preach the gospel." He never would have said, "Faith cometh by hearing"; or that "God by the foolishness of preaching saves." Baptism and the Supper of the Lord are signs and seals

[1] In saying "*preached* word, I do not mean to imply that God does not also use His *written* word, which is in fact the record of the preaching of His inspired servants. Nor do I mean to imply that infants may not, by the sovereign grace of God, be quickened apart from the use of instrumental means. No doubt, all infants who die in unconscious infancy are quickened. I am not treating of that question; but of the instrumentality appointed by God *to be employed by His Church* in seeking to bring others into life.

of mercies already received; and they only strengthen the soul, when the soul, through faith, views them as signs and seals of a grace already given.

But whilst the Scripture teaches us that we receive new and heavenly life the moment we believe, it also teaches us that this life is resident in that which is called in Scripture, "the new man which is renewed for knowledge according to the image of Him that created it,"—τον νεον (ανθρωπον) τον ανακαινουμενον εις επιγνωσιν κατ' εικονα του κτισαντος αυτον. (Col. iii. 10). And again, in Eph. iv. 24—τον καινον ανθρωπον τον κατα Θεον κτισθεντα εν δικαιοσυνῃ και ὁσιοτητι της αληθειας—"the new man created according to God in righteousness and true holiness." These two passages plainly declare that something *new* is created in believers—something that is contrasted with and antagonistic to our "*old* man," the name of our old moral nature as derived from the first Adam: the one being created in the likeness of Christ, the other being found in moral identification with Satan and sin. "The new man" is in fact the embryo of our new heavenly being, by and by to be clothed upon with a body glorious as the body of Christ, our risen Lord: and then, its powers of development will in all respects be complete and unhindered. But at present it is far otherwise. When first created, its powers are, as it were, in infancy, needing strength and development. The opposing influences of the world, the agency of Satan, and yet more, the close presence of our old unregenerate nature full of energetic evil, all war against it; for "the old man which is corrupt according to the deceitful lusts" ceases not to exist when "the new man" begins to be.

On the contrary, it finds in the near proximity of good. fresh occasion for the display of its enmity against *all* good. In order to strengthen "the new man" in this conflict, and in order to develop its powers, the Holy Spirit, as the Comforter, is given to dwell abidingly in and with it. "In whom also having believed, ye were sealed with that Holy Spirit of promise," &c. (πιστευσαντες εσφραγισθητε, "ye believed and were sealed," the concurrence of the aorists marking what is *similarly* past.) The Holy Spirit, therefore, is given to abide in us the moment we believe; and thus the believer is strengthened for the resistance of external and internal evil, and for the development of good. In proportion as he advances thus, he grows in grace and increases in *practical* sanctification.

We must beware, however, lest in our anxiety to follow after practical sanctification (unspeakably important in its place) we should forget or undervalue that other "sanctification," through the blood of the cross, which is referred to in such passages as these, "Jesus also that He might sanctify the people with His own blood suffered without the gate." (Heb. xiii.) And again, "In the body of His flesh through death (not, consequently, by any subsequent act) to present you holy, spotless, and uncharged in His sight"—ἁγιους, αμωμους, ανεγκλητους. (Col. i.) And again, "*sanctified* by the offering of the body of Jesus once" (Heb. x.); in immediate connexion with which verse, we find these words subjoined, "for by one offering he hath perfected for ever them that are [so] *sanctified.*" This sanctification perfects, *as regards acceptance and the putting away of guilt;* and as being the result of the Cross alone, at-

taches to us in all its completeness the moment, through faith, we become connected with the Cross. That faith is the instrumental link that connects us with this sanctifying power of the Cross is plainly taught in such words as these—the words of the Lord Jesus Himself —"inheritance among them that are sanctified through faith in me." (Acts xxvi. 18.)

Again, even as the Tabernacle and Temple of Israel were hallowed by the presence within them of the glory of the Lord, so when the Holy Spirit is pleased to come and make the body of a believer His temple, another kind of sanctification is received which is also abiding and unchangeable; for the *fact* of the indwelling presence of the Holy Spirit in a believer is the same always, although the degree in which His leadings are obeyed or resisted varies. This is another kind of sanctification, not (be it observed) an antecedent to, but a consequent of, acceptance through the atoning blood.

And when, at last, at the return of the Lord of life, that mighty power is to be put forth towards His people, which in the twinkling of an eye, is to separate them from all that they *naturally* are, and to change them into His own heavenly likeness—when they shall not only be separated from their earthy selves, but made like unto their risen Lord—as truly bearing the image of the heavenly as they have here borne the image of the earthy, then at last they shall understand the fulness of the sense in which Christ is said to be made from God (απο Θεου) "sanctification" unto His people. Such is the final result of sanctification through the once offered blood.

But man's need of such sanctification and of such

life is denied by those who confound the το γνωστον του Θεου, spoken of in this passage, with that full and saving knowledge of God which pertains only to those who have received the gospel of His grace. The writings of "the Broad-Church" and of the early "Friends" afford fearful examples of this. They seek to make the presence of light in the natural conscience identical with that condition of *light* and *life* which pertains to the regenerated.[1]

Ανεγκλητος, αμεμπτος, αμωμος, αμωμητος, ανεπιλημπτος, αναιτιος.

In the passage which I have above quoted from Col. i. 22, the first of these words, ανεγκλητος, occurs; but in our version it is translated as if it were strictly synonymous with the second, αμεμπτος. The same mistake is made in the translation of 1 Cor. i. 8—ὁς και βεβαιωσει ὑμας ἑως τελους ανεγκλητους εν τῃ ἡμερᾳ του κυριου ἡμων Ιησου Χριστου.

We should be very careful to distinguish between words which attach to us on the ground of that which has been accomplished for us, *externally*, by the finished sacrifice on the Cross, and words which imply a closely

[1] For further remarks on this subject, see "The First and Second Chapters of the Romans Considered." *Houlston and Stoneman*, Paternoster Row.

obedient walk in the Spirit. The former apply to all believers *as such;* the latter only to those who "walk worthy of the vocation wherewith they are called." Ανεγκλητος refers to a condition that pertains to *all* believers in virtue of that which their Substitue has borne for them: αμεμπτος refers to a practical condition *not* necessarily attaching to all.

Ανεγκλητος is derived from εγκαλεω, *to accuse*, or *bring a charge against any one*. In this sense it is used seven times in the New Testament. See Romans viii. 33: τις εγκαλεσει κατα εκλεκτων Θεου—who shall lay any thing to the charge of God's elect? See also Acts xix. 38: εγκαλειτωσαν αλληλοις, let them *implead* one another. And Acts xix. 40: κινδυνευομεν εγκαλεισθαι στασεως. It is thus a forensic term, implying criminal arraignment; so that whilst εγκλητος means a person charged with guilt as a criminal, ανεγκλητος means a person free from such charge; and in this forensic sense is always used, when applied to the relation in which believers stand to God in the courts of His judgment above.

Αμεμπτος, on the other hand, means, *not found fault with; unblamed*. The distinction between "blame" and "criminal accusation" is very obvious. God has been pleased to pronounce all who are "of faith" to be "uncharged" (ανεγκλητοι). They are never, therefore, to stand as those who have any charge to answer, before His heavenly bar, for they are pardoned already, their guilt having been borne by Another. How entirely the condition expressed by ανεγκλητος is the result of the work of the Lord Jesus *on the Cross*, is forcibly shewn by the text to which I have referred in Col. i. 21, 22—

και ὑμας ποτε οντας απηλλοτριωμενους . . . . νυνι δε αποκατηλλαξεν, εν τῳ σωματι της σαρκος αὐτου δια του θανατου, παραστησαι ὑμας ἁγιους και αμωμους και ανεγκλητους κατενωπιον αὐτου. Observe the words "*in the body of His flesh through death.*" Yet they who are thus "sanctified by the offering of the body of Jesus once," and who are, in consequence thereof, "uncharged," may fail in walking blamelessly "as dear children." Take the Corinthians as an example. The Apostle says, very expressly, that they are "uncharged," and should so continue—ὁς και βεβαιωσει ὑμας ἑως τελους, ανεγκλητους εν τῃ ἡμερᾳ του κυριου ἡμων Ιησου Χριστου: but the Apostle does not say they were walking "blamelessly" (αμεμπτως). On the contrary, he was about to censure them, and that severely. Ανεγκλητος, therefore, stands strongly contrasted with αμεμπτος in such a passage as this, which, and Col. i. 22, are the only passages in the New Testament in which ανεγκλητος is used with reference to our relation to the courts of God.

Αμεμπτος is always used in a *practical* sense, and can only be applied to those who walk watchfully and obediently. The Apostle, in the case of those whom he recognised as believers, does not pray that they might be ανεγκλητοι, for God had already made them so; but he does pray that they might be in a state of blamelessness. See 1 Thess. v. 23—αυτος δε ὁ Θεος της ειρηνης ἁγιασαι ὑμας ὁλοτελεις· και ὁλοκληρον ὑμων το πνευμα και ἡ ψυχη και το σωμα αμεμπτως εν τῃ παρουσιᾳ του Κυριου ἡμων Ιησου Χριστου τηρηθειη. The Apostle expresses his confidence that the Thessalonians who were, through grace, walking "*blamelessly*" would be

preserved "*blameless*"; but of the Corinthians he does not say this. In their case, he limits himself to the expression of a confidence that they would be maintained "*uncharged.*"

The practical force in which αμεμπτος and αμεμπτως are always used may be seen in the following passages:

Luke i. 6, "walking in all the commandments, &c. of the Lord *blameless.*

Phil. ii. 15, "that ye may be *blameless* and harmless."

Phil. iii. 6, "touching the righteousness that is in the law, *blameless.*"

1 Thess. iii. 13, "stablish your hearts *unblameable* in holiness."

1 Thess. ii. 10, "how justly and *unblameably* we behaved."

1 Thess. v. 23, "be preserved *blameless,*" &c.

These are the only passages in the New Testament in which αμεμπτος and αμεμπτως occur as denoting conduct: and in all are rightly translated. But instead of "blameless" being appropriated, as it should have been, to αμεμπτος, it is used in our version as the translation of no less than five other words, viz., ανεγκλητος, αμωμος, αμωμητος, αναιτιος and ανεπιλημπτος.

When ανεγκλητος is used in its forensic sense, the confounding it with αμεμπτος is a serious error. And yet *in the only two places* where ανεγκλητος does occur in this sense (viz., 1 Cor. i. 8, and Col. i. 22) our version renders it either "blameless" or (which is an equivalent word) "unreprovable." Ανεγκλητος is a word that

concerns acceptance, and in any question concerning *that*, there is no room for any mention of "blamelessness." Even Abraham could only be justified as one who was in himself "ungodly." See Rom. iv. "Blamelessness" in that absolute sense in which alone it could be recognised in the courts of Heaven in any question touching acceptance, attaches to none who have ever trod this earth, except only to the Holy One of God. Even an Apostle had to say, "in many things we all offend." The ground on which believers enter Heaven is not that of "blamelessness," but because of their being "uncharged" on account of their Substitute. He who most diligently watches his own spirit, will, at the close of the day, find many things to confess as failures; and he does so confess them through the blood of the Lamb. Such an one, through the mercy and grace of God, is the subject of no blame. On the contrary, God, through Jesus, looks on him approvingly and encourages his efforts to resist his own evil and to serve Him. This, it is true, is a qualified sense of "blameless." Yet there is no other in which it can attach to believers here: and shows how vain it would be to look to "blamelessness" as a ground of *acceptance* before God.

But besides the use of ανεγκλητος as referred to above, it is sometimes applied to those who are not criminated by their fellow men—those against whom public opinion brings no indictment. In this sense it approaches very nearly the meaning of "*blameless*" as that word is understood among men; for men seldom blame without also criminating. It frequently happens that words may, through connected circumstances, approximate in some of their applications, but such

accidental approximation should never lead us, in translating, to deviate from the strict literal meaning of the terms. "Blameless" and "uncharged" do not, even in their human use, really represent the same thoughts; and, as regards the Divine arrangements, the two thoughts are utterly distinct. The places in which *ανεγκλητος* is used in what may be termed its human sense, are, 1 Tim. iii. 10: Tit. i. 6, 7. In these places it is applied to the appointment of deacons, and also of elders or bishops, of whom it is required that they should be such as stand "uncharged" at the bar of public opinion. *Διακονειτωσαν ανεγκλητοι οντες.*—*Καταστησῃς κατα πολιν πρεσβυτερους . . . . . ει τις εστιν ανεγκλητος . . . . . δει γαρ τον επισκοπον ανεγκλητον ειναι.* Ανεγκλητος is, in all these passages, rendered "blameless" in our version.

Αμωμος (a word usually adopted in LXX as the translation of תמים which, however, more nearly corresponds with *τελειος*) is derived from *α* privative and *μωμος*, *a blemish.* See 2 Peter ii. 13—*σπιλοι και μωμοι*, "spots they are and *blemishes*." Μωμος corresponds with, and is probably derived from, the Hebrew מום or מאום, frequently used in the Old Testament, sometimes in a physical, sometimes in a moral sense. See LXX of Lev. xxi. 18—*πας ανθρωπος ᾧ εστιν εν αυτῳ μωμος* (מום) *ου προσελευσεται· ανθρωπος τυφλος η χωλος*, &c.—then follows a long enumeration of natural or else contracted deformities, mutilations and defects. See the use of this word in Leviticus throughout, and Deut. xv. 21. Μωμος, therefore, does not denote such disfiguration as arises from a stain or spot (*σπιλος*) which might be washed away: it refers rather to abiding

blemishes whether natural or caused by maiming or disease. Its moral meaning may be easily inferred from its physical. Any habitual or chronic moral decrepitude, deformity or disease would make morally μωμος.

Ασπιλος is derived from α and σπιλος, "*a spot.*" Σπιλος and σπιλωμενος refer to defilement less fixed than that indicated by μωμος, and arising commonly from external causes, as when we speak of "spotted" or "defiled" garments—"hating even the garment spotted (ἐσπιλωμενον) by the flesh." See also Jas. i. 27, ασπιλον εαυτον τηρειν απο του κοσμου. He who is spiritually "lame" (Heb. xii. 13) or needs "eyesalve that he might see" (Rev. iii. 18) is μωμος: he who carelessly or wantonly "touches the unclean thing" is σπιλωμενος.[1]

There never has been in this sinful earth any one to whom these words αμωμος and ασπιλος, could in their *full* meaning apply, except only He "who offered Himself *without blemish* (αμωμον) unto God" (Heb. ix. 14.)—He who was "as a Lamb *without blemish* and *without spot*"—αμωμος και ασπιλος. (1 Pet. i. 19.) I scarcely need say, that when we speak of the Lord Jesus, the freedom from blemish and from spot which we ascribe to Him is not only perfect, but essential, eternal and underived: and although the Scripture, in speaking of believers when brought into their final glory, speaks of them as being in a full and perfect sense, αμωμοι and ασπιλοι, yet freedom from blemish in their

[1] See ασπιλος, as used to translate זכו from זכך, *to be pure*, in Hexapla.—Sym. Job. xv. 15.

case is not essential but derived, the result of their Saviour's redemption—"Christ loved the Church and gave Himself for it . . . . that He might present it unto Himself a glorious Church, *not having spot* or wrinkle (σπιλον η ρυτιδα) or any such thing, but that it might be holy and *without blemish*" (αμωμος). In the Revelation, when οἱ ηγορασμενοι απο της γης were seen standing around the Lamb in glory, the description concludes with the words, αμωμοι γαρ εισι—for they are *without blemish*. (Rev. xiv. 5.) See also Jude 24, "to present you *without blemish* (αμωμους) in the presence of His glory." In the circumstances contemplated in these passages, αμωμος and ασπιλος will not only be imputatively, but absolutely true of the redeemed.

But we have to remember that the relation of reconciliation, acceptance, and favour in which God stands to His believing people does not commence hereafter: it commences here. *Here* they are already viewed in and through Christ: *here* they are already known in love. On this ground we find such texts as these—"He hath not beheld iniquity in Jacob, neither hath He seen perverseness in Israel." (Num. xxiii. 21.) And in Cant. iv. 7,—"thou art all fair my love, there is no spot in thee—μωμος (Heb. מוּם) ουκ εστιν εν σοι. And in Col. i. 21, 22—και ὑμας ποτε οντας απηλλοτριωμενους . . . . . ΝΥΝΙ ΔΕ ΑΠΟΚΑΤΗΛΛΑΞΕΝ, εν τῳ σωματι της σαρκος αυτου δια του θανατου, ΠΑΡΑΣΤΗΣΑΙ ὑμας ἁγιους και αμωμους και ανεγκλητους κατενωπιον αυτου—"to present you holy and without blemish, and uncharged in his sight." Καθως εξελεξατο ἡμας εν αυτῳ προ καταβολης κοσμου, ειναι

ἡμας ἁγιους και αμωμους κατενωπιον αυτου, εν αγαπῃ. See also John xv. 3—ΗΔΗ ὑμεις καθαροι εστε δια τον λογον ὁν λελαληκα ὑμιν—"already ye are clean in consequence of (δια with acc.) the word that I have spoken unto you," viz. the word that guided them to Him and to His blood.[1]

Again, words which like τελειος, αμωμος, ασπιλος, &c., cannot in a *strict* sense be practically applied to the redeemed until they are changed into the likeness of their risen Lord, are in a modified sense applied to them here. Of this there is no more remarkable example than the use of τελειος. That word in its full and heavenly meaning, could denote nothing less than absolute perfectness—freedom from all tendency to sin,—the having nothing to bridle or restrain because nothing is present but good. Such is the perfectness of Heaven. Such was ever the absolute perfectness of Jesus. Such was the perfectness which the Law demanded and would have recognised, if any could have been justified thereby. But when once the great question of acceptance has been set at rest, by acceptance being granted freely in the name of Another, the standard by which God tries the present practical conduct of His children, as respects their "well-pleasing" is adapted to their present condition. Instead, therefore, of exacting the absolute perfectness of Heaven,

[1] Compare also Eph. v. 26: καθαρισας τῳ λουτρῳ του ὑδατος εν ρηματι, having cleansed it with the washing of water (such cleansing as the ablutions in Jewish and other rites signified) *by the word*. Thus it is *the word* that is the *instrumental* means of cleansing by bringing to Christ, and not a ritual ordinance.

which while they have sin in the flesh, they cannot render, he is pleased to apply a modified rule and to say, "if any man offend not in word, the same is a perfect man and able also to bridle the whole body." "Bridling" is not the perfectness of Christ nor of Heaven. If believers were not regarded as standing under the priesthood advocacy and intercession of the one Mediator they never could have such words as τελειος, ασπιλος, or αμωμος applied to them practically here. See ασπιλος thus used in 2 Pet. iii. 14,—"be diligent that ye be found of Him in peace without spot and irreproachable—ασπιλοι και αμωμητοι. See also in *one* passage a similar practical application of αμωμος —παντα ποιειτε χωρις γογγυσμων και διαλογισμων, ἱνα γενησθε αμεμπτοι και ακεραιοι, τεκνα Θεου αμωμα,[1] εν μεσῳ γενεας σκολιας, &c. (Phil. ii. 14, 15.) The Church at Laodicea were not αμωμοι, for they had become spiritually "blind." Those at Thyatira were not ασπιλοι, for they tolerated Jezebel. The Church at Philadelphia only was αμεμπτος. Although αμωμος when *practically* used, may seem to approximate very nearly to αμεμπτος, yet really they differ as widely as do our English words "blemish" and "blame." Αμωμος in the sense which it *commonly* bears in the Scripture contrasts with αμεμπτος just as much as ανεγκλητος does.

Αμωμητος, on the other hand, is *only* used as a *practical* word. It is derived from α priv. and μωμεομαι or

[1] The received reading, αμωμητα, cannot be sustained in this passage, or at least it is supported by far less complete and *satisfactory* evidence than that which can be adduced for αμωμα.

μωμαομαι, *to reproach.* Μωμεομαι is *said* to be derived from Μωμος, the name of a pagan deity, whose office was supposed to be to reproach with severity the follies and vices of his fellow deities. It is better, however, to trace its origin, like that of αμωμος, to מוּם, *blemish;* and to say that μωμεισθαι refers to reproach *called forth by blemish,* and therefore *severe.* The following passage from Lucian, shews how strongly the thought of severity of judgment is connected with this word—και ὁ ουδεις αν, αλλ' ουδ' ὁ Μωμος, μωμησασθαι δυναιτο. It would be especially used, therefore, when eyes jealous either from holiness or from enmity, are watching conduct. St. Paul evidently had before him the thought of being surrounded by hostile and envious observers when he said, μηδεμιαν εν μηδενι διδοντες προσκοπην, ἱνα μη μωμηθῃ ἡ διακονια (2 Cor. vi. 3.)—and again, στελλομενοι τουτο μη τις ἡμας μωμησηται εν τῃ ἁδροτητι ταυτῃ τῃ διακονουμενῃ ὑφ' ἡμων. (2 Cor. viii. 20.) Both these passages (the only ones in which μωμεομαι is found) occur in the Second Epistle to the Corinthians—an epistle in which the Apostle refers continually to the bitterness of his enemies at Corinth. Αμωμητος, therefore, would apply to one whose character and ways were subjected to strict scrutiny to see whether any blemish were discoverable, and who was pronounced free from reproach—irreproachable. It is, therefore, a stronger and more definite word than αμεμπτος. It is used once only as a certain and undoubted reading in the New Testament, viz. 2 Peter iii. 14—διο, αγαπητοι, ταυτα προσδοκωντες σπουδασατε ασπιλοι και αμωμητοι αυτῳ εὑρεθηναι εν ειρηνῃ—"without spot and irreproachable."

Ανεπιλημπτος is twice translated "blameless," and

once "unrebukeable," in our version. It is derived from επιλαμβανομαι, "to lay hold of"—used sometimes in a good sense, as in Heb. ii. 16, ου γαρ δηπου αγγελων επιλαμβανεται, αλλα σπερματος Αβρααμ επιλαμβανεται, "for verily he taketh not hold of angels, but of the seed of Abraham he taketh hold"; but often used in a hostile or evil sense, as when the Jews watched the Lord Jesus, that "*they might take hold of* (ινα επιλαβωνται) his words, or as when "they caught or laid hold of" Paul and Silas and drew them to the rulers. See Luke xx. 20 and Acts xiv. 19. "Apprehend" is similarly used in English. Accordingly, any one detected in the commission of a forbidden act would be said to be επιληπτος, as in the following passage—και πως ὁραται καπιληπτος εὑρεθη, (spoken of Antigone caught in the forbidden act of burying her brother.) Hence it is applied to those who are laid hold on by words of censure; and επιληπτωρ means one who inculpates or reprehends. Ανεπιληπτος, therefore, as the opposite to επιληπτος thus used, means one not open to reprehension—irreprehensible. Thus we find ανεπιληπτος τοις τροποις; ανεπιληπτος τον βιον, irreprehensible in life or manners. Επιληπτος implies *severe* reprehension as may be seen in the following passage from Thucydides v. 17—νομιζων καν αυτος τοις εχθροις ανεπιληπτος ειναι, thus paraphrased by the Scholiast, μη αν αυτος παρεξων κατηγοριας αφορμην. Επιληπτος, however, though stronger than μεμπτος is scarcely so strong as μωμητος. Free from blame; free from reprehension or expressed censure; free from reproach; free from charge or crimination, may be given, perhaps, as the respective renderings of αμεμπτος, ανεπιληπτος, αμωμητος and

ανεγκλητος. Επιλητος differs from μεμπτος not only in conveying the thought of expressed censure rather than of mere blame, but of censure expressed by the public voice or else by those who stand in some authoritative or official position. Men blame where they do not formally reprimand. The places in which ανεπιλητος occurs in the New Testament are, 1 Tim. iii. 2—"A bishop then must be irreprehensible—not open to censure." Also 1 Tim. v. 7—"That they might be irreprehensible," spoken of widows. Also 1 Tim. vi. 14—τηρησαι σε την εντολην ασπιλον, ανεπιλητον—that the tongue of reprehension or censure may not lay hold of the truth through any misconduct of thine. In these three passages the public voice is that which seems to be referred to.

Αναιτιος is the fifth word which is rendered "*blameless*" in our version. It occurs twice in Matt. xii—in the fifth verse, being rendered "blameless"; in the seventh, "guiltless." The primary meaning of αιτιος (from which αναιτιος is derived) is one who is the cause or author of anything. Η εν ουρανῳ δυναμις συμπασιν αιτιος γιγνεται σωτηριας. *Arist. de mundo.* Παντων αιτιος (ὁ πλουτος) και των αγαθων και των κακων. And in the Scripture, εγενετο τοις ὑπακουουσιν αυτῳ πασιν αιτιος σωτηριας αιωνιου. (Heb. v. 9.) That which is the cause of any thing evil is, of course, regarded as responsible for that evil. Hence an easy transfer of the word αιτιος to "*guilty*"—especially when "guilty" is applied to any one as the avowed or proved author of the evil in question. Similarly, αιτια signifies "a cause," as in Matt. xix. 3, and Acts xiii. 28. But a deed which is the cause of evil may be made the ground

of accusation, and hence come to signify the accusation or the crime itself—especially when such accusation or crime is supposed to be capable of proof.

Αιτιος, therefore, in its secondary use, is rightly defined by Eustathius, ὑπευθυνος και κολασεως αξιος. It means one against whom a charge is not only brought (*that* would be expressed by εγκλητος) but proven. Αναιτιος would, consequently, denote one against whom the indictment failed and was pronounced "unproven." He against whom no indictment is preferred is ανεγκλητος; he against whom an indictment has been brought, but on grounds shewn to be false or insufficient is, in the strict sense, αναιτιος, "not guilty." He who presents an indictment would be said εγκαλειν: he who produces the proof on which such indictment is founded, αιτιασθαι. Εγκλημα might be applied to a charge made at random, and without any attempt at proof: αιτια would mean an accusation either proved or professedly capable of being proved. The inscription written over the Cross was intended to be regarded as an indictment proved, and as furnishing a just cause for the death of the Lord Jesus. Although the Jews could find in Him μηδεμιαν αιτιαν θανατου (Acts xiii. 28.)—although Pilate had distinctly said, εγω ουδεμιαν αιτιαν εὑρισκω εν αυτῳ, yet επεθηκαν επανω της κεφαλης αυτου την αιτιαν αυτου γεγραμμενην. The connexion between the meanings of αιτια as "cause," "crime," and "professedly proved indictment" is illustrated by these passages. The use of αιτια is also illustrated by a passage from Suetonius, who says, speaking of a criminal, "præcedente titulo qui causam pœnæ indicaret." "Cause" is the word which is used as the translation

of αιτια in Matt. xxvii. 37, in the versions of Wiclif,[1] Tyndale, Cranmer, Geneva (A.D. 1557), and Rheims (A.D. 1582.) I mention these things, to shew how much the thought of proved or professedly proved guiltiness enters into αιτιος, and of *disproved* guiltiness into αναιτιος.[2]

Believers, although in their own personal relation to God, they cannot claim to be any thing else than αιτιοι (ΠΡΟΗΙΤΙΑΣΑΜΕΘΑ Ιουδαιους τε και Ἑλληνας παντας ὑφ᾽ ἁμαρτιαν ειναι), yet, through grace, they are ανεγκλητοι, and therefore never will be treated as αιτιοι. They will be treated as if αναιτιοι, because of the atoning blood of their Substitute, and therefore will never "come into judgment." "Verily, verily, I say unto you he that heareth my word, and believeth on Him that sent me hath everlasting life, and cometh not into judgment (εις κρισιν) but hath passed from death unto life." (John v. 24.)[3]

[1] See also the following from Thucydides, ὁ μη ρηθεις λογος τοις ὡδ᾽ εχουσιν αιτιαν αν παρασχοι ὡς, ει ελεχθη, σωτηριος αν ην. Αιτια is sometimes used in the sense of friendly expostulation; such expostulation, however, being grounded on reasons assigned—αιτια μεν γαρ φιλων ανδρων εστιν ἁμαρτανοντων, κατηγορια δε εχθρων αδικησαντων.—*Thucyd.* i. 69.

[2] "Above his head his cause writtun." *Wiclif.*
"Over his heed the cause of his death written." *Tyndale.*
"Over hys heed the cause of his death wrytten." *Cranmer.*
"Ouer his head the cause of his death written." *Geneva.*
"Ouer his head his cause vvritten." *Rheims.*

[3] As being ανεγκλητοι, therefore, and not coming into judgment (εις κρισιν) they are never to be placed at the bar of God to be tried as if criminals. An enquiry conducted before the judgment-

Thus believers, although in themselves αιτιοι, yet being (in virtue of their guilt having been borne by Another) ανεγκλητοι, and being, in and through Christ, already regarded as ἁγιοι and αμωμοι (Col. i. 22), and being, finally, to be presented perfectly ασπιλοι and αμωμοι (Eph. v. 27) are to seek to be practically ασπιλοι (2 Peter iii. 14) αμωμοι (Phil. ii. 15) αμωμητοι (2 Peter iii. 14) αμεμπτοι (1 Thess. v. 23) ανεπιλημπτοι (1 Tim. iii. 2) here.

The passages in which ανεγκλητος (uncharged, having no crime laid to one's account) occur, are :—

1 Cor. i. 8, "*uncharged* in the day of our Lord Jesus Christ."

Col. i. 22, "holy and without blemish, and *uncharged*."

Also 1 Tim. iii. 10; Tit. i. 6, 7.

seat or tribunal of a king, or a magistrate, or military commander, in order to determine what should or should not be rewarded in the conduct of those who have served as soldiers, or as servants, is a very different thing from trial at a bar where persons charged with crime alone are brought. A court constituted for the adjudgment of reward is a very different thing from a criminal assize, though in both there may be a judgment-seat, "The justified" will stand before the judgment-seat or tribunal of their Master in order that every thing that has been like "gold, silver, or precious stones" in their past service may be rewarded, whilst every thing that has been, like "wood, hay, or stubble," worthless, will be set aside as fit only for the flames, Thus believers will receive with reference to (προς) that which they have done in the body, though they will not receive κατα (according to) all that they have done. And this is what the Apostle states—ἱνα κομισηται ἑκαστος . . . . . ΠΡΟΣ ἁ επραξεν.

Those in which *αμεμπτος* (blameless, not to be blamed) occur, are Luke i. 6; Phil. ii. 15; Phil. iii. 6; 1 Thess. iii. 13; Heb. viii. 7.

Αμεμπτως (blamelessly) is found 1 Thess. ii. 10; 1 Thess. v. 23.

Αμωμος (without blemish) occurs:—

Eph. i. 4, "without blemish before Him in love."
Col. i. 22, "to present you holy and without blemish."
Phil. ii. 15, "the sons of God, without blemish."
Jude 24, "to present you without blemish before the presence of His glory."
Rev. xiv. 5, "for they are without blemish."

The passage in which *αμωμητος* (free from reproach, irreproachable) occurs, is:—

2 Peter iii. 14, "in peace, without spot and *without reproach*."

Ασπιλος (without spot) occurs:—1 Tim. vi. 14; Jas. i. 27; 1 Peter i. 19; 2 Peter iii. 14.

Ανεπιλημπτος (irreprehensible) occurs:—1 Tim. iii. 2; 1 Tim. v. 7; 1 Tim. vi. 14.

Αναιτιος (guiltless—one proved not guilty):—Matt. xii. 5; xii. 7.

On θειοτης as distinguished from θεοτης.

This distinction to which I have referred above, is thus commented on by Professor Trench, in his "Synonyms of the New Testament," p. 7:—

"Neither of these words occurs more than once in the New Testament; θειοτης only at Rom. i. 20; θεοτης at Col. ii. 9. We have rendered both by 'Godhead'; yet they must not be regarded as identical in meaning, nor even as two different forms of the same word, which in process of time have separated off from one another, and acquired different shades of significance. On the contrary, there is a real distinction between them, and one which grounds itself on their different derivations; θεοτης being from Θεος, and θειοτης, not from το θειον, which might be said to be the same thing as Θεος, but from the adjective θειος.

"Comparing the two passages where they severally occur, we shall at once perceive the fitness of the employment of one word in one, of the other in the other. In the first (Rom. i. 20) St. Paul is declaring how much of God may be known from the revelation of Himself which He has made in nature, from those vestiges of Himself which men may everywhere trace in the world around them. Yet it is not the personal God whom any man may learn to know by these aids; He can be known only by the revelation of Himself in His Son; but only His Divine attributes, His majesty, and glory. This Theophylact feels, who gives μεγαλειοτης as equi-

valent to Θειοτης here; and it is not to be doubted that St. Paul uses this vaguer, more abstract, and less personal word, just because he would affirm that men may know God's power and majesty from His works; but would *not* imply that they may know Himself from these, or from any thing short of the revelation of His Eternal Word.

"But in the second passage (Col. ii. 9) St. Paul is declaring that in the Son there dwells all the fulness of absolute Godhead; they were no mere rays of Divine glory which gilded Him, lighting up His person for a season, and with a splendour not His own; but He was, and is, absolute and perfect God; and the Apostle uses θεοτης to express this essential and personal Godhead of the Son. Thus Beza rightly: 'Non dicit: την θειοτητα, *i.e.*, divinitatem, sed την θεοτητα, *i.e.*, deitatem, ut magis etiam expresse loquatur; . . . . . ἡ θειοτης, attributa videtur potius quam naturam ipsam declarare.' And Bengel: 'Non modo divinæ virtutes, sed ipsa divina natura.'"

Verse 29, 30.

Πεπληρωμενους πασῃ ΑΔΙΚΙΑι, ΠΟΝΗΡΙΑι,[2] ΠΛΕΟΝΕΞΙΑι, ΚΑΚΙΑι—μεστους φθονου, φονου, ἐριδος, δολου, κακοηθειας—ψιθυριστας, καταλαλους, θεοστυγεις, ὑβριστας, &c., &c.

The order of arrangement in this passage should be noted. The first four terms are comprehensive and generic; the next five, specific, standing to the former four in the relation of subordinate ramifications to main branches; the third clause enumerates the characteristic names which rightfully attach to those in whom this fulness of evil is displayed.

The first of these generic names is *αδικια*. Αδικια is, sometimes, used in a wide and comprehensive sense, to denote any deviation from the rule of right; at other times, it is used in the more specific sense of "unjust," as in the sentence—"He who is so unjust as to do his brother an injury, will scarcely be so just as to condemn himself for it." In our own language, "unrighteousness" and "unrighteous" are sometimes used to denote iniquity in a general sense; at other times they are applied to that which we specifically term "injustice." Examples of the use of *αδικια* in its comprehensive sense are frequent in the New Testament. See Luke xiii. 27—"depart from me, ye workers of iniquity (*της αδικιας, unrighteousness.*) The wide scope of evil de-

[2] Πορνειᾳ is a confessed interpolation

noted by αδικια in this passage may be seen from the context. The words applied to the Lord Jesus in John vii. 18—και αδικια εν αυτῳ ουκ εστιν, are equivalent to the ascription of perfect righteousness. See also 2 Thess. ii. 10—"deceivableness of *unrighteousness;*" and 2 Thess. ii. 12—"having pleasure in *unrighteousness.*" In James iii. 6, we read of the tongue being "a world of *unrighteousness*" (ὁ κοσμος της αδικιας) and in 2 Tim. ii. 19, it is said, "let every one that nameth the name of Christ depart from unrighteousness (αποστητω απο αδικιας.) See also its use in the present chapter—"who hold the truth in unrighteousness." In all these instances the comprehensive meaning of αδικια is very obvious.[1]

In comprehensive and generic terms such as those we are considering, there must, of necessity, be considerable similitude of meaning. The very circumstance that all

[1] The use of αδικια in this general sense is not unconnected with its specific meaning, viz., "a depriving another of his rightful due." [Το αδικειν εστι το βλαπτειν ἑκοντα παρα τον νομον. *Arist. Rhet.* iv.] Whether the rule of right be violated by depriving another of his due, or in any other way, all such violations are capable of being denominated by a common name, because the characteristic of them all is, infraction of a law to which obedience is due. Under the Mosaic Law, every trespass was regarded as an injury done to God and to His Law, and compensation was demanded. And since the Divine Law is not only prohibitive, but is also mandatory—not only saying "thou shalt not hate," but "thou shalt love," *any* infraction of its commandments must be regarded as αδικια, on the same principle on which a perfect observance of them would be regarded as δικαιοσυνη.

αδικια and all πονηρια are alike *sin*, establishes as close a connexion between them, as that which obtains between branches borne on the same root. Yet distinctness does not always make distinction easy. We well know that the colours of the rainbow are distinct, yet we do not always find it easy to mark the exact point where one colour ends and the next begins. And when distinct colours are mingled (such as the blue and the scarlet in producing the purple) we do not find it easy to say at what moment the first true shade of purple begins; nor can we determine with precision when the last line of twilight gives place to the real darkness of night. And if in things physically and palpably distinct we find this difficulty, how much more in moral subjects where, commonly, our thoughts are less clear and our words less exact. In such things peculiarly, "we know in part." That there is a distinction between αδικια and πονηρια and between πονηρια and κακια is evident—otherwise, we should not find them, in this and other passages, contrasted. What distinction then may be drawn between πονηρια and κακια?

That πονηρος is a stronger word than κακος, is evident from its application to Satan, who is continually called ὁ πονηρος, but never ὁ κακος. We read of τα πνευματικα της πονηριας, but not of τα πνευματικα της κακιας. In English a similar distinction subsists between "wickedness" and "badness;" "wicked" and "bad." Το πονηρον also is the name for wickedness when regarded abstractedly, as the great moral characteristic of the world. "I pray not that thou shouldest take them out of the world, but that thou shouldest keep

them from the evil (εκ του πονηρου.) "The whole world lieth εν τῳ πονηρῳ." Κακος is often used to indicate merely the absence of qualities that ought to be present, as when we say, κακος τεχνιτης, κακος ιατρος, κακος στρατιωτης: but καρπος πονηρος is equivalent to καρπος σαπρος. Compare Matt. vii. 17, and Luke vi. 43. A wound might be pronounced κακος if it lacked tokens of healthfulness; but it would not be called πονηρος unless there were great anguish and tokens of virulent disease. So in the *moral* use of πονηρος, it would not be applied to indicate the mere absence of qualities that ought to be present, nor to denote evil that was caused mainly by the stimulus of external temptation. He who has in himself a well-spring of living, operative, energetic evil, needs no external temptation to its display. The πονηρος has been described as being πονῳ πονηρος,—one who labours after evil because he loves it, and tasks all his energies in order to produce it. "Significat πονηρος aliquid amplius quam κακος, nempe eum qui sit in omni scelere exercitatus et ad injuriam cuivis inferendam totus comparatus (*Beza.*) He is δραστικος του κακου (*Hesychius.*)

Although the absence of certain qualities of good may be sufficient to justify the application of κακος, yet it must not be supposed that κακος is limited to denoting the absence of qualities of good, or that it does not always imply the *practice* of vice. On the contrary, we do not ascribe κακια to any one who does not manifest his depravity by deeds of vice. But there is a difference in the manner of doing the same deeds. He who commits a crime because he hates good and

delights in evil, has attained a greater ripeness and development of evil than one who has been drawn away by the seductiveness of pleasure or some powerful external temptation, rather than impelled by an energetic hatred to good. Him who, well-skilled in the ways of wickedness, delights in drawing others into vice and in depraving them, we call πονηρος; but we ascribe κακια to his victims, till they too learn to be like their master and become as πονηροι as he. Him whom we regard simply as being himself depraved we may pronounce κακος; but if we think of him not only as depraved but as rejoicing in depravity and loving to produce and spread it, we pronounce him κακος ΚΑΙ πονηρος. Πονηρια therefore which may be consistently translated "wickedness" must be regarded as a more advanced development of evil than κακια. But observe we are speaking of "development." As all that is in the oak is virtually contained in the acorn, so the germ of πονηρια, κακια, and every other form of evil is, naturally, in all alike: and when developed, they are as connected branches of the same tree, even SIN. When, therefore, we speak of any one as filled with αδικια we regard him as an habitual violator of that rule of right which God has established as an immutable principle of His government. Violation of right is the great thought connected with αδικια. When we speak of any one as filled with πονηρια, we think of him as one who, being evil and loving evil, seeks to make others evil and to do them evil, as one prepared to say, "evil, be thou my good." Love to, and delight in, evil, for its own sake, may be said to be the great characteristic of πονηρια. Αδικια directs the thought to the blessed

rules of God as outraged; πονηρια to the ways of Satan as loved and delighted in. When we speak of any one as filled with κακια, we regard him as having habits and practices of vice, which whatever their motive, or whatever their result as respects others, are, looked at simply in themselves, vile and abominable. A condition of moral evil, regarded simply *per se*, is the chief thought suggested by κακια.[1]

[1] It is admitted by all that κακια is continually used in the comprehensive sense in which I have here taken it, as the name not of a specific vice, but of vice in general. The perpetual employment of it in this sense by Aristotle, who always opposes αρεται και κακιαι; the fable of Prodicus, as given in Xenoph. Memor. ii. 12, where κακια is taken as the personification of vice as opposed to Αρετη; the words of Cicero, who, refusing to translate κακια by "*malitia*" renders it *vitiositas*, and adds "nam *malitia* certi cujusdam vitii nomen est, *vitiositas*, omnium," afford sufficient evidence of the use of κακια in the generic sense.

It is true indeed that κακια and the more ancient κακοτης are also used in a more specific sense, sometimes, for example, denoting "*cowardice*"; sometimes, "*malice*" or "*maliciousness*." The latter use flows apparently from the employment of κακος, to denote inauspicious or malign influence, as when we say, κακον ἡμαρ, κακον οναρ, κακος μορος, and the like. Hence a maligning tongue is called κακη—whence κακια as "*malignity*." There are no doubt passages in the New Testament where it bears this specific meaning, as in Col. iii. 8—οργην, θυμον, κακιαν, βλασφημιαν, αισχρολογιαν εκ του στοματος ὑμων; but in the majority of cases it retains its comprehensive meaning. See Acts viii. 22—μετανοησον ουν απο της κακιας. See also James i. 21—διο αποθεμενοι πασαν ρυπαριαν και περισσειαν κακιας," &c. And 1 Cor. v. 8, and 1 Peter ii. 16, in neither of which places is there any reason why

Πλεονεξια, also, is used in this passage as a *generic* term. Abundant instances of its use as denoting, not merely "covetousness," but a greedy (and not unfrequently, a fraudulent and *overreaching*) grasping after gain, whether of honour, dominion, power, influence, or any thing else that might be supposed to conduce to "*advantage*." How much this abominable feature of human character was found among the Greeks, even at the most polished period of their history, may be seen in Thucydides, who continually uses πλεονεξια in this comprehensive sense—ου γαρ μετα των κειμενων νομων ωφελιας αἱ τοιαυται ξυνοδοι, αλλα παρα τους καθεστωτας πλεονεξιᾳ. [For examples of πλεονεξια in the sense of "*stratagem*" and "*overreaching*" (a sense which may be considered a secondary or derived one, arising from this, that greediness after acquisition leads to overreaching) see Xenoph. Cyrop. i. 6, 29, and compare 2 Cor. ii. 11—ἱνα μη πλεονεκτηθωμεν ὑπο Σατανα, "that we might not be overreached by Satan." See also 2 Cor. vii. 2—ουδενα επλεονεκτησαμεν. In these two examples from the New Testament however, πλεονεκτεω has not *merely* the sense of "overreach," but of so overreaching as to gain something thereby.] Eph. iv. 19, is another instance of πλεονεξια used in a general sense —"to work all uncleanness with *greediness*"—εις ειργασιαν ακαθαρσιας πασης εν πλεονεξιᾳ.

Πλεονεξια, taken in its generic sense, is not confined

we should take from it the fulness of its signification. In the passage we are considering, it stands as one of the four generic names, and not as one of the five specific which come in the second clause.

to "covetousness *in respect of wealth*" merely, but is used to denote greediness in the acquisition of any thing. Yet, since πλεονεξια is so frequently used in the New Testament in the specific sense of covetousness it may be well to remark on it a little. It differs from φιλαργυρια, "a love of money for its own sake," in that the latter may display itself in hoarding what we have, without grasping at that which belongs to others, or in any way interfering with their possessions. Φιλαργυρια may, indeed, (and commonly does) lead to πλεονεξια, but it *may* exist without connexion with rapacity or fraud or any thing that men would pronounce to be αδικια—manifesting itself in niggardliness and indisposition to aid others, rather than in any positive infraction of the rule of right. The secret and quiet nature of this vice, and the possibility of concealing it from the eye of man, make it peculiarly dangerous. When men do discover it, they condemn it sometimes more unsparingly than πλεονεξια itself; for men dislike any thing that centres entirely in self, and πλεονεξια *seems* less selfish than φιλαργυρια, because he who is rapacious in gain is not unfrequently prodigal in expending, whereby the appearance of selfishness (especially when others are manifestly benefited by the expenditure) is lessened. I say "appearance," because the gratification of self is always the real object of the πλεονεκτης, whether he accumulate or whether he scatter. Few sins are more unsparingly condemned in the Scripture, than πλεονεξια, "lust after unjust gain." See Eph. v., where "covetousness" is ranked with the grossest vices and pronounced idolatry. See also Col. iii. 5, where again it is called idolatry. In 2 Pet. ii. 3,

it is connected with πλαστοι λογοι or hypocrisy—και εν πλεονεξια πλαστοις λογοις ὑμας εμπορευσονται.

The places in which φιλαργυρια and φιλαργυρος occur are only three, viz., 1 Tim. vi. 10, Luke xvi. 14, and 2 Tim. iii. 2.[1]

Whilst therefore πλεονεξια, seeing that it *always* implies the grasping at more than is rightfully our due and consequently involves injurious action to others, does, as to this, differ from φιλαργυρια, which *may* be manifested merely in innocuous, though selfish and illiberal, accumulation, it closely resembles another vice found in those who are denominated in Scripture

[1] In 1 Tim. vi., after the Apostle had spoken of the wickedness and evil practices of those who considered "that godliness was gain," (νομιζοντων πορισμον ειναι την ευσεβειαν), he afterwards adds, ριζα γαρ παντων των κακων εστιν ἡ φιλαργυρια, "for the love of money is the root of all the evils, or of all these evils," viz., those just before detailed.

Some, but without reason, have wished to translate ριζα "*a* root." But we do not so translate αιτια, αρχη and αιτια, in the three following passages, which afford instances of parallel construction. The first is from Lysias (ὑπερ του Ερατοσθενους φονου, § 7.) Επειδη δε μοι ἡ μητηρ ετελευτησε, παντων των κακων αποθανουσα αιτια μοι γεγενηται. We here translate αιτια "*the* cause." [It may also be observed that the context shews that τα κακα means here *the* evils which he was speaking of as having come upon him.] The second passage is from Demosthenes (ὑπερ Μεγαλοπολιτων, § 24.) Και τουτο το λυμαινομενον παντ' εὑρησομεν, και ταυτην αρχην ουσαν παντων των κακων, το μη εθελειν τα δικαια πραττειν ἁπλως. Here we translate αρχην "*the* beginning."

See also Demosth. (ὑπερ της Ροδιων ελευθεριας, § 16.) Πολλων κακων ἡ ανοια πολλοις αιτια γιγνεται. "*The* cause."

ἁρπαγες—persons marked by fierce and destructive rapacity such as is denoted in Scripture by "ravening wolves" (λυκοι ἁρπαγες.) There is, however, this difference that πλεονεξια does not necessarily manifest itself in deeds of violence. It may be quiet and stealthy in its operations; seeking to get advantage over others by craftiness and deceit, rather than by any open exercise of violent power. Indeed, one who is inferior in strength and power, and who might, therefore, fear to be ἁρπαξ, may be successfully πλεονεκτης and overreach those with whom he might fear to contend. Judas was πλεονεκτης when he stole from the bag which he professedly guarded; Jezebel was ἁρπαξ when she seized on the vineyard in Jezreel. Besides, the one great motive to the πλεονεκτης (in the sense we are now considering) would be the lust of gain, whereas pride, or the lust of revenge, or the wantonness of tyranny may lead to the violence of rapacity. Nero, no doubt, was often ἁρπαξ from other motives than the mere lust of gain; and so were the Pharisees. In cases where πλεονεξια and ἁρπαγη are conjoined, as in the parable of Nathan, where the rich man took the lamb, we call the agent πλεονεκτης or ἁρπαξ, just as our minds view the sin as most characterized by its covetousness, or by its violence. According to that which we deem the *predominant* aspect, we give the name. (For some excellent remarks on φιλαργυρια see *Trench*, § xxiv.)

Full of envy, murder, &c.] Φθονου, φονου. Some have imagined that similarity of *sound* is the reason of the juxta-position of these two words. But surely we

cannot suppose that a regard to *sound* could have influenced the order of words in a passage in which the Holy Ghost is detailing the great facts connected with the manifestations of human evil. The connexions of Scripture have their origin in reasons far other than this. Have we never recognized any moral connexion between "envy and murder?" Does not the first recorded crime after the fall exemplify it? Does not "envy" necessarily produce hatred?—and is not every one that hateth his brother a murderer?—1 John iii. 15.

Κακοηθειας.—This word is sometimes used in a generic, sometimes in a specific sense. Ηθος is a word which denotes inward moral character—the tone and character of "the inner man;" in this contrasted with εθος which refers to that which is habitually developed in action. To say therefore that any one is bad in his ηθος, is to say that he is altogether morally diseased. "The whole head is sick and the whole heart faint. From the sole of the foot even unto the head there is no soundness in it, but wounds and bruises and putrifying sores." Such would be κακοηθεια in its generic sense. It is not unfrequently used by Greek writers in a comprehensive sense. See Isocrates who couples κακοηθεια with πονηρια.

In the passage before us, however, κακοηθεα is classed with the specific vices, and is, in our version, translated "*malignity*," which, if taken specifically to denote the habit of viewing and representing every thing in the worst possible light, (το επι το χειρον υπολαμβανειν ἁπαντα) is not an objectionable translation. It is not unusual when a species peculiarly resembles its genus,

or when a generic habit has a peculiar tendency to develop itself in a particular specific form, to give the name of the genus to the specific form of manifestation. Thus, there is a terrible connexion indicated between the specific vice "malignity," and κακοηθεια in its awfully comprehensive sense.

The following observations of Professor Trench on this word are well worthy of regard. "It would therefore seem preferable to understand κακοηθεια here in the more restricted meaning which it sometimes possesses. The Geneva version has done so, which has rendered it by a periphrasis, 'taking all things in the evil part;' which is exactly the definition that Aristotle, of whose ethical terminology the word forms a part, gives (*Rhet.* ii. 13)· εστι γαρ κακοηθεια το επι το χειρον ὑπολαμβανειν ἁπαντα: or, as Jeremy Taylor calls it, 'a baseness of nature by which we take things by the wrong handle, and expound things always in the worst sense;' the 'malignitas interpretantium' (Pliny, Ep. v. 7); being exactly opposed to what Seneca (*De Irâ*, ii. 24) so beautifully calls the 'benigna rerum æstimatio.' For precisely this use of κακοηθως, see Josephus, *Antt.* vii. 6. 1; cf. 2 Sam. x. 3. [Cum quæ possumus in bonam partem interpretari, in pejorem rapimus, contra quam exigit officium dilectionis." *Grotius.*] *Trench's Synonyms*, § xi.

Ψιθυριστας.] Whisperers—they who secretly slander another. Κατ' εμου εψιθυριζον παντες οἱ εχθροι μου. (Ps. xl. 8.)

Καταλαλους.] They who talk at or against others

with a view of destroying them by their tongues, and in that sense, talk them down. It is not wonderful that θεοστυγεις, "hateful to God," should be used in close connexion with "the whisperer" and "the slanderer." That even believers may *fall into* such vices is manifest from facts, and from the Epistles. See 2 Cor. xii. 20. But he who habitually and constantly walks in this path and knows no other, hath not seen God, neither known Him. Habitude is one thing; temporary deflection another.

Ὑβρισται.] They who in the pride of superior strength wantonly insult others. The great instance is seen in those who mocked and despitefully entreated Jesus. But every insulting display of strength is ὑβρις. Pride, which loves nothing except itself, is often the cause of ὑβρις. It could not be found in the meek, contrite, and lowly—ὑβρισται "των μενος αιεν ατασθαλον." (Hom. Il. xiii. 634.) See also Arist. Rhetor. ii. 2.—Εστι γαρ ὑβρις το πραττειν και λεγειν εφ' οἱς αισχυνη εστι τῳ πασχοντι, μη ἱνα τι γιγνηται αὐτῳ αλλο, η ὁ τι εγενετο, αλλ' ὁπως ἡσθῃ· οἱ γαρ αντιποιουντες ουχ ὑβριζουσιν αλλα τιμωρουνται. Αιτιον δε της ἡδονης τοις ὑβριζουσιν, ὁτι οιονται κακως δρωντες, αυτους ὑπερεχειν μαλλον. What more satanic than this? Joy founded on the shame or on the pain wantonly inflicted on another, because one's own superiority is displayed in the infliction.

Ὑβρις, wherever it exists as a habit, will always be accompanied by another vice, viz., ὑπερηφανεια, *haughtiness of heart.*

The force of ὑπερηφανος, as the exact opposite of

ταπεινος, *lowly,* may be seen in the LXX of Proverbs iii. 34, twice quoted in the New Testament — Κυριος ὑπερηφανοις αντιτασσεται, ταπεινοις δε διδωσι χαριν. See also Luke, διεσκορπισεν ὑπερηφανους διανοιᾳ καρδιων —a passage in which the reference of ὑπερηφανεια to haughtiness of *heart,* is very evident.

Such haughtiness of soul would not only display itself in acts of insulting violence (ὕβρις) but also in words and deeds of αλαζονεια.

Nor would ὑπερηφανεια be limited to haughtiness towards man. It would display itself also in contemptuous scoffing against wisdom, truth, and God. Accordingly in the passage just cited from LXX., ὑπερηφανος is used to represent the לוץ of the Hebrew. The force of לוץ (*scorner*) may be seen in such passages as the following—"The *scorner* heareth not rebuke" (Prov. xiii. 1.) "Judgments are prepared for *scorners*" (Prov. xix. 29.) "Wine is a *mocker*" (Prov. xx. i.) Many of the German writers, and they who have learned from them, afford fearful examples of ὑπερηφανεια in its worst forms, and not unfrequently of αλαζονεια too.

There can be no doubt that αλαζονεια as used by the Greek writers, was intended to denote the ascription to oneself of more than truth warranted. One of the Scholiasts quoted by Suicer, speaks of ὁ αλαζων as synonymous with ὁ ψευστης; and Plato, Xenophon, and Aristotle concur in defining the αλαζων as one who is προσποιητικος των μη ὑπαρχοντων.

In the judgment therefore of these philosophers, the proudest attempt to magnify ourselves or to display our greatness, is not to be considered αλαζονεια, if, in that which we arrogate to ourselves, we do not palpably

transgress the limits of truth. Alexander might boast as much as he pleased of his *real* exploits without being αλαζων. He would only be αλαζων when he invented additions.

But such is not the estimate of God. He looketh at the intention of the heart. However true, according to human judgment, a statement may be, yet, if it be made with the view of magnifying ourselves, it is αλαζονεια in His sight. If St. Paul had written as he did to the Corinthians (2 Cor. xi.), *not* with the view of bringing them back to a just and proper estimate of what grace had made him to them as an Apostle of God, but merely with the intent of extolling his own sufferings and service, it would have been αλαζονεια in the estimate of God. But, painfully to himself, he said what he said, for their sakes. "I am become a fool in glorying; ye have compelled me." Again, if merely with a view of magnifying himself he had said, "I laboured more abundantly than they all"—if he had not, in truth of soul, added, "yet not I, but the grace of God that was with me," it would have been αλαζονεια, even though the statement was grounded upon fact. But the Apostle was not αλαζων. He was ταπεινος in heart and in word; and what he wrote he wrote under the sanction and inspiration of God for others' sake. He was able in truth to say, "We do all things, dearly beloved, for your edifying."

But in all human boasting, even when its subject is fact, there is a principle of falsehood. The God of Truth would ever say to every one who gloried in what he himself had done, "What hast thou that thou hast not received? and if thou hast received it, why dost

thou glory as though thou hadst not received it?" The last great head of Assyria, Antichrist, as prophetically described in Isaiah x., does not untruly say that he had thoroughly devastated the nations; yet God treats his words as *αλαζονεια*, and bids him remember that he is but as an axe that has been wielded by another's hand and has executed another's will. This, however, is a kind of falsehood not recognised by the writers who have given the definition of *αλαζονεια* above referred to.

DISPLAY with the view of exalting himself is the great object of the *αλαζων*. *Αλαζονεια* may, and commonly does, declare itself in words; but it may also be developed in acts. Hence we read in Scripture of *αλαζονεια του βιου* (1 John ii. 16)—an expression which seems to teach us, that love of display is *αλαζονεια*, whether developed in gathering around ourselves the pomp and circumstance of life, or in extolling ourselves with the tongue of boastfulness. It teaches us that he "whose life is a vapour," and "who cannot make one hair white nor black," has no more right to magnify himself by pomp and adornment than by boastful and magniloquent description. The impression sought to be created is, in either case, false. If the Apostle condemns as *αλαζονεια*[1] the saying in careless confidence, "I will go to such an such a city and continue there a year," &c.—if to say this would be to arrogate to ourselves a power of control over the future that is not ours to exercise, so he who surrounds himself with a splendor that is at variance with his true condition as an exile from Paradise in a fallen world—

[1] See James iv. 16,—*νυν δε καυχασθε εν ταις αλαζονειαις ὑμων.*

himself a fallen creature, is chargeable with proud and untruthful assumption.

Another most evil characteristic of the *αλαζων* is that he continually seeks to lower others, in order that he may the better magnify himself. Thus his joy is in great part drawn from the depression of others, just as the joy of *ὑβρις* is derived from the pain inflicted on others. To love others as himself is a thought that never enters into the mind of the *αλαζων*.

In the worldly and unbelieving *αλαζονεια* never, probably, confines itself to facts, but always exaggerates and asserts false claims. Believers, however, have to watch lest they be tempted to *αλαζονεια*, not so much in making mention of things that are untrue, as in boastfully making mention of things, of which, according to the world's judgment, they might justly be proud.

And although *αλαζονεια* is a marked characteristic of those "who trust in their wealth, and boast themselves in the multitude of their riches"; yet it is found no less with those who boast in their abasement. The religious history of the world affords as many examples of *αλαζονεια* as the secular. The Apostle early spoke of things which had "a show of wisdom in will-worship, and humility, and neglecting of the body not held in honour to the satisfying of the flesh";[1] but

[1] The ellipsis in this passage might be supplied by *εχομενου*, or some such word—*αφειδια σωματος ουκ εν τιμη τινι (εχομενου) προς πλησμονην της σαρκος*. Compare *εν οργη εχειν*, and *εντιμους εχειν*. (Phil. ii. 29.) If the persons referred to were asked why they were so reckless of their bodies, they would reply that they wished to shew that their bodies were not held in any regard

he tells us that they who did such things were men vainly puffed up by their fleshly mind, who held not the Head, even Christ. Some men seek influence by means of their magnificence; others by their austerities. Yet pride is the ruling principle in both.

Mr. Trench rightly observes, that "the αλαζων is boastful in *words;* the ὑπερηφανος, proud in *thoughts;* the ὑβριστης, insolent and injurious in *acts.*" Αλαζονεια, however, is capable of a somewhat wider application. We attribute it not only to those who boast in words, but to those also who make a display in *deed* of such things as men are accustomed to boast of in word. Αλαζονεια βιου would be limited to the display of things goodly and sumptuous; αλαζονεια would be applied also to the display of the ascetic.

Εφευρετας κακων.] Inventors of fresh forms of vice, as if the world were not already sufficiently full of wickedness. "Contrivers of all such arts as minister to vice." *(Bp. Taylor.)* Is it otherwise in Christendom now? Age after age accumulates evil, till the last closing scene which the Revelation describes.

Γονευσιν απειθεις, ασυνετους.] Ασυνετους answers to the נבל and כסיל of the Hebrew. Επι εθνει ασυνετῳ (נבל) παροργιω αυτους. (Deut. xxii. 21.) Ανηρ αφρων ου γνωσεται, και ασυνετος (כסיל) ου συνησει ταυτα. (Psalm xci. 6.) In the Proverbs כסיל is continually used to denote that recklessness of folly in the child

as respected the satisfying of the flesh. These, their words of explanation, the Apostle uses. The pretence was specious—it had a shew of wisdom, but was in reality "will-worship."

which refuses to avail itself of the experience and unselfish counsel of the parent. Hence, perhaps, the connexion of ασυνετος with disobedience to parents in the passage before us. Thus, Proverbs i. 10: "A wise son maketh a glad father"; but "a *foolish* son is the heaviness of his mother." And again, "a *foolish* son is a a grief to his father." "A *foolish* son despiseth his mother." "A *foolish* son is the calamity of his father."

Συνεσις answers nearly to what we mean by common sense. It is the power of putting things together (συν et ιημι) and so comprehending the general bearing of the circumstances of which we have to judge. Practical facts and truths ascertained by personal observation, or else gained by instruction from others, are the subjects of συνεσις. Israel, as described in Isaiah i., refusing to give heed to the many lessons, which, in so many ways, their God had sought to teach them were emphatically ασυνετοι. The Gentiles refusing to attend to the lesson which the plain facts of creation taught them were ασυνετοι.—Εσκοτισθη ἡ ασυνετος αυτων καρδια. When the disciples were slow to recognise the difference between an unwashed hand and a defiled heart, the Lord Jesus said to them, Ακμην και ὑμεις ασυνετοι εστε.[1] He, therefore, is in the full sense

[1] Ασυνετοι would be a feeble word to express the madness of those who call it "faith" to believe that that is not "bread" which the evidence of our senses as well as the word of God (1 Cor. x. 16, 17.) declares to be *bread*. Such madness is rather the result of judicial blindness inflicted because of previous folly. If we cannot distinguish a sign from the thing signified συνεσις must have failed indeed; or, if we can receive as Tradition from the

ασυνετος who, laying aside his sense, and refusing to be guided by the most palpable facts, or the plainest instructions, acts madly and recklessly as the slave of his prejudices or passions. The voice of wisdom and the warnings of experience fall upon his ear unheeded.

The ασυνετος by his folly injures himself as much or more than he injures others. One of the first thoughts that occurs to us in connexion with the ασυνετος is the ruin that he works for himself. But when we speak of the ασυνθετοι, αστοργοι, and ανελεημονες we think of the woe and disaster with which they affect others. Ὁ ασυνθετος is one who refuses to be bound by the agreements, however solemn, into which he enters. Covenants are broken by him; oaths despised. He worships self and self-interest; and to that all engagements, public and private, national or social, are made subservient.[1]

The αστοργος is one who has no feelings of kindness towards his fellow man. Στεργω, from which it is derived, is applied often to the love which exists or should exist reciprocally between parents and offspring; but is also used in a wider sense to indicate the kindly feeling which should exist between man and his fellow-

Apostles that which contradicts the words which the Apostles WROTE.

[1] Ασπονδος is a rejected reading. In contrast with ασυνθετος, ασπονδος would describe one who violated national compacts—treaties; just as the ασυνθετος despises those which are between man and man. Ασυνθετος, however, is a term wide enough to include ασπονδος.

man, or between animals of the like genus; and sometimes it means simply "to oblige." See Soph. Æd. Col. 518: Στερξον με—"Oblige or gratify me." It is, therefore, a comprehensive word, and the absence of the qualities denoted by it mark one in whom selfishness has so extinguished all kindly natural feeling, that not only is there no spontaneous flow of it towards others, but it cannot be elicited even by the appeals or solicitations of those who have a natural right to expect from him kindness and care. The kindly feeling of the αστοργος is centred on himself? Why should he trouble himself by contributing to the happiness of others? The αστοργοι may sometimes imagine that they are not ανελεημονες, *pitiless*. They may think that they would not be deaf to the cry of anguish, or turn away from the demand of misery. But they deceive themselves. He who feels no joy in promoting and beholding the happiness of others will find it very easy to be equally unconcerned about their *un*happiness. He who has earned for himself the character of αστοργος will soon shew that he deserves the name of ανελεημων. Let kindly feelings, even in Christians, be allowed to wane, and pitiless feelings will soon begin to spring.

It must be remembered too, that moral habits of evil are not negative merely. The absence of good involves necessarily the presence of the opposite evil; for if the power of God be not present, the power of Satan will be. They of whom the Apostle here speaks as αστοργοι and ανελεημονες, manifested their lack of kindness and pity by deeds of cruelty and blood. The hunting, kidnapping, and torturing of slaves; parricide; the exposing and murdering their infant children (a practice

sanctioned and encouraged by their laws) and other like deeds bore witness that "pitilessness" was in them no negative quality merely. They drowned in shouts of joyful exultation the groans of the dying gladiator; and they revelled in the agony of human victims, crushed, lacerated, and devoured by wild beasts let loose upon them.

But I will not dwell further on this record of evil. The Scripture tells us that they who practised and delighted in these things had had knowledge of the eternal power and divinity of God; (Rom. i. 23) of the beneficence of God; (Acts xiv. 17) and of the righteous judgment of God against those who committed such things. The passages I have quoted from Aristotle and others, (and many more might be added) show how many true things the Gentiles were able to *say* about the excellency of virtue and the abominableness of vice. But "saying" is not doing. Even if conscience in man recognised, far more perfectly than it does, the truths addressed to it by God, such recognition implies nothing morally good in the person who so recognises; for the test of moral goodness is obedience to that which is right, not the mere fact of recognition. Experience may teach us that certain kinds of food are baneful, yet if they be pleasant, I may, in spite of my conviction, resolve to take them. In the last great day it will be satisfactorily shown that all who are condemned will have acted against some light that has been vouchsafed to them—light which their consciences either had, or should have, recognised.

The steps by which the Gentiles gradually advanced into increased distance from God should be carefully

noted. First, refusing to glorify God as God, they addicted themselves to *vain reasonings*, and so their hearts became more and more darkened. Next they became *idolaters*. Then again, God judicially interfered and gave them up to *uncleanness and to a reprobate mind*, so that they not only practised deeds of abomination, but delighted in those who did them.

Such is the picture drawn by the Spirit of God, not of uncivilized heathenism merely, but of the educated and refined heathenism of Greece and Rome. Such were the poets, and philosophers, and statesmen of antiquity. Solon and Zeno practised and sanctioned the grossest of all human sins; Plato (probably, says Cicero,[1] *not unjustly*) was charged with that sin; the laws of Sparta and of Crete openly sanctioned it. The last act of Socrates was an act of idolatry; and idolatry is pronounced in Scripture to be the worship of devils. "That," says the Apostle, "which the Gentiles sacrifice, they sacrifice to devils, and not to God." (1 Cor. x. 20.) Under the names therefore of Venus, and Vulcan, and Mars, and Juno, devils were worshipped. The spirit of Pytho, which was consulted at Delphi, is said in Scripture to have been an unclean spirit, for Paul cast it out of the girl who followed Silas and himself at Philippi. *Εγενετο δε πορευομενων ημων εις προσευχην, παιδισκην τινα εχουσαν* ΠΝΕΥΜΑ ΠΥΘΩΝΟΣ,[2] *απαντησαι ημας*. See Acts xvi. 16. The Pythoness therefore was really possessed by a devil; whence the oracular responses of Delphi; and we know that it was the

[1] Tuscul. Q. iv. 33.

[2] The true reading is probably *Πυθωνα*.

oracle of Delphi that for centuries guided society both in Greece and Rome. Socrates is declared by Xenophon to have been constantly in the habit of consulting it or diviners.[1] Yet although the Scripture thus clearly reveals the real nature of Pagan idolatry, the poets who adorn it, and throw a fascinating halo around the corrupt tales of mythology — such poets, for example, as Homer and Virgil, are early placed, even by Christian parents, in the hands of their children, who are thus trained in an atmosphere of Pagan thought and feeling. This would not have been done, in the manner and to the extent in which it has been done, if the chapter before us had been meditated on and appreciated.[2]

[1] Αλλα μην εποιει και ταδε (ὁ Σωκρατης) προς τους επιτηδειους· τα μεν γαρ αναγκαια συνεβουλευε και πραττειν, ὡς ενομιζον αριστ' αν πραχθηναι· περι δε των αδηλων, ὁπως αν αποβησοιτο, μαντευομενους επεμπεν, ει ποιητεα. *Xenoph. Memor.* i. 1, 6.

155 [2] Romanism and Ritualism have sometimes advised the study of the Fathers or the Schoolmen as a substitute for the Pagan writers. But this would be only to exchange one form of error for another. Superstition and demonolatry, under the name of saint-worship, early pervaded the professing Christian body. An *instructive* but fearful view of the condition of Christianity in the age of Jerome (an era which some would have us regard as one of brightness) may be seen in a work not long ago published by the late Dr. Gilly, entitled "Vigilantius and his times," by W. S. Gilly, D.D., Canon of Durham, &c. *Seeley, Fleet Street.*

Christian parents in educating their children should endeavour to furnish them with such knowledge as the children would really value in case of their becoming energetic, practical Christians. A knowledge of Hebrew, Greek, and Latin, would be always valued by such, because of the Scripture. But an excellent

Yet great as this iniquity was, there was yet a remedy in the gospel of the grace of God. This, the Apostle was commissioned to bear into the darkest scenes of Gentile iniquity, such, for example, as were presented at Corinth and at Ephesus. In the midst of those realms of wickedness he preached the blood of Jesus — saying, "Men and brethren, through this man is preached unto you the forgiveness of sins; and through Him all who believe are justified from all things." Many heard and believed; and Gentile Christianity shone brightly for a season. But soon a change came over it also.[1] The Apostles lived to see the commencement of that change and prophetically declared the results. "This know, that in the last days perilous times shall come. For men shall be lovers of their own selves, lovers of money, (*φιλαργυροι*) boasters, proud,

knowledge of Greek and Latin may be gained without tampering with the works of authors, who, by mythological legends and the like, throw a halo of brightness around vice and demonolatry.

[1] "Hegesippus as he is cited by Eusebius (H. E. iii. 32) witnesseth, that the Church continued a virgin till the Emperor Trajan's time; but that, after the death of the Apostles, the conspiracy of error began to discover itself with open face:— *Ὡς ἀρα μεχρι των τοτε χρονων παρθενος καθαρα και αδιαφθορος εμεινεν ἡ εκκλησια . . . . ὡς δ' ὁ ἱερος των αποστολων χορος διαφορον ειληφει του βιου τελος, παρεληλυθει τε ἡ γενεα εκεινη των αυταις ακοαις της ενθεου σοφιας επακουσαι κατηξιωμενων, τηνικαυτα της αθεου πλανης την αρχην ελαμβανεν ἡ συστασις, δια της των ετεροδιδασκαλων απατης, οἱ και ἁτε μηδενος ετι των αποστολων λειπομενου, γυμνῃ λοιπον ηδη τῃ κεφαλῃ, τῳ της αληθειας κηρυγματι την ψευδωνυμον γνωσιν αντικηρυττειν επεχειρουν.* See *Daillé de usu Patrum*, p. 3.

blasphemers, disobedient to parents, unthankful, unholy, without natural affection, trucebreakers, false accusers, incontinent, fierce, despisers of those that are good, traitors, heady, high-minded, lovers of pleasures more than lovers of God; having a form of godliness, but denying the power thereof."

How is it possible, after reading this passage, to talk of progress toward good in this present dispensation. The steps by which the professing Church has progressed in evil have not been dissimilar to those by which the heathen world receded from the light which was vouchsafed to them. Proud but empty philosophic reasoning abounded in the early centuries. The philosophers of the East and of ancient Greece, lived again under new forms in the schools of Alexandria and western Asia. Of them too it could be said, "Professing themselves to be wise they became fools." "Their foolish heart was darkened." Idolatry succeeded; and with idolatry came in a flagitiousness which has made Christianity a bye word and a reproach, with Jews, Mahomedans, and Heathens. Latitudinarianism finds in this an excuse for its sceptical indifference. The language of Scripture, although so plain and definite, is said to be vague and unintelligible. Reverence for "the Scriptures of Truth" is scoffed at as "Bibliolatry." Men glory in thinking for themselves: "Our tongue is our own; who is Lord over us?"

The literature, the philosophy and the statesmanship of the day, as well as the temper of society at large, evidence a decided purpose of withdrawing, further and further, from the definiteness of revealed Truth and its restraints. Men are forming for themselves a vacated

circle—a circle vacated by Truth; and into this circle from which the God of Truth is being banished, Satan with the full power of the delusion of Antichrist will come. "Ye have heard," said the Apostle John, "that THE Antichrist cometh"—Ηκουσατε οτι ὁ Αντιχριστος ερχεται. The only marvel is that longsuffering mercy should have so long delayed his coming. But it will not always be delayed. That "hour of temptation which is to come upon the whole οικουμενη, to try them that dwell upon the earth" will come at last; and then will be found the blessedness of those who have adhered to the *despised* testimonies of God's holy Word. They who have not been ashamed to confess the worthlessness of their own names, and who, through grace, have not despised the proposal of God to ignore those names and to accept them instead, in the imputed value of the name of Jesus, shall not be ashamed in that day. God will be the hiding-place of such. He will "compass them about with songs of deliverance."

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152 I have before observed that the Romanists have sometimes advised the study of the Fathers or the Schoolmen as a substitute for the Pagan writers. When, however, it becomes a question between the reading of the Scripture and the study of the Pagan authors, Romanist writers have not hesitated to prefer the latter. "Cum ergo plus nocumenti inferatur ex libris sacris in linguam vulgarem versis quàm ex lectione Gentilium philosophorum, merito illud inhibetur, etiam si de alio nulla fiat prohibitio." Such are the words of a Spanish Romanist, Alonso de Castro, quoted by

Cypriano de Valera in the introduction to his Spanish Bible, A. D., 1602.

"As respects the Pagan writers (continues Valera) we know that they contain many an impiety and blasphemy against the Divine majesty (muchas impiedadas y blasphemias contra la Magestad Divina.) As when Terence says, 'Non est flagitium, mihi crede, adolescentem scortari' . . . . the which is directly opposed to the seventh commandment of the Law, which says, 'No fornicaràs: y Deut. xxiii. 17. Manda Dios, *que no aya puta en Israel*' . . . As respects the immortality of the soul, many of the philosophers denied it, many doubted it, and but few acknowledged it. . . . . The resurrection of the body, all the philosophers with one voice rejected. . . . . Aristotle and many others asserted that the world existed from everlasting, that it neither had beginning nor will have end. The same Aristotle taught 'that virtues and vices are in our own power,' . . . . but the Scripture says that we are naturally 'children of wrath,' that we are 'slaves of sin.' Finally the philosophers introduced an infinity of Gods, for that one would not suffice to govern the world: but the Scripture says, 'Hear, O Israel, Jehovah our God is one Jehovah.' . . . . All this is read in the philosophers and is permitted, but the word of God which is veritable truth and holiness is not permitted. . . . . 'Moreover our adversaries say that it would have been much better for the Church if the gospel had never been written.' . . . . 'It would have gone better with the Church (says Cardinal Hosius) if there existed no written gospel.'" [Todo esto se lee en los philosophos, y se permite: la Palabra de Dios, que es la misma verdad y sanctidad, no se permite. . . . . Ytem, nuestros adversarios dizen, "Que mucho mejor fuera para la Iglesia si el evangelio nunca fuera escripto. . . . . *Melius* (dize Cardenal Hosio) *actum fuisset cum Ecclesiâ, si nullum exstaret scriptum Evangelium.*]

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Benjamin Wills Newton, says, - -

The Scripture it must be remembered, distinctly asserts its own VERBAL INSPIRATION. The Apostle Paul expressly says that he wrote in " words taught of the Holy Ghost-"
And the words, " Wherefore as the Holy Ghost saith," (Hebrews 3-7,) and also " Whereof as the Holy Ghost saith," is a witness to us, (Hebrews 10-15,) are immediately followed by citations from the Psalms and from Jeremiah. What then can be more important than precision in the interpretation of the words of Scripture? Accuracy is valuable always; but in the interpretation of Scripture, it is a duty.

It is the more important now, when the temper of the day, disliking the restriction of definite truth, is disposed not to repress, but to encourage, the many attempts made to introduce laxity and uncertainty into the exposition of the Word of God. -

Written from,
70, Finchley New Road,
London.
May the 20th, 1856.

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